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Following the devastating riots that took place there in June 2010, the city of Osh (Kyrgyzstan) has 
been the subject of a number of post-conflict reconstruction projects aimed at rebuilding its 
damaged urban fabric. As well as being varied in form and approach, these interventions have had a 
significant impact on the ways that Osh’s citizens experience the city.  Whilst some residents have 
welcomed the changes that have been brought about in Osh, others are concerned about what these 
might mean for their continued wellbeing in the city. 
By interrogating the shifting relationships between place, identity and collective memory, this thesis 
explores post-conflict reconstruction in Osh between 2010 and 2013. It seeks to build a clearer 
picture of urban change in the city over this period, and to unpack the diverse motivations that 
underpinned the reconstruction projects that were pursued or proposed at that time. Above all, it 
asks what these changes have meant for Osh residents, many of whom were still reeling from the 
violence that ripped the city apart in 2010. 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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The view from Sulaiman-Too 
At the centre of the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh stands an imposing rocky outcrop - Sulaiman-
Too Mountain - from whose summit visitors can see the whole of the city spread out before them. 
The mountain is a gift to the urban geographer. A short walk up the steps climbing the side of the 
mountain, past teenagers flirting on the rocks and elderly ladies making a pilgrimage to pray at the 
summit, and you are rewarded with a bird’s eye view of the city’s streets and neighbourhoods, and 
an insight into many of the identities and experiences that intersect in the city. Looking around, your 
eye can travel from the bustling mahallas to the north, to the green parks that snake alongside the 
river Ak-Bura as it cuts through the length of the city. In the foreground some landmarks stand out: 
the new Mosque, funded by Saudi Arabian contributions, situated on the mountain’s southern 
slopes, and the dark red neo-classical buildings of the Osh State University’s main campus. Further 
out, past the bazaar or down towards the south-east of the city, Soviet era blocks rise, a hulking 
reminder of the city’s relatively recent past as part of the Soviet Union. On a clear day you can see 
right to the snow capped mountains that mark the edge of the Ferghana Valley and hint at the Tajik 
border which lies beyond. On most days your mobile phone will chirp when you reach the summit, 
as a text message welcomes you on to the mobile phone networks of nearby Uzbekistan.  
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Figure 1. Location and views of Sulaiman-Too (Source: GoogleMaps) 
Looking once again towards the north, another feature may catch your eye; a slash of shining new 
metal roofs tracing the path of the road to Aravan, shining silver against the dulled metal of their 
neighbours. These roofs tell a story. They bear witness to those buildings which have been rebuilt 
and repaired following the terrible violence that engulfed the city in June 2010, killing around 470 
people. Residents in this neighbourhood built barricades to prevent the marauding mobs from 
penetrating deeper into their community, but they couldn’t save the houses that lined this street (a 
main route in and out of the city). All along Alisher Navoi Street, houses were burned to the ground, 
in a pattern that was repeated across Osh in those few days. From the mountain, you can see the 
city’s scars. 
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Figure 2. Silver roofs of repaired houses along Alisher Navoi Street, seen from Sulaiman-Too 
(Source: Author’s own) 
These silver roofs are testament to the twin forces of destruction and reconstruction that have 
shaped the urban environment in Osh since 2010, and it is these forces that are at the heart of this 
investigation. The violence of 2010 has brought about many changes in the urban landscape of Osh, 
but the logic and effects of these changes are not always clear at first glance. This thesis attempts to 
dig deeper into the physical changes that constituted reconstruction in post-conflict Osh to ask how 
this reconstruction should be understood. It examines the activities of international organisations 
and donors alongside the municipal authorities’ vision of urban renewal (as embodied in the city 
Masterplan) and the hopes of non-elite city residents to build a full and nuanced picture of the aims 
and effects of reconstruction on Osh. To this end, it poses a number of key research questions; 
!3
• Firstly, how has the physical reconstruction of the city been carried out in Osh since the 2010 
Events? Who has been responsible for this process, and what have been the underlying principles 
and approaches that have informed it? 
• Secondly, how should this process of reconstruction be characterised? Did it represent a 
continuation of the violence against the city that took place in June 2010, or was it intended as a 
corrective response to this, one that would protect the spaces - and by extension people - most at 
risk as a result of the June Events. 
• Finally, this investigation will explore how changes in the built environment have disrupted and 
reshaped these relations between communities, place and memory. It will ask how this has been 
experienced by the people living in Osh, and what this might mean for their future in the city. 
1.2 The Osh Events 
The Osh Events, as the violence that took place between the 10th - 14th June 2010 has come to be 
known, took place in the tense and destabilising power vacuum which followed the ousting of 
President Bakiyev from power in April 2010. The Events have been the subject of a number of 
enquiries by national and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and one 
international commission (the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, or KIC), which have enabled 
observers to piece together a picture of what happened on those fateful nights.   1
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 See Bibliography for a list of key reports into the violence.1
Figure 3. Map showing main areas of damage in Osh City (Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT) 
To give a brief picture of the Events, the violence which was to rip through the heart of Osh was 
apparently triggered by an incident in a Casino near the Hotel Alai in the city centre, causing large 
groups of young men to face off against each other, and against police. Before long, this violence 
had spread throughout Osh city and into neighbouring towns and villages (aided by the ubiquitous 
use of mobile phones to spread rumours, information and calls to arms), including to Jalalabad, the 
second largest city in the south of Kyrgyzstan after Osh (KIC 2011). Violence was largely carried 
out along ethnic lines, with members of the region’s ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations carrying 
out violent acts against each other, including murder, assault, sexual violence, kidnapping and 
destruction of property. When the dust settled after four nights, the toll of death and destruction was 
heavy. Most international investigations agree that around 470 people were killed, and a further 
1,900 seriously injured. 400,000 had fled their homes in Osh, Jalalabad and surrounding towns and 
villages, with around 100,000 of these crossing the border into nearby Uzbekistan (KIC 2011, 
Amnesty International 2010, Freedom House et al 2012, International Crisis Group 2010). The 
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physical fabric of the city also suffered greatly. Iconic buildings and places such as the Uzbek 
Theatre, several Uzbek schools and the historic central bazaar were burnt, along with around 1,800 
homes and businesses in Osh city alone. Although both Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities suffered 
and committed atrocities during the Events, the ethnic Uzbek community bore a disproportionate 
burden of violence. Amnesty International estimates that 74% of those killed were Uzbek, and that 
90% of the homes and businesses destroyed belonged to Uzbeks (Amnesty International 2011). The 
aftermath of the violence further exacerbated this asymmetry, as the police response to the Events 
have focussed overwhelmingly on the Uzbek community. One year on from the violence and 85% 
of the 271 people arrested for offences related to the events were Uzbek (Amnesty International 
2011). 
The reasons behind this outbreak of devastating violence are complex. The largest city in the 
Ferghana valley, a historically important trading stop on the silk road, Osh encapsulates the region’s 
diverse ethnic mix and cartographic contradictions (Ismailbekova 2013; Liu 2012). Osh is 
Kyrgyzstan’s second largest city after the capital Bishkek (the 2009 census recorded a population of 
just over 258,000), and was named the country’s second capital in 2000, being granted republic city 
status (equivalent to an Oblast’ or province, and the same as Bishkek) in 2003 (National Statistical 
Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 2009). It is home to a large ethnic Uzbek population, along with 
minority groups such as Russians, Tajiks, Tatars and others. This varied ethnic make up, along with 
its physical proximity to the border with Uzbekistan, and the cultural and educational legacy of the 
Soviet era, means that Osh is a trilingual city, where Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek are widely spoken. 
It became an important industrial centre during the Soviet period, a process which, along with 
policies of sedentarisation and high rise housing construction, brought about significant changes to 
the city’s demographic profile (Liu 2012). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union industry in Osh 
has followed a similar pattern of decline to that witnessed in many former Soviet states, and the 
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factories that once employed thousands have now closed down. The city has known two episodes of 
serious conflict in recent years; in 1990 violence broke out, triggered by a dispute over land use in 
the city, that quickly degenerated into inter-ethnic violence  throughout the oblast’ (2012). Sadly, 
this was repeated just 20 years later, when the city again came to the fore for all the wrong reasons 
and violence flared up in the form of the Osh Events. 
 
Figure 4. Map showing location of Osh (Source: Nations Online Project) 
Although commonly described as ethnic violence, the roots of the June Events are more complex 
than this phrase suggests, and without the sense of inevitability such terminology often implies. 
Indeed, Bond and Koch underline the importance of contextualising such outbreaks of apparent 
ethnic violence in order to fully understand their causes and dynamics  (Bond & Koch 2010). This 
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is especially important when one considers that in the long history of the Ferghana valley region, 
inter-ethnic relations have generally been well managed  - such violence is the exception, not the 
norm (Megoran 2012).  
As mentioned above, the violence of June 2010 should be situated in the context of the political 
instability which followed the removal of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April 2010. Following 
this sudden political transition - often termed the ‘Tulip Revolution’ - the provisional government 
found itself unable to effectively respond to rising tensions in the country’s South, with disastrous 
consequences. These tensions can themselves be attributed to a number of factors,  including 
criminal networks, unemployment and political instability (Freedom House et al 2012; Melvin 
2011; KIC 2011). A crucial element in understanding the Osh Events, though,  is the linking of 
ethnicity, clan structure and the North-South divide that has defined politics in Kyrgyzstan since 
independence, and possibly before then (Bond & Koch 2010), an issue that will be discussed again 
in Chapter 4. To Melvin, this “dynamic ethno-political process” links local ethnic tensions to the 
wider conflict responsible for the “steady erosion of the already weak state institutions in 
Kyrgyzstan and the growing use of mass popular mobilisation and violence in political 
struggles.” (Melvin 2011: 6). According to this model, the first post-Soviet President Akayev, a 
northerner, courted the support of the Uzbek community (resident almost entirely in the Southern 
provinces of Osh, Jalalabad and Batken) to shore up his support in the country’s South. This formed 
an informal alliance whereby the Uzbek community was afforded protection and non-interference in 
exchange for their tacit support of Akayev. The pact fell apart when Bakiyev - a southerner with no 
need for the Uzbek community’s support - came to power in 2005. Instead, in the five year’s of 
Bakiyev’s rule nationalism rose and the position of the Uzbek community in the South became 
more difficult (Megoran 2012; Melvin 2011). With inter-ethnic relations so intertwined with the 
North-South struggle for political power in Kyrgyzstan, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 2010 
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revolution, which brought northern politicians back to the Presidency, should have a destabilising 
effect on interethnic relations in the South.  
Following the fall of Bakiyev, then, the Uzbek community once again turned to northern politicians 
to guarantee their rights (Bond & Koch 2010).  Leaders of the Uzbek community in Kyrgyzstan 
perceived that the arrival of the new provisional government contained opportunities to advance 
certain community interests (such as language rights) through consultations around the elaboration 
of a new constitution (Megoran 2012; Freedom House et al 2012; Melvin 2011). However, public 
statements and meetings in this regard were perceived very negatively by many Kyrgyz, who feared 
the spectre of Uzbek separatism in such actions. Such a response is revealing of what Megoran has 
termed the “profoundly insecure” nationalism that has come to play a central role in Kyrgyz politics 
in recent years (Megoran 2012: 16), and also informs the Osh Events. Although former President 
Askar Akayev initially pursued a politics of inclusion under the slogan ‘Kyrgyzstan our common 
home’, this had become less prominent by the end of his rule, and was replaced entirely by the 
language of nationalism during the Bakiyev era (Megoran 2012: 6). Such nationalism does not 
readily agree with the aspirations expressed by Uzbek politicians in the Spring of 2010, further 
increasing tensions in the South. 
Since the 2010 violence, progress has been made in the city’s reconstruction, with International 
Organisations, NGOs and donor governments helping to rebuild homes, businesses and cultural 
venues in the city, as well as funding the rehabilitation of parks and schools. However, this process 
has been caught up with the introduction of the city Masterplan, which sets out plans for Osh’s 
regeneration, resulting in a somewhat confusing picture of the city’s future, a situation that will be 
explored in detail in Chapter 6. This has been muddled even further by the city authorities’ 
reluctance to share the contents of the Masterplan with residents and other interested parties, 
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leading to confusion and apprehension regarding its potential impact on the city. The judicial 
response to the violence is also problematic, with one Human Rights Watch report warning that this 
had been marked by torture, harassment and ethnic bias against Uzbeks (Human Rights Watch 
2010). Today an uneasy peace reigns in the city; whilst daily life may have returned to normal, 
many residents express fear that the violence that has occurred twice in 20 years may well return to 
the city a third time. 
1.3 Interrogating violence against the city 
Although the overt violence has, for the most part, ended in Osh, its effects can still be felt in the 
city. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the city still bears the scars of the Events. What is 
more, the three years following the violence (the time period that this investigation focusses on) saw 
a great number of interventions introduced in the built environment as a response to the destruction 
that occurred there. Understanding what drove these post-conflict interventions in the urban fabric 
of the city and unpacking their relationship with the violence that preceded them is one of the 
central challenges of this thesis.  
This investigation proceeds from an understanding, central to contemporary visions of the city, that 
urban space is by its very nature heterogenous, and that this heterogeneity is at the very heart of 
what it means to be urban. This plurality cannot be divorced from the city - to attempt to do so 
would diminish its essential ‘cityness’ (Coward 2009). Furthermore, this thesis understands the 
Events to represent an attack not just against residents in Osh, but against the city itself, and against 
the kind of plurality it represents. Of course, this is not the only way of reading this violence, nor is 
it the only cause of the Events. Conflict that tips over into overt and serious violence of this kind is 
due to a complex causal web of factors (Cashman 2014). However, the overwhelming targeting of 
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Uzbek homes, businesses, educational establishments and cultural venues show that this is one 
important and valid way of reading the Events. What is more, it is an approach that has the potential 
to reveal as much about the reconstruction that followed the violence as the violence itself. 
The acknowledgement of diversity and plurality at the heart of the city is an idea that has steadily 
gained currency in the last few decades. The great Jane Jacobs placed the concept of diversity - 
economic, spatial and socio-cultural - at the heart of her seminal critique of urban planning The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities, calling it the “ubiquitous principle” of the city (Jacobs 
1992: 14). More recently Amin and Graham have also situated the idea of the heterogenous city at 
the centre of their conceptualisation of the “multiplex city” as a driving force in a globalising, 
urbanising world (Amin and Graham 1997).  Their eloquent description of the city as a “variegated 
and multiplex entity - a juxtaposition of contradictions and diversities, the theatre of life itself” 
certainly rings true for Osh, as we shall see throughout this thesis (Amin and Graham 1997: 418). In 
both of these visions the city is not simply characterised by diversity, but actively constitutes it. As 
Valentine has noted, the very “density and intensity” of the city forces its inhabitants into close 
proximity with difference, creating the conditions for plurality (Valentine 2001: 224). More 
recently, in their major ESRC project on the effects of conflict in cities, Pullan and Baille have 
noted that “plurality, even when its presence remains feeble, remains the over-riding theme to urban 
everyday life” (Pullan and Baillie 2013;4). One of the most devastating impacts of urban conflict, 
they go on to say, is the way it disrupts these conditions of plurality. This view is echoed by 
Coward, a theorist whose work on the concept of urbicide will be revisited in more detail in Chapter 
2. Put simply, two important principles underpin Coward’s view of urban space. Firstly, the 
concentration of buildings in the city is “constitutive of a fundamentally public spatiality”, that is 
the “heterogeneity that is the existential quality which defines urbanity” (Coward 2009: 54). 
Secondly, when these buildings are attacked it is precisely because they both represent and create 
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the possibilities for this heterogeneity. An attack on the city can therefore be understood as an attack 
on the plurality in engenders, an attempt to diminish the conditions that make this diversity 
possible. 
It is in these terms that this investigation will frame the Osh Events. Instead of seeing the 
destruction of 1,800 homes and other notable spaces and buildings simply as ‘collateral damage’ 
from the violence that was carried out in the city, these places are seen as having a meaning and 
symbolism of their own. Having taken this approach, the choices that followed this destruction - 
those that decided what should be rebuilt, how and when - also cease to be neutral, and become 
charged with meaning. If we frame the urban destruction and violence of the Events as an attack on 
the city as a site and condition of a plurality that has, for whatever reason, come to be viewed as 
problematic by some, then a crucial question arises. How should we characterise the the 
reconstruction efforts that have followed the violence? This is the question at the heart of this 
investigation. Over the next ten chapters, this thesis will examine the changes (both completed and 
ongoing) that have been proposed in Osh’s urban landscape from 2010 to 2013. It will ask whether 
these changes represent an attempt to continue the assault on plurality so violently expressed by the 
‘Events’, or whether we should consider urban interventions in the post-conflict landscape as a 
response to this attack - an attempt to safeguard and rebuild heterogeneity in the city. It will 
question whether urban change in fact represents something else entirely; an attempt neither to 
diminish nor preserve patterns of diversity in the city, but to take advantage of the state of post-
crisis flux Osh finds itself in to remake these patterns in a new way.  
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
In order to address these questions, this investigation will draw upon primary data gathered during 
fieldwork carried out in Kyrgyzstan in 2012 and 2013, as well as supplementary information from 
media reports and other documentary sources. It will set out an overview of the physical changes 
that have been introduced in Osh since the ‘Events’, and the reasoning behind them. It will then 
move to focus on three case studies of specific spaces in the city - the bazaar, commemorative 
spaces, and housing types - in order to dig down more deeply into the fine grained detail of the 
transformations. Finally, it will draw upon the findings of these case studies to build a picture of the 
different identities that are being unmade, rebuilt and refashioned in the urban landscape of post-
conflict Osh. The next section sets out the structure of the thesis in greater detail. 
Chapters 2-4: Theoretical background. 
  
Chapters 2 - 4 introduce some of the key theoretical concepts that inform the research questions 
guiding this project. Chapter 2 looks at the question of post-crisis reconstruction of the built 
environment, focussing especially on the ways that power is exercised through both the destruction 
and the reconstruction of urban space. It presents some of the challenges of post-crisis 
reconstruction practice, including attaining ‘authenticity’ in reconstruction, building back better and 
successfully implementing participatory practices in post-crisis projects, before moving on to 
suggest a three part model against which reconstruction projects could be measured in order to 
assess their likelihood of promoting a sustainably peaceful city. It is this model that will be used in 
order to assess the likely impact of urban change in Osh later in the thesis. 
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Chapter 3 introduces concept of collective memory, examining its theoretical background, 
introducing different ways of conceptualising the concept (including the approach adopted in this 
investigation), and demonstrating why it is such a useful tool in analysing urban conflict and 
change. 
Chapter 4 provides the contextual background to the study, focussing on the historical, political and 
demographic context of Osh. It sets out three common narratives for understanding the city - as a 
Southern city, an ethnically divided city, and a post-Soviet city - to provide a more nuanced 
interpretation of the environment in which the 2010 Events and subsequent reconstruction of Osh 
have taken place. 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
  
Chapter 5 provides a description of the research methods employed in this investigation, along with 
the rationale for the use of these particular methods. It also describes some of the particular 
challenges posed by the research environment in Osh. 
Chapters 6 - 10: Empirics 
Chapter 6 addresses the first of the research questions underpinning this thesis, describing the 
changes in the urban environment that have taken place since the Events and the logic of 
development driving these. Since it has proved impossible to separate post-crisis initiatives from 
wider urban planning initiatives that took place after the Events (as shall become clear from this 
chapter), it explores both, using case studies to provide a detailed snapshot of the issues and 
challenges that have been brought to life by these processes. This chapter will introduce crucial 
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information regarding the city Masterplan - a central yet highly secretive document at the heart of 
the municipal authorities’ plans for urban change in Osh. Having presented this overview of 
physical change in Osh post 2010, the chapter then moves on to present an initial outline of resident 
perceptions relating to these changes, focussing especially on the central figure of the city Mayor at 
the time of this investigation, Melis Myrzakmatov. 
Chapters 7 to 9 dig down more deeply into the fine grained detail of the transformations described 
above, by examining three case studies relating to urban change in Osh; the bazaar, commemorative 
spaces, and housing. All three case studies are used to unpack the second and third research 
questions addressed by this thesis, focussing on how everyday residents of Osh are experiencing 
Osh’s evolving landscape, and how this relates to the aims and expectations of those actors engaged 
in the reconstruction process. 
Chapter 7 focusses on the bazaar - a place which is both physically, culturally and socially central to 
life in Osh. Whereas the bazaar had previously been highlighted as a space of peaceful exchange 
and economic interdependence (Megoran 2010, Liu 2012), this chapter will demonstrate how recent 
and ongoing change in the bazaar was being interpreted and seized upon by two groups in the city. 
Minority ethnic respondents, especially Uzbek men, reported how their changing use of the bazaar 
reflected their increasing exclusion from public space in the city. In contrast, young women spoke 
about the bazaar in a way that reflected the delicate balance they were trying to achieve; to 
reconcile the conservative gender roles they were expected to fulfil with the globalised aspirational 
lifestyles they wished for themselves, and simultaneously to take the opportunity to carve out a safe 
public space for them to inhabit. 
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Chapter 8 considers changes in commemorative spaces in Osh since the Events. It describes the five 
new monuments built in the city since June 2010, and examines their role in the ‘Kyrgyzification’ of 
public space in Osh, and the far lesser prominence afforded the two ‘peace’ monuments to the 
Events. It also examines the way non-elite memories were being expressed in the urban fabric, 
identifying a number of non-elite narratives which spoke to issues such as Osh’s industrial heritage, 
cultural identity and experiences of the violence. Finally, it will bring these two strands together 
asking how they interact in the spaces of the city and to what effect. This will lay bare the official 
commemorative silence over the city’s industrial past, the divergence of opinion around how and 
where to best remember the Events, and show how questions of ethnicity and identity are being 
negotiated through commemorative space in Osh. 
Finally, Chapter 9 examines the question of housing - an issue with the capacity to rouse great 
emotion in the city. It shows how certain forms of housing have come to be identified with certain 
groups, serving as lieux de mémoire for these communities. When faced with the prospect of 
replacing traditional mahalla housing with new high rise apartment buildings, this chapter will 
examine variations in resident opinion in this regard. Whilst the idea of constructing new high rise 
buildings was widely accepted, there was disagreement as to whether this should entail the removal 
of the mahallas, seen as dangerous and foreign by some ethnic Kyrgyz, and crucial to identity by 
many ethnic Uzbeks. The chapter will also show that when speaking about housing in Osh, 
ethnicity is not the only issue of importance, with the new novostroiki neighbourhoods increasingly 
occupying a vital position in the changing landscape of housing in the city. 
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
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Chapter 10 will draw these strands together to return to the questions posed at the beginning of this 
thesis. How was the city reconstructed after the events, taking into account the differing approaches 
of international and municipal actors thrown into relief by controversy around the Masterplan, for 
example? And how should the reconstruction that has taken place in Osh from 2010 - 2013 be 
characterised, in what way is this affecting city residents and the way they use the built environment 
to store their memories and identities? It will ask what this means at the local level in Osh, but also 
what this can contribute to discussions of post-conflict reconstruction, collective memory and the 
city that are ongoing at a wide level. First, however, the next few chapters will spend some time 
setting out the theoretical framework that will underpin this investigation. 
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Chapter 2: Destruction, Reconstruction and Power in the  
Post-Crisis City 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, this inquiry brings together a number of key themes with the aim of 
better understanding the processes at play in cities in the aftermath of serious violence; collective 
memory, the destruction and reconstruction of urban space, and the contextual details specific to the 
case study in question, Osh. As will be explored in Chapter 3, there are deep-seated and important 
links between the notion of collective memory and urban space; collective memory often 
crystallises in the built environment, lending it a sense of permanence. Actors engaged in 
memorialising processes from both the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ utilise urban spaces and 
structures in order to make (and remake) their narratives of memory and identity in a range of 
creative ways, from the construction of formal monuments to informal retellings of memory 
through quotidian uses of the built environment. But this environment is far from static, and in 
situations of severe conflict the urban space where these memories reside often becomes both the 
location and target of serious violence (Pullan and Baillie 2013). It is this circumstance that will be 
the focus of the following chapter; how the built environment is destroyed and remade by instances 
of crisis, and what this might mean for some of the key issues explored in the previous chapter: 
power, identity, memory and the prospects for rebuilding a sustainably peaceful city. 
Conflict in urban areas, such as that which occurred in Osh in 2010, can be devastating not only for 
the populations that live in the city (although they clearly bear a heavy burden of such violence) but 
also for the wider political community in which the town or city is situated. Towns and cities are 
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certainly important economic and cultural centres, but they have often reached a tipping point of 
“spatial concentration” that enables the development of the kind of political and civil institutions 
traditionally seen as the guarantors of successful democratic states (Hirst 2005; 10). Destroying 
such centres can have considerable repercussions, then. And yet the destruction of towns and cities 
is often represented simply as an unfortunate by product of conflict (whether this takes the form of 
all-out war, acts of terrorism or civil unrest), whose main aim is to pacify or wipe out a population, 
capture a territory or control an economically important asset. In short, the political aims of conflict 
may be acknowledged, but the political aims of the destruction of urban areas often go unexamined 
(Bevan 2007). This is also the case for the process of reconstruction that follows urban destruction – 
this is often widely viewed as a technical undertaking, not a political one (Charlesworth 2006). 
Rebuilding shattered towns and cities thus becomes an affair for technical practitioners – architects, 
planners, builders – whose main goal is to accomplish the task as quickly and effectively as possible 
(See Yarwood 1999 for an example of this approach, and Charlesworth 2006, for a critique). 
But this is a dangerously reductive view of the situation. Seen through a different lens, the 
destruction and reconstruction of urban spaces can be viewed as two sides of the same coin. As we 
shall see in sections 4 and 5 of this chapter, both are concerned with achieving specific political 
aims and exercising power; power over and through space. This understanding of destruction and 
reconstruction echoes that proposed by Flint and Kirsch (2011), who caution against the “false 
dichotomy” between war and peace. They use the example of the Reconstruction era that followed 
(and overlapped with) the American civil war to insist that reconstruction can in fact be viewed “as 
a process of conflict and of militarised power” (Flint and Kirsch 2011: 3). What is more, they 
underline the fact that reconstruction is social as much as physical, with power relations and social 
mores subject to a process of rebuilding, as well as the physical fabric that has been destroyed. By 
adopting this perspective it becomes possible to unpack the otherwise hidden aims of stakeholders 
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involved in both the ruin and rebuilding of towns and cities, thereby uncovering whose interests are 
served by these processes. This chapter argues that revealing these hitherto concealed relations of 
power and interest opens the door to a more transformative practice of post-conflict reconstruction 
(Fetherston 2000). Such a practice would seek to ensure that urban spaces are rebuilt with the needs 
of all communities who live in them in mind, thus contributing towards sustainable and peaceful 
urban environments. In doing so it would allow post-conflict reconstruction processes to finally live 
up to their oft-quoted mantra of ‘building back better’ (Kennedy et al 2008; Amartunga and Haigh 
2001; Lyons 2009; El-Masri and Kellett 2001). 
This literature review will examine two conceptions of power which will serve as useful 
frameworks through which the seemingly opposed forces of destruction and reconstruction at work 
here can be viewed. Firstly, Michel Foucault’s approach, which encourages the researcher to read 
buildings and the urban environment as statements in a wider discourse of power, and in doing so to 
make visible power relationships and interests ingrained in the city (Hirst 2005). Later in the 
chapter, Hannah Arendt’s understanding of power as mutual action will be examined as a possible 
guiding principle for the reconstruction of spaces which can serve the needs of urban communities 
(Arendt 1958; Allen 2002). 
These two understandings of power will then be carried forward into a more detailed examination 
of the processes of urban destruction and reconstruction in sections four and five, in order to further 
understand how these processes are intricately linked to the interests of different stakeholders, and 
how gaining a greater understanding of these relations might help future post-conflict reconstruction 
practitioners in delivering more effective, sustainable solutions in post-conflict contexts. First, 
however, it is important to set out exactly what is meant by terms such as ‘post-conflict 
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reconstruction’, and how this differs from (or indeed, resemble in some respects) other forms of 
reconstruction, such as that which follows natural disasters. 
2.2 What is post-conflict reconstruction? 
Although the term ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ may seem straightforward, in reality it is anything 
but. Simply defining ‘post-conflict’ can be problematic – often reconstruction efforts are underway 
even as military operations are ongoing in other areas of a country, as has been the case in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years (Brinkerhoff 2005; 4), and frequently serious disagreements 
between warring parties continue long after the violence has come to an end (Ibid). This explains 
why the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities has variously been called the 
“twilight between war and peace” (Ferguson 2010; 1) and “Clausewitz in reverse... a continuation 
of war ‘with the addition of other means’” (Ramsbotham et al 2005; 200). The post-conflict period 
is also dangerously fragile - Collier suggests that nearly half of all civil conflicts are the result of 
“post-conflict relapses” (Collier et al 2008), and former High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown has spoken of the “golden hour” of opportunity for effective 
intervention in the immediate post-conflict context (Ashdown 2007). So, any definition of post-
conflict must take into account the complexities of this period – as the former Special 
Representative to the UN Secretary General, Lakhdar Brahimi, has noted “In post-conflict 
situations, there is an absence of war, but not necessarily real peace” (Brahimi 2007; 3). 
The origin of contemporary post-conflict reconstruction is often traced back to two key periods. The 
first widespread use of the term ‘reconstruction’ following conflict came after the American civil 
war, when the physical, legal and social fabric of the South was remade, largely under the aegis of 
the victorious North (Flint and Kirsch 2011). Later, the Marshall Plan reconstruction of post-World 
!21
War Two Europe, when the United States financed the physical, and economic, rebuilding of a 
continent ravaged by war, was to present another important example of the systematic and large 
scale reconstruction of a war torn place (Barakat 2005). However, in recent years the focus has 
switched from this emphasis on the physical restoration of infrastructure and buildings and industry 
as the main aim of the reconstruction process, to seeing this as just one element of a larger 
programme of reconstruction (Ramsbotham et al 2005). Such a holistic vision of reconstruction 
seeks to address a range of issues including security, justice, government, economy and society in 
order to ensure that the conflict is succeeded by a sustainable peace (Ramsbotham et al 2005; 
Barakat 2005; Brinkerhoff 2005). This approach sees successful post-conflict reconstruction not 
simply as the absence of violence in a rebuilt environment, but in the resolution of the factors that 
had previously led to conflict; to use conflict resolution theorist Johann Galtung’s terminology, 
moving from negative to positive peace (Ferguson 2010, Galtung 1969). Echoing this approach, 
Barakat quotes the World Bank definition, of post-conflict reconstruction, as aiming to “to facilitate 
the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social 
development” (Barakat 1998; 10). 
It is important, then, to situate a consideration of the physical reconstruction of the built 
environment after violent conflict, such as this investigation, within the wider context of the modern 
post-conflict reconstruction project. In this way, theorists and practitioners of post-conflict, and 
post-disaster, reconstruction increasingly acknowledge that the bricks and mortar of the urban fabric 
cannot be successfully rebuilt without reference to the psycho-social reconstruction of the city and 
the communities it plays home to (Charlesworth 2006, Clarke et al 2010, Campanella 2006, Hassan 
and Hanafi 2010). Samuels captures this point well in her investigation of the post-tsunami 
reconstruction of Banda Aceh, Indonesia (a double reconstruction in many ways, since the area had 
been plagued by a long and bitter civil war before the tsunami), saying “apart from the visible, built 
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environment, ‘reconstruction’ is also a less visible social, psychological and everyday process. 
Banda Aceh’s residents did not sit and wait for their society to be reconstructed. Indeed, because 
people form the society they live in, only they themselves can rebuild it.” (Samuels in Clarke et al, 
2010). So, whilst this investigation limits itself to examining the physical reconstruction of the built 
environment in a stricter sense, it does so in acknowledgement of, and in relation to, the wider 
context of the post-conflict reconstruction paradigm. 
2.2.1 Post-conflict versus post-disaster reconstruction 
Traditionally literature on post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction has been quite separate, 
since the context and root causes of urban destruction were seen as very different (Nasr 2003). 
However, such a separation may be detrimental to our understanding of reconstruction efforts. Since 
urban disasters are most strongly felt by the most vulnerable groups (Godschalk 2003), these groups 
often suffer a ‘layering’ of man-made and natural disasters. For example Banda Aceh, had been the 
site of an intractable conflict which had marked both the environment and the communities which 
live in it long before the Tsunami which razed the city to the ground in 2004 (Clarke et al. 2010). 
Similarly, when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans the destruction caused served to highlight 
serious ongoing social conflict in the city, making tensions even more acute, and producing very 
real effects in the reconstruction process (Birch and Wachter 2006).  
In practice it is not always feasible, or advisable, to attempt to treat post-conflict and post-disaster 
reconstruction as two separate processes. Moreover, the impact of any disaster on the urban 
environment is seen by some theorists as the function of a city’s resilience, and the resilience of its 
inhabitants, rather than of the nature of the event that initially precipitated the crisis (Godschalk 
2003). That is to say, all disasters, whether they stem from an earthquake or a bomb, are essentially 
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manmade. As El-Masri and Kellett put it “there is a growing recognition that all disasters are ‘acts 
of man’ in which a hazard turns into a disaster by human error or lack of foresight” (El-Masri and 
Kellett 2001: 536).  
When seen this way, then, it is clear that there is a fertile potential for mutual learning between the 
experiences of post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction. Whilst the circumstances may not be 
exactly comparable, especially in post-conflict cases where social resilience can often be severely 
hampered by the divided nature of communities, there is a very real opportunity to build on the 
experiences of post-disaster reconstruction in the post-conflict field, therefore this literature will be 
included in the following sections. Within this chapter the broad term ‘post-crisis reconstruction’ 
will be used to signify the process of reconstruction after a traumatic disruption to the life and fabric 
of the city, whilst the terms ‘post-conflict’ and ‘post-disaster’ reconstruction will refer to elements 
which are specific to one or other of these contexts. 
One of the most significant ways in which post-conflict and post-disaster literatures often diverge, 
however, is around the question of how to measure their success. Whilst many post-disaster 
theorists advocate for successful reconstruction that brings about a more resilient or sustainable city, 
post-conflict reconstruction theorists focus on the question of rebuilding a more peaceful city. But 
what is meant by peace? Before proceeding any further it will be important to take a moment to 
unpack the notion of peace, given its centrality to this thesis. 
Johann Galtung, one of the foremost exponents of the field of peace studies, proposed two notions 
that will strongly inform this investigation’s understanding of peace. Firstly, he made the distinction 
between “negative” and “positive” peace (Galtung 1969). This distinction is underpinned by a 
tripartite vision of violence “direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence (children 
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die through poverty) and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify 
it)” (Ramsbotham et al 2005; 10). Negative peace, therefore, exists in the absence of direct 
violence, but positive peace can only be achieved through the eradication of cultural and structural 
violence also. These distinctions inform the rise of liberal peace theories, of which post-conflict 
reconstruction activities are an integral part, which have become pervasive since the end of the cold 
war (Richmond 2012). This approach is embodied by institutions such as the United Nations, whose 
interventions are often intended to address these three types of violence through the actions of peace 
keeping (direct violence), peace building (structural violence) and peace making (cultural violence) 
(Ramsbotham et al 2005). Liberal peace theory proposes that peace can be built and maintained 
through the introduction of “liberal institutions, norms and political, social and economic systems” 
such as democracy and a market economy (Richmond 2012: 1). However, this concept has 
increasingly been criticised as ethnocentric, culturally biased and even “flimsy” in its results 
(Richmond 2006: 291). Some non-Western actors have proposed other models for peace building, 
such as the ‘Sri Lankan Model’ of “counter-insurgency and stabilisation”, which appears far closer 
to the classic realist vision of a victor’s peace (Goodhand 2010: 342). Simultaneously, theorists such 
as Richmond have called for a ‘hybrid’ approach to peace which takes into account the agency and 
particularities of civil society actors, and refocuses peace making around considerations of human 
security (Richmond 2012). 
This challenging of what has, in recent years, been a near hegemonic vision of the nature of peace 
and peace building has also been reflected within the field of geography, notably in the emerging 
field of peace geographies. Calling on geographers to problematise peace McConnell et al recall the 
many possible meanings of peace, stating “peace can be a yearning for a radically new and just 
social order, or a mechanism employed by the powerful to resist just such a change” (McConnell et 
al 2014: 2). In other words, it is crucial to question whose peace is being constructed and seek to 
!25
unpack who benefits from the kind of peace being rebuilt (see Pugh et al (2008) for an in-depth 
discussion of this issue). As this investigation moves on to consider the activities being undertaken 
in the reconstruction of a sustainably peaceful Osh, it will be vital to keep this question in mind. 
2.2.2 Post-crisis as opportunity 
Moreover post-conflict, and post-disaster, reconstruction is increasingly viewed as a unique moment 
of opportunity in the life of the city to ‘build back better’, to use a much repeated phrase in 
reconstruction literature (Kennedy et al 2008, Amartunga and Haigh 2001, Lyons,2009, El-Masri 
and Kellett 2001). Such an approach recognises the exceptional – and fleeting - circumstances that 
come together in the post-crisis city, and expresses a concern that at present architects, planners and 
agencies involved in the reconstruction process are not making the most of the opportunities for 
improvement that these rare circumstances present (Amartunga and Haigh 2011, Charlesworth 
2006). In the post-crisis period the question of urban reconstruction is brought to the top of the 
government’s agenda for action as communities urgently require shelter and the re-establishment of 
crucial infrastructure; at the same time, external donors and agencies are on hand to provide money 
and expertise to aid the reconstruction effort, and state authorities recognise the importance of 
engaging with these donors before their attention is turned to the next crisis (Ferguson 2010, Hassan 
and Hanafi 2010, Suhrke 2007, Amaratunga and Haigh 2011).  
However, this is not simply an opportunity for benevolent actors, both within the state and 
externally, to build back better – the reality is far more complex. As the next section of this chapter 
will set out, any intervention in the fabric of a town or city entails multiple opportunities to exercise 
power through reconstruction. Choices as diverse as what is rebuilt or knocked down, in which 
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neighbourhoods, by whom, in which style or timescale, or what kind of reconstruction or 
regeneration is prioritised, all have repercussions in terms of the power exercised over and through 
the city, power which can affect different city dwelling communities in different ways (Hirst 2005, 
Nagel 2000, Bollens 1998). 
2.3 Conceptualising power in the City 
The relationship between space (in this case urban space specifically) and power is key to 
understanding the meaning and intent behind the destruction and reconstruction of cities in conflict. 
Urban space is not neutral (a theme that will emerge again in the following chapter). It is utilised by 
different groups to keep memories alive, and therefore as a tool in struggles over power and identity 
also. It is therefore useful to consider urban space as a “resource for power” (Hirst 2005; 3). As such 
a resource urban space has particular resonance; the physical environment lends an impression of 
solidity and timelessness to that which it represents (Connerton 1989). This means that power 
relations ingrained in the fabric of the physical environment are less likely to be questioned, more 
likely to be seen as permanent and timeless (Agnew 1999).  
But how, then, is this resource for power formulated and used, and who does it serve? 
Understanding the built environment as such a resource requires a more complex and nuanced 
understanding of power than the often voiced conception of power as something which can be 
stored and dispensed by the sovereign centre in order to dominate its dependent subjects - such a 
view is too reductive to fully appreciate the way in which power is both spatially transmitted and 
transformed (Allen 2004). It will be more useful to use the framework set out by Michel Foucault, 
whose conception of power allows a greater appreciation of the myriad mechanisms and effects of 
power at play in the built environment, and who they serve. 
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Foucault rejected the notion of power as solely a force of domination, exercised in a direct line from 
sovereign over subjects. He saw power as more diffuse (both in its effects and exercise), situated in 
a variety of centres, with productive as well as restrictive capacities (Foucault 1982, Allen 2004, 
Hirst 2005). According to this thinking it only exists when it is in action – it is not a resource that 
can be stored or held until somebody wishes to use it (Foucault 1982). In Foucault’s work power is 
intricately linked to knowledge. Its greatest triumph of the modern era has been to normalise itself, 
to ensure that rather than forcing a choice on its subjects it has already ensured that all choices 
presented fall within its scope of acceptable outcomes (Allen 2004). This is the subtlety of 
Foucault’s view of power –it is internalised by its subjects in such a way that even as it sets limits 
on the scope of possible actions, this seems normal (Foucault 1982, Allen 2004, Fetherston 2000) – 
this is a power that governs all possibilities instead of simply dictating one, and is all the more 
seductive for it. As Fetherston eloquently puts it; 
“More fundamental than repressive power, Foucault’s conception posits an array of disciplines, 
discourses, specialised knowledges, techniques and institutions which together function not to 
prohibit or repress, but to exhort and to normalise modes of thought and action” (Fetherston 2000: 
200) 
Foucault further suggested that it was by identifying and unpacking these discourses, techniques 
and institutions that researchers would be able to glimpse the mechanisms of power, and lay bare 
who was served by the power relations ingrained in the structures of the status quo (Foucault 1982). 
But how does this relate to the built environment, and more specifically to the seemingly opposed 
forces of its destruction and reconstruction? 
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A crucial aspect of Foucault’s vision is that he considered that objects (including buildings and 
other features of the built environment) as part of discursive practice, that is the practice that sets 
the limits on what is possible and normal (Hirst 2005). In his essay ‘Foucault and Architecture’, 
Hirst urges us to follow Foucault in reading buildings and structures – their layout, appearance, 
location, interior and more – as statements, in order to understand their particular and deliberate role 
in the production of power and knowledge (Hirst 2005). As he says “the task of the architect is not 
merely constructing spaces, but spaces which have specific expressive-experiential effects on the 
subject” (Hirst 2005: 162). It becomes clear, then, that buildings are not neutral; they are designed 
to produce effects of power on those who use, or even see, them, and as such form part of a wider 
discourse of power. By unpacking this discourse, the purpose, reach and beneficiaries of this power 
can therefore be made more clear.  
A powerful example of how power relations are bound up with the built environment can be found 
in recent critiques of the gendered nature of the city. Since the 1980s, feminist geographers have 
advanced a research agenda which demonstrates the mutually constitutive relationship between the 
spatial organisation of the city and the social organisation of gender relations. Scholars such as 
Valentine, McDowell and Fenster have demonstrated how the spatial organisation of the city is not 
impartial, but reflects hierarchical gender relations that define the private sphere as inherently 
feminine, and the public as masculine (or perhaps even more accurately, as male, heterosexual and 
white) (Fenster 2005, McDowell 1999, Valentine 2001). Gendered space produces effects at 
multiple scales, defining what kinds of places are open (and welcoming) for women to use at the 
local level (Fenster 2005), as well as impacting the historical design of cities through the division of 
spaces of production (such as factories) from spaces of reproduction (such as the home) (Valentine 
2001).  
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In turn, urban spaces and the buildings that form them reinforce and enable these hierarchical 
gender relations as part of a discourse of power which restricts women’s access to and right to 
freely participate in certain types of public space and activity. Public space is therefore not universal 
- it is composed of multiple public places to which different groups have differing levels of access 
(Fraser 1990). As Fenster notes in her critique of the Lefebvrian notion of the right to the city, 
women are restricted from freely accessing and making decisions about many urban spaces because 
they are “designed so that they become a ‘trap’ for women, unpleasant and thus unused” (Fenster 
2005: 224). These spaces are often feel unwelcoming and dangerous to women, having been 
designed without them in mind. In contrast, the spaces that seem safe and open to them are often 
linked to certain gendered roles - women as caregivers or consumers, for example - reinforcing the 
public/private binary of gendered space set out above (McDowell 1999). Of course, this also serves 
to obscure the fact that most violence against women occurs in the privacy of the home, and not in 
the ‘dangerous’ public realm (Valentine 2001). Within this paradigm, women’s mobility in the city 
becomes a transgressive act, upsetting as it does the “settled patriarchal order” built into urban 
space (Massey 1994: 11). Unpacking gendered experiences of the built environment, then, reveals 
how urban space has been used as a resource for a certain arrangement of patriarchal power 
relations, and restricts women’s experience of the city. As Fenster puts it succinctly “the right to use 
and belong to the city is abused by patriarchal cultural and religious powers constructing public 
spaces as forbidden” (Fenster 2005: 224). 
Moreover, another aspect of Foucault’s understanding of power which is of particular relevance to 
an investigation of the destruction and reconstruction of the built environment, is the question of 
who has the right to express certain types of knowledge in a given society. Referring to Foucault’s 
work on insanity and clinical observation, Hirst shows how “enunciative modalities mean that only 
certain subjects are qualified and able to speak in particular ways: that certain statements cannot be 
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made by everybody and anybody” (Hirst 2005; 157).  This is important in the context of 
reconstruction since, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, reconstruction is often framed 
as an apolitical process to be undertaken by technical practitioners – ‘experts’. However, by digging 
deeper and seeking to understand how certain subjects are qualified as ‘experts, and why it is only 
certain people or groups (architects, planners et al) are deemed qualified to intervene in 
reconstruction, we can again begin to unravel the power relations that underpin this situation. 
So, by adopting Foucault’s nuanced account of power as set out above, it becomes possible to begin 
to reveal how the built environment, its destruction and reconstruction, itself acts as part of one or 
more discourses of power. The physical fabric of towns and cities is not neutral, then – it exerts 
effects on the people who use it, framing and limiting their choices whilst all the while making this 
process seem normal and immutable. Understanding the way this happens enables the researcher to 
unpack the power relations that are ingrained in the built environment, and to discern whose 
interests are served by the buildings and spaces that make up a given town or city (and whose 
interests would be served by changes to it). Bearing in mind this framework for understanding 
power, its location, exercise and mechanisms, the following two sections will examine the processes 
of urban destruction and reconstruction in more detail. 
2.4. Conflict in the city – power through destruction 
The city as a site of conflict may not be a new phenomenon – human history is full of examples of 
urban warfare from Carthage to Hiroshima to Fallujah (Coward 2009, Graham 2004). However, 
cities experience violent conflict intensely - Birch and Wachter have noted the “disproportionate 
effect” of disasters, whether man made or natural, in urban environments, a fact they attribute to the 
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density of the urban fabric and the complex, interdependent nature of their systems (Birch and 
Wachter 2006; 1).  
Sadly, the phenomenon of urban conflict looks set to become ever more significant in the future, not 
least as the world continues to urbanise at a staggering rate: the UN predicts that 60% of the global 
population will live in cities by 2030 (UN DESA 2005), and the Stern report has noted that the 
effects of this urbanisation will be especially acute in developing countries, where climate change 
will make already marginalised urban communities even more vulnerable (Stern 2006). At the same 
time, the International Labour Organisation has warned that inequality is on the rise in cities across 
the world (ILO 2008), all of which factors combine to make the city a tinderbox for possible violent 
conflict. Moreover, the rise of asymmetrical warfare (in the decade from 2001 to 2010, only two of 
the twenty-nine major armed conflicts that took place in the world were between states (SIPRI 
2011) has often meant that the city itself has become the site and target of violent attacks by 
terrorists, insurgents and rebel groups, and of battles between such groups and the state actors 
seeking to pacify them. Such conflicts seem to fit within Kaldor’s definition of ‘New Wars’ – 
conflicts which ““involve a blurring of the distinctions between war (…), organised crime (…), and 
large scale violations of human rights” (Kaldor 2002; 92). Although Kaldor’s assertion that New 
Wars are no longer about ideology seems premature, her description of the non-traditional actors 
involved in such conflicts, and the diffuse, globalised war economies that fund them, characterises 
much of the violence that has occurred in cities in recent years very well (Kaldor 2002, Graham 
2004). 
Taking these factors into account, there can be little doubt as to the importance of understanding 
conflict in cities as a distinct phenomenon, and one that looks likely to continue to proliferate in the 
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future. As Graham warns “urban areas are now the “lightning conductors” for the world’s political 
violence” (Graham 2006; 4). 
2.4.1 Urbicide 
Conflict is not simply something that happens in cities though. Certainly, the forces explored above 
increase the likelihood of outbreaks of violent conflict in urban areas. However, for many theorists 
this is just one side of the coin; violence also needs to be examined as something that happens to 
cities (Coward 2009, Bevan 2007). In other words, the urban environment is not only the location of 
violence, but its target. In its most extreme form this phenomenon has been termed ‘urbicide’, and 
is explored in greater detail below. 
Martin Coward, probably the foremost exponent of the concept of urbicide points to the experiences 
of war in Mostar and Sarjevo, in the former Yugoslavia, and the “rubbleisation” of towns in 
Chechnya and Afghanistan by Russian forces as proof that in many cases the very buildings and 
streets that make up the city had become targets in themselves, rather than simply that strategic 
buildings and infrastructure you might expect (Coward 2009). Other theorists have cited the 
bulldozing of buildings in the occupied territories by the Israeli Defence Forces (Graham 2006), and 
the Nazi destruction of synagogues, Jewish owned shops and other buildings on Kristallnacht 
(Bevan 2007) as examples of cases where the destruction of the fabric of the city for its own sake 
has come to the forefront of urban violence. Of course, as Graham points out urbicide does not only 
occur at the hands of an armed group, but also through peacetime activities of planning and urban 
development, which often requires the destruction or remaking of huge swathes of the cityscape. 
This is “the dark side of the discipline of urban planning that is rarely acknowledged” (Graham 
2004: 34). 
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2.4.2 Destroying spaces of multiculturalism 
The significance of such occurrences can be explained in two, by no means mutually exclusive, 
ways. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the first explanation sees the urban 
environment as symbolic of possibilities for multiculturalism, pluralism and mixing. Building on 
Heidegger, it sees the spaces provided by the city as the basic conditions which enable ‘being-with-
others’, making heterogeneity “the existential quality which defines urbanity” (Coward 2009; 
54) .This means that the act of targeting the city, seeking to destroy the very spaces that enable this 
mixing, is an act of violence against the multiculturalism at the heart of the urban experience, which 
aims to install an exclusionary, monocultural society in its place (Coward 2007). Some theorists 
have interpreted this as the revenge of the ‘backwards’ countryside against the city, yet such an 
interpretation cannot account for the experience of many urban conflicts, and risks falling into the 
trap of anthropocentrism (Fregonese 2009, Coward 2009). Crucially, though, it must be recalled that 
plurality does not necessarily mean equality - even highly heterogenous places can have “highly 
asymmetrical” power relations (Pullan and Baillie 2013: 4). 
Of course, such an attack on urban plurality can be achieved through bombs – the case of the Stari 
Most in Mostar is emblematic of this, as its destruction served more than just a strategic purpose; it 
physically prevented the two communities of Mostar from meeting and mixing (Yarwood 1999). 
This is perhaps closest to what Coward has written about - urbicide as a military strategy. And yet, it 
can also come about through more subtle, insidious means, such as the discriminatory planning 
policies and practices which can have a significant impact on different groups’ access to the city or 
the character of a neighbourhood, for example (Weizman 2007, Coward 2007, Bollens 1998, 
Graham 2004). The gentrification of the city, often greatly encouraged by state authorities, can have 
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a similarly deleterious effect on disadvantaged communities (Murtagh 2008). This could be 
characterised as a kind of slow urbicide - a strategy which is not as immediate as the shelling of a 
city, but just as devastating for its diversity. 
2.4.3 Erasing memories of difference 
The second logic of urbicide - either slow or fast - is intricately linked to the first, and sees urban 
violence as an attack on the culture and identity of a particular group, as expressed through the 
physical fabric of the city. Such violence has the ultimate aim of eradicating all memories and 
evidence of the group in the space of the city (Bevan 2007). In these cases Bevan argues that 
“architecture takes on a totemic quality” (Bevan 2007; 8), whereby the destruction of the physical 
expression of a community’s identity, sense of belonging and memories, is an inevitable precursor 
to the destruction of the community itself. Bevan acknowledges that in post-conflict situations it is 
not always possible to readily differentiate between the general destruction caused by conflict and 
targeted urbicide of culturally significant space, but argues that even a lack of care in this regard can 
serve the same purpose (Bevan 2007).  
Such a view foreshadows the ideas that will be explored in the next chapter, on collective memory. 
When a community’s memories are ingrained into the built environment, they gain a sense of 
permanence and timelessness (Connerton 1989, Nora 1996). By destroying such markers, then, the 
group’s memory and identity are literally wiped from the city. The impact of this kind of urbicide on 
the process of post-conflict reconstruction is considerable. Rebuilding culturally and 
commemoratively significant buildings becomes an act of resistance for the community or 
communities which have been under attack; we can consider the swift (and frequently criticised) 
reconstruction of Warsaw city centre in the aftermath of the Second World War, or Palestinian 
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refugees’ insistence on rebuilding the exact street patterns of their ruined neighbourhoods in Nahr 
al-Bared as communities’ ways of fighting back against efforts to erase their memories, and 
therefore identities, from the urban fabric (Bevan 2007; Hassan and Hanafi 2010, Ramadan 2009).  
The preceding sections have demonstrated the value of understanding the specific effects and 
meanings of violent conflicts in urban areas. Not only are such conflicts likely to become 
increasingly common, as urban populations swell, inequality grows and asymmetric ‘new wars’ 
continue proliferate, but they are likely to produce disproportionate effects on densely packed cities 
and their inhabitants. These conflicts, and the reconstruction that follows, take place within an 
urban environment that is deeply embedded in discourses of power. As such the destruction and 
reconstruction of the built environment should not be seen as neutral or incidental, but rather as an 
intervention in these discourses of power, producing effects that demand analysis and attention.  
Moreover, there has been a growing acceptance that violence does not just happen in cities, but to 
them. Violence directed against the city itself – urbicide - can occur in a number of ways, as part of 
a military strategy or as part of urban planning initiatives, for example. Key to this notion - 
especially in any investigation into the question of post-conflict reconstruction - is the idea that 
urbicide constitutes a two-pronged attempt to fundamentally change the character of the city, 
turning it from a heterogenous, multicultural space, where the buildings themselves are testimony to 
the communities that live there, to an exclusionary, monocultural zone where all trace of the other 
has been erased, and control is absolute. Urbicide, then, can be read as an attempt to pacify a 
problematic urban space and bring it into the discourse of power of the aggressor or powerful party.  
Whilst the notion of urbicide focusses on the destructive side of the equation, the question of what 
is rebuilt following conflict or crisis in the city is also of vital importance, and is bound up with 
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questions of power in the city. The next three sections will explore some of the key issues involved 
in reconstruction programmes. Firstly, it will examine the normative goals of reconstruction – the 
will to ‘build back better’ – to identify some of the potential pitfalls of this otherwise laudable aim. 
It will then consider the vexed question of authenticity, which is often invoked as an important aim 
of the reconstruction process. Finally, it will explore the question of community participation, which 
is often presented as a panacea to problems arising from the first two issues, but which itself entails 
a number of challenges. All three of these issues combine practical concerns in the post-crisis 
moment with wider questions about the way the reconstruction of the cityscape is again bound up 
with issues of power, identity and memory. 
2. 5. Issues in post-conflict reconstruction practice – rebuilding power 
2.5.1 Building back better 
When seeking to rebuild urban places shattered by disaster, one of the first questions to present 
itself to practitioners is whether to rebuild what was there previously, or whether there is an 
opportunity to ‘build back better’. For many theorists this choice is simple; it is simply impossible 
to return the post-conflict city to the status quo ante. As Clarke et al point out, the passage of time, 
people’s experiences of the events that damaged the city, and their experience of the reconstruction 
process itself (their interactions with donors and aid agencies, for example) mean that it is simply 
impossible to recreate the urban environment as it was before the crisis hit (Clarke et al,.2010). 
They liken this to a corkscrew effect – the city might return to a similar position to prior to the 
conflict, but it has also moved on tangibly (Clarke et al. 2010). 
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Practitioners are therefore urged to consider how their reconstruction interventions can rebuild a 
better urban environment. What precisely is meant by ‘better’ varies between writers: for some it 
means increasing the resilience of the city, improving its capacity to bend but not break under 
systemic stress (Godschalk 2003, Berke and Campanella 2006), whereas others question whether 
the reconstructed city could be made more sustainable (Pelling 2003). Others still focus on the role 
of “architects as potential peace-builders” in remaking more peaceful, equitable cities 
(Charlesworth 2006;1). It is the last of these definitions that is the most relevant in the context of 
this investigation. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that reconstruction programmes often serve a political as well as 
practical purpose, showing the victorious government as powerful, active, progressive and above 
all, concerned with the welfare of its citizens (Charlesworth 2006). Nonetheless, any description of 
the post-crisis urban environment at a “fresh start” (Amaratunga and Haigh 2011; 8), should be 
avoided. If, as discussed earlier, the city is constructed of its communities as much as its buildings, 
then even the most catastrophically ruined town cannot be seen as a blank slate where architects and 
planners have free reign to rebuild however they wish. Crisis is not necessarily a break with the 
past, but can itself be a concentrated expression of that past (Bond Graham 2008). 
Bollens has identified a typology of four different modes of planning that it is useful to consider in 
this context; a neutral planning strategy, which attempts to treat urban issues as purely technical 
questions; a partisan strategy, which explicitly seeks to favour one group over another through 
planning strategies; an equity strategy, which seeks to redress perceived ethnic or political 
imbalances in the city; and finally a resolver strategy, which, in Bollens’ words, “seeks to 
reconceptualise the planning of cities and urban communities to facilitate mutual empowerment and 
tolerable urban co-existence” (Bollens 1998; 731-2). Practitioners seeking to ‘build back better’ in 
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the wake of serious urban conflict should aim, therefore, to adopt the position of planners as 
resolvers if they are to rebuild sustainably peaceful urban places. As we shall see in the course of 
this investigation, however, in reality neutral, partisan and equity strategies are all too common in 
such situations. 
2.5.2 Authenticity in reconstruction 
One of the most persistent questions to raise its head in discussions of post-conflict reconstruction is 
that of authenticity. The notion of authenticity is difficult to pin down – after all, who decides what 
is and is not ‘authentic’ – but to many theorists it is of vital importance to the success of the 
reconstruction process (Bevan 2007, Greer 2010, Clarke et al. 2010). In short, the reconstructed 
landscape should in some way match, and therefore be endowed with meaning by, the “internal 
landscape” of communities living there (Clarke et al. 2010). This can take the form of rebuilding 
original street patterns and ensuring former neighbours can live together again (Hasan and Hanafi 
2010), or by attempting to acknowledge the history and memory of a space, and how it was 
previously used in daily life, in any new plans (Hebbert 2005). In 1994 UNESCO recognised the 
centrality of the question of authenticity to modern planning, conservation and reconstruction 
practice when it agreed the Nara Document on Authenticity. This document recognises the notion of 
authenticity as a guarantor of the “collective memory of humanity”, and warns against the 
ideological misuse of conservation activities to erase or change this collective memory (UNESCO 
1994; 4). 
The consequences of skin deep, inauthentic, reconstruction are serious. Writing about the 
reconstruction of Mostar’s famous bridge, the Stari Most, Greer decries the new structure as a 
“prosthetic” or “simulacrum” which simply parrots the old bridge, without paying testimony to 
!39
Mostar’s wartime experiences, a silence which “may have the counter effect of making memory 
even more potent and dangerous” (Greer 2010;  130). Similarly, Bevan has highlighted the 
reconstruction of post World War Two Warsaw as a complex and problematic case. Whereas the 
process of fast reconstruction could be interpreted as an act of defiance after the near destruction of 
the city, the end result of this process has been lambasted as a “Disney operation” which again 
represents a facsimile of the former town without acknowledging the impact of the war (Bevan 
2007; 181-3). Both writers fear such reconstruction, which is concerned with heritage rather than 
history, to use Lowenthal’s distinction (Bevan 2007), simply papers over the cracks caused by 
conflict. Clearly this is far from the resolver model of planning discussed above. As we shall see in 
Chapter 6, this kind of approach is all too common, with prominent individuals such as the former 
Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov espousing an approach to heritage and reconstruction that has 
been criticised for its inauthenticity and denounced as “sham replicas” (Cecil 2011).  
But if the importance of authenticity in reconstruction is so readily acknowledged, then why does it 
continue to cause a problem? This can partly be attributed to the need to reconstruct quickly, as 
communities’ needs for shelter and infrastructure are pressing in the immediate post-conflict period. 
This may mean that questions of authenticity are not at the forefront of practitioners’ considerations 
(Bevan 2007, Pelling 2003). However, this urgency is not the only reason that authenticity may be 
disregarded in some cases. Whilst this may be seen as integral to the successful reconstruction by 
some theorists, these theorists measure the success of such interventions by their capacity to rebuild 
more peaceful cities (Bevan 2007, Greer 2010, Suhrke 2007).  
And yet, peace is not always the sole, or even primary, goal of all post-conflict interventions. 
Whoever controls the reconstruction process can use this to promote specific policy aims, whether 
they are political, cultural or economic. For example, Nagel notes that reconstruction in post-civil 
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war Beirut is largely concerned with the reconstitution of a commercially successful space in the 
city centre (Nagel 2000). In fact, the commodification of post conflict spaces and projects in the 
global and donor-driven economies is a recurring theme in post-conflict and post-disaster 
reconstruction literature (Greer 2010, Sammuels 2010). Elsewhere Bollens has demonstrated how 
Israeli planning regulations fail to take into account traditional Arab patterns of land ownership and 
construction, thus obstructing authentic Arab housing developments, and contributing to the wider 
Israeli policy aim of discouraging the growth of the Arab population in Jerusalem (Bollens 1998). 
Conversely, Saudi Arabian funding of the rebuilding of mosques in Bosnia has paid little attention 
to the local vernacular of Islamic architecture, instead favouring plain, whitewashed interiors that 
reflect Saudi Arabia’s own Wahhabist tradition of Islam, and its wish to promote this form of 
religion abroad (Bevan 2007).  
All of these interventions – whatever their underlying policy aim - will be in vain if the city slips 
back into violent and destructive conflict. The message of theorists such as Bevan is clear – 
reconstruction that simply seeks to sweep the traces of past violence under the carpet leaves a city 
which is doomed to repeat the mistakes of its past. But given that the concept of authenticity is both 
nebulous and often contested (especially in divided cities), how can practitioners integrate it 
effectively into their work? The next section explores one solution that is often proposed as an 
answer to this question, but that is in itself a problematic and contested issue; participatory 
reconstruction and planning. 
2.5.3 Participatory approaches to reconstruction – panacea or whitewash? 
Stakeholder participation in reconstruction projects is widely held to have a range of significant 
benefits to the rebuilding process. It ensures that practitioners have all the relevant information and 
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pertaining to the project, enabling goals to be met more effectively (Siriwardena and Haigh 2011); it 
empowers communities, encouraging them to feel ownership of the projects rather than simple 
passive recipients of aid (Clarke et al 2010); it can be more economic, more closely tailored to the 
needs of the community, and more smoothly implemented (El-Masri and Kellett 2001); and it can 
even help ease the trauma in conflict and disaster affected communities (Pelling 2003). It is no 
surprise, then, that stakeholder participation and consultation has become a buzzword in 
reconstruction, and in development practice more widely. 
Stakeholder engagement is no simple task, however. Taking on board Freeman and Reed’s 
definition of stakeholders as “any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement 
of an organisation’s objectives, or who is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives” (Freeman and Reed cited in Amaratunga and Haigh 2011; 118), Siriwardena and Haigh 
note the near infinite list of people and groups that could be considered to be stakeholders in any 
reconstruction process, from residents to unions, credit organisations, state bodies, international 
non-governmental organisations, traditional and religious authorities and much more (Siriwardena 
and Haigh 2011). Moreover, these stakeholders may support, oppose or be indifferent to the project, 
and this position may change over time (Siriwardena and Haigh 2011).  
Stakeholder engagement also requires a considerable shift in practice on the part of reconstruction 
practitioners; this way of working often requires them to move from the position of lauded expert (a 
position which afforded them considerable power) to that of facilitator (El-Masri and Kellett 2001). 
This process can be met with significant reluctance, as reconstruction professionals are reluctant to 
cede their position of power or are concerned that the participatory approach, while laudable, does 
not take sufficient account of the technical necessities and skills of the planning and construction 
professions (Turok 1994). Turok eloquently demonstrates how these concerns can arise during the 
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transition to a more participatory planning system in his investigation of the development of a post-
apartheid planning system in Johannesburg, through the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan 
Chamber (Turok 1994). Here he notes another important concern regarding the practicalities of 
instituting participatory approaches to planning; put simply, it takes a lot more time to reach 
decisions in this way (Ibid). Clearly, this could prove problematic given the urgent needs of 
communities in the immediate post-conflict context, and yet for many theorists the involvement of 
affected communities is the key to rebuilding successfully (Godschalk 2003; Sammuels in Clarke et 
al. 2010; Siriwardena and Haigh 2011). Once again we see the tension between the urgency of the 
post-conflict period and the need to address from the outset the long term issues which are crucial to 
rebuilding sustainably. 
However, this kind of stakeholder engagement is not without its own set of problems. In fact, some 
theorists warn that, if not properly thought out, this kind of engagement can actually make the 
situation worse in post-crisis zones. For example, Simpson has noted that in the aftermath of the 
Gujarat earthquake in 2001, consultation with local people was distinctly biased towards a small 
number of members of the middle class Hindu community – meaning that the consultation was not 
truly representative, and in fact risked cementing a certain arrangement of power relations within 
the community (Simpson 2006). Similarly, Pelling warns that the need for NGOs and donors to 
promptly find suitable and capable interlocutors to facilitate stakeholder engagement risks creating 
an NGO dependent class of professional interlocutors, without actually engaging the most marginal 
groups (Pelling 2003). The simultaneous requirements to act quickly in the post-crisis context, and 
to ‘build back better’ in a sustainable and inclusive manner are once again at the heart of this 
conundrum (Amaratunga and Haigh 2011). There is widespread acknowledgement that stakeholder 
engagement in post-crisis reconstruction is necessary, and that owner-driven projects are more 
effective than donor-driven, and yet it also crucial to acknowledge that such engagement it is no 
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quick fix, and brings with it its own set of complexities and problems (Davidson et al. 2007, Pelling 
2003, Simpson 2006). 
2.6. Conclusion – destruction, reconstruction and power 
Foucauldian analysis of how power relations are ingrained and normalised through the spaces and 
practices that surround us in everyday life, this suggests a three-pronged approach to understanding 
the destruction and reconstruction of the built environment, and to building back better. Such an To 
return to the question of power explored earlier in this chapter, it is clear that a Foucauldian 
perspective is a useful tool in unpacking the power relations ingrained in the built environment, and 
in identifying whose interests are served by the destruction and reconstruction of towns and cities. 
Seeing the built environment as part of a discourse of power has a knock on effect on how we view 
interventions in this realm. The targeting of the city (urbicide in its diverse forms) is thus 
understood as part of a struggle to exert control over identity and memory. Choices made during the 
reconstruction process - what to rebuild, how, where and by whom - are also revealed to be part of 
this struggle, as the city is remade  according to a new set of power relations. But in order to adopt a 
more transformational approach to the endeavour of post-crisis reconstruction, aiming to ‘build 
back better’, it might be useful to move beyond Foucault and adopt a more avowedly normative 
approach. Whilst a Foucauldian approach can help to identify webs of power in the built 
environment, it does not necessarily suggest the practical steps to build against domination through 
reconstruction, which must be the ultimate aim of reconstruction practice. As Fetherston has noted, 
reconstruction is not enough; post-crisis intervention must be transformative, and aimed at building 
a long-term peace (Fetherston 2000).  
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To do this, it seems apt to consider the work of Hannah Arendt, whose notion of power has a 
number of explicitly spatial and transformative elements, and Jurgen Habermas, who builds on 
Arendt’s legacy to present a theory of communicative ethics – an approach which has readily been 
taken up by some planning theorists (Healey 1992 and 2006). 
For Arendt, power only ever exists through action; like Foucault, she rejects the idea that it can be 
stored in reserve as a resource (Arendt 1958, Allen 2002). In her own words, it is “a power 
potential, not an unchangeable, measurable and reliable entity like force and strength” (Arendt 
1958; 200). Where her concept of power differs considerably from Foucault is her emphasis on the 
‘bottom-up’ potential of power (for better or for worse – she warns against the potential for 
ochlocracy, or mob rule (Arendt 1958; 203)). Arendt sees power as constituted through the free 
interaction of people in the public realm – the “space of appearance” - in which issues of public 
interest can be debated, plurality (of actors and opinions) acknowledged, and from which power, in 
a productive, emancipatory sense, can emerge (Arendt 1958, Hansen 1993). 
The spatial element of this vision of power is crucial. The ‘space of appearance’ that Arendt refers 
brings with it a potential for power through the exchanges and plurality it houses – in short, by 
making the free association of people possible (Arendt 1958, Hansen 1993). The relation between 
space and power is therefore mutually reinforcing – a public space, such as a town square or civic 
building, may help to make free association, and therefore power, possible, but it only becomes 
truly ‘public’ through the concerted actions and expressions of power that take place there – as 
Benhabib puts it “public space is the space ‘where freedom can appear’” (Benhabib 2002; 211). 
Seen in this light, the links between an Arendtian concept of power and the debates surrounding the 
destruction and reconstruction of urban places discussed earlier in this chapter become clear, 
especially with regards to divided communities. Violence against urban places, and the 
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reconstruction that follows this, can threaten this heterogenous space of appearance at the heart of 
the city. Hansen picks up on this theme, highlighting the relevance of Arendt’s thinking to 
contemporary discussions about “the capacity of urban forms to provide public access to common 
sites within which people could assemble as equals enjoying eachother’s company as competent 
actors – in short, as a plurality of citizens joined in solidarity by a common world” (Hansen 1993).  
This thinking is especially useful when thinking about urban planning in a post-crisis context. The 
creation of such sites would not only allow people to interact freely, but have a sufficient “capacity 
for ambiguity” to meet the needs of a fractured post-crisis society, in contrast top-down approaches 
such as monuments or general plans, which all too often attempt to impose a unitary view on the 
city (Pullan and Baillie 2013; 5). Such an approach suggests that urban reconstruction in the post-
crisis moment should be about opening up spaces of opportunity and ambiguity - public places that 
enable creative and emancipatory power from the bottom-up. This is in direct contrast to the urge to 
secure and privatise space seen in so many instances of post-crisis reconstruction such as post-civil 
war Beirut (Nagel 2000), Banda Aceh after the 2004 tsunami (Sammuels 2010), and the City of 
London after the terrorist attacks of the 1990s (Coaffee 2004).  
Arendt has been criticised by some, though, for an overly restrictive view of which issues are 
admissible for discussion in the public realm, and which should remain in the private realm. 
Benhabib offers a powerful critique of Arendt from a feminist standpoint, showing how excluding 
issues that have been traditionally assigned to the private sphere from the agenda in public space, in 
fact risks maintaining a patriarchal arrangement of power relations (Benhabib 1992). A perspective 
which maintains such an imbalance of power relations clearly fails to meet the transformative goal 
of post-conflict practice set out above. In response to this perceived shortcoming Benhabib offers 
Habermas, who shares Arendt’s focus on the importance of public space as a forum for dialogue, 
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but is more committed to widening and democratising access to this public sphere (Benhabib 1992). 
Whereas Arendt’s view of power and public space underlines the importance of creating spaces that 
have a bottom-up power enabling potential, Habermas’ approach encourages intervention earlier in 
the reconstruction and planning process to ensure that public space is constitutive of, and 
constituted by, a “radically open” public agenda (Benhabib 1992). 
Such an aspiration fits with the widely held view of Habermas as a strongly normatively committed 
theorist of modernity (Howell 1993). His theory of communicative action in the public realm is 
especially well suited to the post-conflict context since it seeks to provide a procedural roadmap to 
aid modern, plural societies in achieving what Fetherston has termed “dynamic coexistence”, or a 
“means of renegotiating the bases of mutual existence distorted by war”, through reasoned, 
intersubjective dialogue (Fetherston 2000; 212). In a Habermasian “ideal speech situation”, actors 
would participate in communicative exchange with the goal of identifying valid claims, defining 
priorities and deciding on actions in the political community (Healey 2006). Such exchanges would 
be subject to four tests – are they “clear and comprehensible”, “sincere and trustworthy”, 
“appropriate and legitimate” and “accurate and true” – to guard against the danger of 
communicative misinformation or distortion (Forester 1982). 
The ultimate aim of this process is to bring the diverse concerns and claims of a plural community 
into the same horizon of understanding, providing an open, just and rational means of deciding that 
community’s path, whilst precluding the subjugation or exclusion of any one group by another 
(Healey 2006). The attraction of this approach in the reconstruction of divided towns and cities is 
clear, as Healey sums up “such reason is required where ‘living together but differently’ in shared 
space and time drives us to search for ways of finding agreement on how to ‘act in the world’ to 
address our collective concerns” (Healey 1992; 150). As discussed in section 4 of this chapter, cities 
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can become targets by dint of their inherent potential for plurality and multiculturalism; indeed, 
managing such mixity is often seen as a thorny policy issue for contemporary urban 
administrations. Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality therefore seems to offer a possible 
means of positively managing this diversity, using it as a tool for empowerment rather than a fuel 
for division (although some have questioned how successful this can be in the face of deep rooted 
divisions (Healey 2006)). 
One theorist who has attempted to build a Habermasian approach into planning theory is Patsy 
Healey, whose theory of collaborative planning seeks to develop an institutionalist, communicative 
approach to planning (Healey 1992, 2006). She applies Habermas’ principles of communicative 
rationality to the planning process, using them as a tool through which, even in the most conflictual 
of circumstances, communities can find “a way of living together differently, through struggling to 
make sense together” (Healey 1992; 152).  This approach places as much emphasis on the process 
of planning as on its content, and shares the normative goals expressed by Charlesworth – that 
planning should be oriented towards goals of sustainability, social justice and inclusion (Healey 
1992, 2006). Interestingly, as well as its clear links to Habermas, the institutional approach adopted 
by Healey shares Arendt’s views on the generative possibilities of power, as well as an 
acknowledgement of the socially grounded and constructed nature of the decisions, interactions and 
knowledge that make up the planning process (Coaffee and Healey 2003). In short, Healey is 
calling for an approach to planning which, in direct contrast to neoliberal planning practices, 
emphasises the widest possible inclusion of stakeholders in the planning process, and the realisation 
!48
of consensus around even the thorniest of planning issues via free discursive practices in the 
Habermasian mode (Healey 1992, 2006).  2
Arendt and Habermas’ spatialised conceptions of power suggest two opportunities for 
transformative interventions in the reconstruction of the post-crisis city. Coupled with the 
Foucauldian analysis of how power relations are ingrained and normalised through the spaces and 
practices that surround us in everyday life, this suggests a three-pronged approach to understanding 
the destruction and reconstruction of the built environment, and to building back better. Such an 
approach would consist of three steps; 
 • Unpacking the hidden power relations ingrained in the built environment, and their role in 
influencing which buildings were destroyed in conflict, and which are which are scheduled 
to be rebuilt. As the next chapter will suggest, one way of approaching this challenge is 
through the prism of collective memory. 
 • Encouraging a collaborative planning process in the post-conflict environment, where the 
reconstruction agenda is set through inclusive, communicative practices that themselves 
build mutual trust and understanding in divided communities. 
 • Promoting the reconstruction of shared buildings and spaces that enable generative, grass 
roots power, rather than those which perpetuate divided communities, or the spatial 
arrangements of power which formerly contributed to conflict 
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 Whilst Healey acknowledges criticisms of this approach as being overly idealistic and unrealistic, 2
she points out that the 10 years between the first publication of her book Collaborative Planning 
have seen a sea change towards greater multi-stakeholder consultation across Europe (Healey 
2006). 
In addressing these three steps, reconstruction efforts must also avoid the pitfalls raised in section 5 
of this chapter. Reconstruction must be authentic to the communities that will live and use the 
environment, and not a convenient facsimile of what went before. The reconstruction process must 
be truly inclusive, engaging with all concerned groups as equals and aware of the power relations at 
play during the consultation process itself. Finally, the reconstruction process has to represent an 
attempt to move towards progressive and sustainable peace in and through the built environment, 
not simply a return to the status quo ante. 
The understanding of the destruction and reconstruction of the built environment, and its 
relationship to the exercise of power, explored above is intricately linked with the idea of collective 
memory that will be set out in the following chapter. The distinction between power exercised over 
subjects through the urban fabric, and generative power constituted and wielded by people coming 
together in and through spaces in this environment, mirrors the distinction between ‘top down’ and 
‘bottom up’ expressions of collective memory in the built environment that will be discussed next. 
This suggests that to use both theoretical frameworks in concert could provide an opportunity to 
bring new insight to the understanding and practice of post-crisis reconstruction of towns and cities. 
A key task of this enquiry will be to use the notion of memory to help ascertain to what extent the 
three steps set out above have been met in Osh since the events of 2010. That is, unpacking the 
relationship between memory and the built environment in Osh will help us to understand how 
power relations are ingrained in current and recent planning decisions, to what extent any planning 
process has been - or should be - collaborative, and whether reconstruction in the city is enabling 
the creation of spaces for generative power or simply (re)building problematically skewed power 
relations. These questions, and more, will be addressed further in Chapters Six to Ten, but before 
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moving on to this analysis it will be useful to spend some time exploring the notion of collective 
memory, what it means and how it can help to provide an insight into the post-crisis city. 
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Chapter 3: Theorising Collective Memory 
“The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting” 
Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting 
3. 1. Introduction 
Of the trio of central themes underpinning this research identified in Chapter One, the notion of 
collective memory is significant as the key which should help to unlock new insights into the 
question of post-conflict (re)construction in Osh. It is the prism through which multiple 
perspectives on urban change in Osh since the 2010 events can be both discerned and analysed. And 
yet the concept of collective memory is by no means a unitary one. As shall become clear over the 
course of this chapter there are a number of ways that collective memory has been theorised in 
recent years, with some writers presenting it as a way in which power (over identity or historical 
narratives, for example) is imposed from above, whilst others insist on its potential for 
emancipatory resistance at the grassroots. The relationship between collective memory and the built 
environment is also multifaceted, sometimes recording indelible traces of power relations, 
sometimes concretising identity and sometimes helping to process the experience of radical - even 
traumatic - change into the narrative arc of a community. In the broader context of an investigation 
into urban change in the aftermath of violent conflict, then, it is clear that a consideration of 
collective memory, with its intimate links to notions of power, identity, trauma and resistance, has 
the potential to be quite illuminating, hence its central position in this thesis. 
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Collective memory has become increasingly popular in recent years, both as a subject of academic 
investigation and as a prism through which academics seek to better understand a wide variety of 
phenomena – indeed, it has become such an important issue that Huyssen has been moved to call it 
“a cultural obsession of monumental proportions” (Huyssen 2000; 26). Numerous explanations 
have been offered for memory’s inexorable rise, including the increasing prevalence of identity 
politics and ethnic conflict (Bell 2006), the rise of the nation state as the pre-eminent form of 
political organisation in the contemporary world (Olick 2003), the wave of democratisation that 
spread over Eastern Europe, South America and Southern Africa, prompting public debates over the 
past (Misztal 2003) and the seemingly unstoppable rise of globalisation, which has pushed people to 
look to memory as a shelter from what Edward Said termed “the ravages of history and a turbulent 
time” (Said 2000; 177). 
Collective memory is not the same thing as history, even though, as Bell has noted, the distinction 
between the two concepts is not always clear (Bell 2006). This paper will take the view that whilst 
history should be seen as the conscious re-telling and analysis of events that have already occurred 
in the past, memory, the very act of remembering, brings those events into the present, and presents 
them as an ongoing experience (Halbwachs 1952; Bell 2006; Connerton 1989). 
So, what can collective memory offer as a prism through which to view post-conflict cities? Firstly, 
as will become clear in the course of this chapter, many theorists have suggested that collective 
memory is intimately linked to space and the built environment, (see Halbwachs 1952, Nora 1996, 
Connerton 1989) and that this link deserves further investigation in order to fully understand the 
way we use and understand the world around us. Secondly, seeking to understand how collective 
memory is mediated through the urban environment suggests new ways of seeing and investigating 
cities, whether it is by focussing on monuments and other explicitly commemorative spaces (see 
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Johnson 1995, 2002; Crampton 2001, Jarman 2001) or by seeking to understand the informal ways 
in which ordinary people use their surroundings as aide-memoires in their day to day lives (see 
Blokland 2001, Hebbert 2005) as discussed in the first half of this chapter. By questioning how 
collective memory is inscribed in the built environment, these writers have all developed powerful 
and novel methods for exploring cities. Finally, as will be argued in the second half of this chapter, 
understanding how collective memory and the built environment are linked helps us to better 
understand themes such as power, identity and trauma, all of which are central to understanding the 
post-conflict city. 
3.2. What is collective memory? 
Virtually every consideration of the concept of collective memory begins with reference to the 
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs – as Misztal puts it “his assertion that every group develops 
a memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity is still the starting point for all research 
in the field” (Misztal 2003; 51). 
Although Halbwachs’ seminal works on collective memory, including Les Cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire (Social Frameworks of Memory) and La Topographie legendaire des evangiles en terre 
sainte (Legendary Topography of the Gospels of the Holy Land), were neglected for some time, the 
key concepts he developed in the early part of the 20th century have since played a central role in 
informing discussions of collective memory, and particularly the spatial elements of memory 
(Hebbert 2005). Some of Halbwachs’ key ideas, that collective memory is constitutive of group 
identity; that memories are acquired and evoked socially, not individually; and that collective 
memories are rooted in the present, and continually recalled and remade according to the needs of 
the present (Halbwachs 1952),  are still central to our understanding of collective memory. These 
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ideas have been leant further credence by the rise of modernist conceptions of the national as an 
“imagined political community” which relies of shared cultural resources and mythology 
popularised by Benedict Anderson (Anderson 2006; 7). 
What is more, Halbwachs’ work introduced a consideration of the dynamic relationship between 
collective memory and place. His 1941 work La topographie légendaire des evangiles en terre 
sainte, explored how spaces in Jerusalem had been overlaid with layers of memory by Jews, 
Romans, Christians and Muslims, all of whom have used the landscape, buildings, paths and other 
elements of the built environment as parts of their frameworks of remembering (Halbwachs 1941). 
Places in the built environment are especially attractive components of a framework of collective 
memory by virtue of their perceived stability – what better way to underpin your community’s 
claim to a specific, unbroken lineage than by linking it to “the material milieu that surrounds us”? 
(Connerton 1989; 37). 
The notion of using the built environment to store memory was further developed by another 
French academic, Pierre Nora, who undertook a vast project of cataloguing the sites – often, but not 
always, material – in which French collective memory is inscribed (Nora 1996). Nora identified 
what he called Lieux de mémoire, or realms of memory, which he described as “material, symbolic 
and functional” sites, which house the complex network of collective memories that support a given 
community (Nora 1996; 14). Although Nora has been criticised for promoting an overly nostalgic 
view of the past as a golden age of more authentic memories (Till 2008), his assertion that the 
acceleration of history in the twentieth century explains the growing importance of the study of 
collective memory, and its expression through the environment that surrounds us, remains 
influential today (Nora 1996). 
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Today, numerous academics have further investigated the role of elements of the urban environment 
as potential vessels or “touchstones” for collective memory (Forest and Johnson,2002, Gillis 1994, 
Johnson 1995), and it is these investigations that will form the basis of this literature review. The 
second part of this review will examine some of the key issues brought to light by investigations of 
the links between collective memory and the built environment – power, identity and what could be 
called post-crisis paradigm shifts – and in doing so demonstrate the considerable explanatory power 
of collective memory as a prism through which researchers can view the built environment.  
3.3 Theorising collective memory; ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ and meeting in the middle 
However, before exploring these issues, it will first be vital to look more closely at contemporary 
interpretations of the notion of collective memory itself, especially focussing on its interactions with 
space. This section will set out two broad schools of thought on the nature of collective memory – 
often characterised as “top-down” and “bottom-up” (Misztal 2003) – before suggesting a third 
approach that attempts to integrate the most useful elements of both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
methods, whilst seeking insights in the dynamic space where ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
expressions of collective memory meet. 
3.3.1 Imposing memory from above 
Broadly speaking, the ‘top-down’ approach, which explores how collective memory is used by elite 
groups to continuously legitimise their position of power and conception of society,  can trace its 
theoretical roots to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s (1983) study of the construction of tradition (and by 
extension social memory) The Invention of Tradition. This influential work sought to demonstrate 
how much of what is currently presented as age-old ‘tradition’ is, in fact, a relatively recent 
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invention, created to increase social cohesion and cement group membership, to legitimise the 
authority of governing institutions, and to ensure group members share the same belief systems and 
norms of behaviour (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Crucially, Hobswbam and Ranger point to the 
process and materials used to construct new traditions, and they highlight the fact that a tradition 
itself may become the site and symbol of dischord, a battleground where group identity is 
negotiated and tested (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).  
This observation is particularly pertinent for the study of collective memory in the physical 
environment, and has been developed and tested by numerous geographers who have studied the 
process of memorialisation in the built environment (see Johnson 1995, 2002; Gillis 1994, Forest 
and Johnson 2002). Mitchell has likened these investigations to an “archaeology of power”, that 
uses the diverse traces inscribed in the physical landscape – but especially around commemorative 
sites such as memorials, statues, museums and the like - to piece together a picture of the way the 
dominant force in a given society wished to be seen – what it wanted people to remember, and 
forget (Mitchell 2003; 446). In recent years a range of spaces have been subjected to this kind of 
investigation, including Robben Island and the Voertrekker monument in South Africa (Deacon 
1998; Crampton 2001), Soviet statues and memorials in Post-Soviet Russia (Forest and Johnson 
2002), protestant ‘orange arches’ in Ulster (Jarman 2001) and public statuary in Dublin (Johnson 
1995) to name but a few. 
  
These kinds of investigations are demonstrative of the ‘top-down’ approach to collective memory in 
a number of ways. They focus on elements of the built environment that have been constructed with 
the explicit aim of promoting collective remembering of something, or someone, unpacking the 
both the visual imagery and symbolism used in the commemorative space, and its placement and 
relationship with other elements of the environment (Till 2008, Crampton 2001, Johnson 2002). By 
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subjecting the form and location of memorial spaces to careful scrutiny, these writers have sought to 
unearth clues to the political and social purpose of the space beyond its stated aim of 
commemoration. 
Recalling Renan’s prescient statement that ““l’essence d’une nation est que tous les individus aient 
beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oublies bien de choses” (the essence of a 
nation is not only that individuals have many things in common, but also that they have all forgotten 
many things) (Renan cited in Bhabha 1990; 11), ‘top-down’ theorists of collective memory have 
investigated the processes whereby certain memories are allowed to be commemorated in public 
space, and others are not. The successful development of memorial spaces can be ascribed to the 
social power and cultural capital of the person or group pushing for commemoration (Jordan 2006), 
with controversy and contestation around this process arising when power relations are in flux 
(Deacon 1998, Forest and Johnson 2002).   
However, the ‘top-down’ approach has been criticised for focussing too narrowly, to the detriment 
of its explanatory power. By restricting its investigations to the most obvious of memorial spaces – 
the monuments and museums that Schudson sees as “self-consciously framed acts of 
commemoration” – ‘top-down’ theorists have ignored the countless other places in which collective 
memory crystallises (Schudson 1997; 3). Thus, investigations have concentrated on the 
quintessential ‘low hanging fruit’ – places where memory has clearly been codified, instead of 
digging more deeply to find the less obvious, but potentially more interesting, quotidian expressions 
of collective memory in space. As Schudson puts it “we look for effective public memory at self-
conscious memory sites not because that is where we will find what we are looking for, but because 
that is where the illumination makes looking most convenient” (Schudson 1997; 3). 
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What is more, many theorists have rejected the idea that an entirely ‘invented’ collective memory or 
tradition can be imposed on people from above – as Misztal points out “people tend to reject any 
vision of the past which contradicts their recollection and sense of truth” (Misztal 2003; 60). Seeing 
collective memory solely as the prerogative of ruling elites, who impose it onto the passive masses 
from on high, is seen by many theorists as a reductive, and unrealistic, approach which negates the 
power of the everyday experience of most people (Irwin-Zarecka 2007, Misztal 2003, Olick 2003, 
Rolston 2010).  
3.3.2 Identifying ‘street level’ memories 
Thus, a different approach developed alongside the ‘top-down’ method, one that takes its cue not 
from the elites, but from the street level – this is often referred to as popular memory (Misztal 2003; 
61). This approach, which seeks to identify and examine collective memories that are constructed 
from the ‘bottom-up’ takes its cue from the writings of Michel Foucault, who suggested that popular 
knowledge is devalued by a pervasive “system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates 
this discourse and this knowledge” (Foucault 1980: 207). Foucault was therefore interested in how 
‘counter’ or ‘popular’ memories – often articulated in informal ways outside the scope of this 
system of power - can resist the hegemonic discourses of memory, and other “regimes of truth”, 
imposed from above (Misztal 2003, Foucault 1980; 81).  It is clear to see how this concern has been 
carried over into investigations of collective memory by theorists who seek to identify how certain 
groups express their collective memories in opposition to the universalising commemorative 
discourse of those in power (Misztal 2003). This point is well made by Olick, who reminds us that 
“memory is never unitary, no matter how hard various powers strive to make it so. There are always 
subnarratives, transitional periods and contests over dominance” (Olick 2003; 8).  
!59
The ‘popular’ memory approach gained in popularity in the 1970s and 80s, especially through the 
work of the Popular Memory Group, based in Birmingham University’s Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies (Misztal 2003). Members of the Popular Memory Group were concerned to ensure 
all of the ways a society constructs the past were taken into account when thinking about collective 
memory and history, and saw popular memory not simply as an “object of study”, but also as a 
“dimension of political practice”, that is to say, they considered the uncovering of previously 
unheard or silenced narratives as an emancipatory, and very political, process (Popular Memory 
Group 1998; 75). After all, there is a reason that certain types of knowledge are privileged in the 
public sphere whilst others are silenced. One of the most important contributions of the Popular 
Memory Group to the study of collective memory was their focus on the importance of oral history 
as a way of unearthing hidden narratives, and literally giving voice to silenced memories (Perks and 
Thomson 1998, Misztal 2003). 
This conception of collective memory is reflected in the work of writers such as Hebbert, Blokland 
and Atkinson, who have advocated investigations of collective memory that begin at street level and 
through the experiences of ordinary people (Hebbert 2005, Blokland 2001, Atkinson 2007). In 
investigations of the built environment, this approach does not focus on the monumental 
architecture constructed by elite groups with the express aim of commemoration. Rather it examines 
the everyday spaces in which members of a community meet and participate in the re-telling (and 
therefore construction) of collective memory – in Atkinson’s words “the ordinary places where 
memory erupts” (Atkinson 2007; 521). This might include a cafe, a butcher’s shop, or a street 
corner (Blokland 2001), or a new housing development – and its relationship with what previously 
stood in that space (Atkinson 2007, Dawson 2005), investigating how these spaces resist the 
discourse that elite groups might seek to impose. This approach also takes into account the conflicts 
and tensions between groups seeking to inscribe memories in public spaces from the bottom-up, as 
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described, for example, in Bosco’s analysis of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo movement in 
Argentina (Bosco 2004). 
3.3.3 Collective memory – a third way? 
However, the most fruitful approach to understanding collective memory, and specifically its 
relationship with the built environment, is to bring the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches into 
the same investigatory framework, as has been advocated by a number of academics (see Schudson 
1997, Olick 2003, Rolston 2010, Irwin-Zarecka 2007). This approach does not deny that elites 
attempt to construct and privilege certain narratives of collective memory, but either does it ignore 
the narratives being created and popularised at the street level. Instead it looks at the dynamic 
interactions between these narratives to try and shed light on the processes through which one 
narrative becomes widely accepted as the ‘truth’, and how this changes over time (Rolston 2010, 
Misztal 2003).  
This focus seems particularly appropriate for investigations of the relationship between collective 
memory and the built environment, since this often provides the space in which ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ expressions of collective memory interact – for example, some writers have begun to 
detail the changing ways in which people interact with monuments and statues – exemplars of ‘top-
down’ collective memory -  showing how people’s everyday use of monumental space can often be 
highly subversive, using the space to tell their own story (see Forest and Johnson 2002, Mitchell 
2003). Of course this process works both ways, and Rolston’s consideration of the future of murals 
in Northern Ireland shows how elite groups, now embarrassed by images of warfare seen to be out 
of the step with the new, peaceful, Northern Ireland, have tried to use the street level vernacular of 
mural painting to portray a more peaceful past and future (Rolston 2010). 
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Such a dynamic approach to understanding collective memory does not negate the experiences of 
ordinary people, and the way they use and experience the built environment from day to day. 
Neither does it deny the power of elite groups to manipulate and shape the built environment to 
reflect the narratives of collective memory they favour, or underplay their motivations to do so. It 
does, however, encourage researchers to think in wider terms than simply one paradigm, and to pay 
attention to the processes and negotiations that occur when differing narratives of collective 
memory, formed in different contexts, from different materials and by different groups, collide in 
the same space. 
3.4 Power, identity and trauma in collective memory and the built environment 
The second section of this literature review seeks to examine why collective memory is such a 
useful prism through which to examine the built environment. Understanding how, as Nora (1996; 
1) put it, memory is “crystallised” in our surroundings helps us to understand how the built 
environment is affected by (and produces effects upon) a number of issues that will be central to 
this research. Specifically, investigations of the relationship between collective memory and urban 
space, using the dynamic approach outlined above, have often revealed particularly interesting 
insights into questions of power (who does and does not have power in a given society? What are 
the hidden ways through which power exercised in the public sphere?); identity (how is community 
identity constituted and perpetuated? Who is left out of this process?); and the impact of sudden, 
often traumatic, shifts in social and political relations, such as periods of warfare or revolution. Of 
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course, these issues rarely stand alone – they are interlinked in complex causal webs, and impact on 
each other in diverse ways.   
3.4.1 Collective memory and power 
Mitchell has likened the process of deconstruction of collective memory in the built environment to 
an “archaeology of power”, that uses the diverse traces inscribed in the physical landscape to 
uncover who held power in a community, by investigating who was able to decide what was 
memorialised in the built environment, and what was not (Mitchell 2003; 446).  Just as the previous 
chapter demonstrated how buildings can form part of a discourse of power in a given place and 
time, commemorative places often play a key role in this discourse. This archaeology requires the 
researcher to take into account both the top-down and bottom-up perspectives, as it is concerned as 
much with unravelling officially constituted memorials and commemorative spaces as it is with 
showing their flip-side; which narratives have purposefully been devalued or forgotten in the public 
space.  
For example, Till has noted the gendered nature of imagery prevalent in many war memorials, 
suggesting that in the past women were often left out of such representations, or reductively 
represented as passive victims of conflict, instead of the active participants they often were (Till 
2008). This suggests that women’s memories of conflicts were not valued in public, monumental 
spaces. Similarly, Andrew Crampton’s examination of the Voortrekker monument in South Africa 
highlights the positioning of the monument in direct sight of the South African parliament in 
Pretoria as a significant statement about power relations in and of itself (Crampton 2001). 
Conversely, Mitchell has described how groups can subvert the meanings and use of memorial 
spaces that they do not feel meet their commemorative needs or accurately reflect their memories 
!63
and experiences, even when they may not have the power to erect their own competing memorials 
(Mitchell 2003). These examples show how subjecting the form and location of memorial spaces to 
careful scrutiny can uncover clues to the structure of power relations in a society at the time they 
were erected, and how these shift and change over time (Johnson 2002). This supports Connerton’s 
assertion that dominant groups consolidate their dominance by refusing to allow other groups to 
assert their collective memory (Connerton 1989). 
Such scrutiny takes into account not only whose memories are honoured in the built environment, 
but how they came to be so – who had the power to ensure their voice was heard. This can partly be 
explained by the cost of building and maintaining commemorative places, which can often only be 
borne by (or with the support of) powerful elites (Mitchell 2003).  Referring to urban change in 
Berlin,  Jordan develops this argument further, setting out four factors that she believes must 
combine if a space is to be transformed into a widely accepted memorial space; firstly, so called 
“memorial entrepreneurs”, or advocates for memorialisation in a space, must lobby on behalf of the 
space; then proposals made by such advocates “must resonate with a broader public”; and finally 
both land use, and land ownership, must favour its transformation into a specifically 
commemorative space (Jordan 2006; 11-13). These factors all rely on the kind of cultural, social 
and economic capital that is more accessible to powerful groups, who are more likely to be able to 
lobby (or be in a decision making position), have more tools at their disposal to influence public 
opinion, and are more likely to be able to influence issues of land ownership and use. This 
assessment seems to be borne out by Chang and Huang’s investigation of waterfront redevelopment 
in Singapore, where what has been built – and crucially what has been demolished and ‘forgotten’ – 
reflects the values of elites. The ‘ordinary’ people that previously lived and worked there were 
powerless to stop their experiences from being written out of the redeveloped environment, except 
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from through highly selective state-controlled processes of commemoration through public art 
(Chang and Huang 2005). 
3.4.2 Collective memory as marker of identity 
Theorists of collective memory have long been concerned with the question of identity – it was 
Halbwachs who suggested that collective memories are used to continually construct and reinforce 
the identity of a given community by demonstrating both its uniqueness, and a sense of its unbroken 
continuity through time, from past, to present, to future (Halbwachs 1952). It is by being reshaped 
through what Connerton refers to as the “framework” of collective memory that individual 
memories are forged into the distinct and continuous historical narrative deemed so important to the 
legitimacy, and therefore longevity, of a group’s identity. (Connerton 1989; 37). There is 
considerable overlap between this conception of collective memory as a constituent part of group 
identity and the modernist views of national identity proposed by Smith, and by Anderson who 
famously proposed the model of the nation as an “imagined political community” (Smith 1999, 
Anderson 2006; 7). This explains why many collective memory theorists see the rise of the nation 
state and the increasing attention paid to the question of collective memory in the public sphere as 
closely linked, as the new national community sought to strengthen people’s perceptions of it as 
cohesive and legitimate (Misztal 2003, Till 2008). 
Investigations of expressions of collective memory in the built environment can reveal hitherto 
unseen aspects of the construction of identities in public space. For example Deacon’s work 
unpacking the debates that took place in South Africa in the 1970s and 80s around the future of 
Robben Island aptly demonstrates this point. Here she shows the tension between the ‘old guard’ of 
the right wing government, who wished to turn the area into a nature reserve, and anti-apartheid 
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campaigners, who wanted to turn it into a museum, specifically geared for remembrance of the 
apartheid period and prisoners who had been kept there. Each group was attempting to use the 
physical space (Robben Island) as a resource in order to purposefully remember or forget the 
horrors of the apartheid era as it came to an end, and as South Africans began to negotiate a new 
political and cultural identity after years of white supremacist rule (Deacon 1998). Similarly, Mills’ 
investigation of a neighbourhood of Istanbul – Kuzguncuk – investigates how the existence of a 
well known Armenian church alongside a mosque is presented as proof of the harmonious and 
tolerant history of this rapidly gentrifying neighbourhood. However, she argues that this selective 
interpretation of the built environment in Kuzguncuk obscures the traumatic and violent experiences 
of minority groups such as the Armenians (but also the Greek and Jewish communities) during the 
‘Turkification’ of modern day Turkey. Indeed, Mills contends that by the time the mosque was built, 
the multi-ethnic nature of the neighbourhood that residents now ‘remember’ through the 
juxtaposition of church and mosque had already disappeared (Mills 2006). Numerous other writers 
have undertaken similar work to show how what is remembered and what is forgotten in the built 
environment can tell the researcher much about the struggle to define and negotiate community 
identities in public space and, crucially, how such identities shift and evolve through time (see Lim 
2000, Jarman 2001, Schwartz and Zerubavel 1986). 
3.4.3 Radical change and social trauma 
According to Connerton, expressions of collective memory often signify an attempt to “mark out 
the boundaries of a radical beginning” through a ritualised use of the past (Connerton 1989; 13). 
This is because all new beginnings, however radical they may be, need to refer to the past regime 
and ways of being in order to be intelligible (Connerton 1989). This understanding supports 
suggestions that it is when a community feels threatened that it asserts its collective memory as a 
!66
bulwark against the perceived threat (Bell 2003, Rolston 2010, Megill 1998). This is particularly 
salient during periods of sudden, radical social and political change, and helps to explain why 
numerous theorists have chosen to investigate the links between collective memory and traumatic 
events in recent years (see Bell 2003, Edkins 2003, Neal 1998, Sztompka 2000). 
The concept of trauma has increasingly been transplanted from its origins in psychology and 
medicine to become a figure of contemporary social discourse (Sztompka 2000). However, as Bell 
has pointed out, this process has not been without controversy, with some theorists protesting that 
psychological readings of trauma cannot be stretched to encompass the collective experience, even 
as others have argued that trauma at the collective level is essentially a social construct (see Bell 
2003).  
Attempts to define trauma at a social or cultural level have drawn on a number of key themes of 
temporality, perception and community cohesion. Sztompka has identified four qualities of 
“potentially traumatising social change”; timing (it is “sudden and rapid”), scope (it is far reaching), 
origin (it is perceived as being externally imposed) and mentality (it is perceived as “shocking” or 
“unexpected”) (Sztompka 2000; 452). Neal echoes this assessment, seeing collective trauma as “an 
assault on social life as it is known and understood” which provokes shock and chaos, and threatens 
a group’s core values (Neal 1998; 4-5). In turn, Edkins has described social trauma as an event 
which upsets and distorts the “linear time” of the state (or other dominant political community), and 
therefore threatens to disrupt its carefully constructed narrative of unbroken political and social 
legitimacy (Edkins 2003). So, drawing on all of these conceptions, social or collective trauma can 
be defined as an event (or events) that radically disturb that which a community has come to 
perceive as normal. 
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This is not necessarily a wholly negative experience – trauma can be viewed as a feature of social 
change (Sztompka 2000), a brief “window for re-inscribing new understandings of the world” (Bell 
2003; 10). That is to say, the shocking effect of a traumatic event on a community prompts a re-
ordering of not only social relations but also social memory, as old orthodoxies are questioned and 
collective memory is rewritten in order to make sense of trauma by selectively incorporating certain 
of its elements – what Salvatici, Losi and Passerini have called ‘taming chaos’ (Salvatici et al. 
2001). Indeed, the process of absorbing a traumatic event into a community’s narrative of collective 
memory can itself bolster group cohesion, as members of a community negotiate appropriate ways 
of retelling and recalling the event (Neal 1998, Bell 2003). Intriguingly there are parallels between 
this notion and the idea of a brief window of opportunity to physically ‘build back better’ in the 
post-crisis moment explored in the previous chapter. 
Of course, in this process many of the same tensions described in the first half of this chapter will 
emerge, as a new narrative is developed and inscribed in the public space through a process of 
negotiation between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ impulses, where some aspects of collective 
memory are privileged and others forgotten. In this vein, Gluck’s examination of Japanese 
memories of the ‘Postwar’ period is illuminating, as it shows how the national trauma of defeat the 
Second World War gave rise to five separate narratives of collective memory, supported by different 
elements of Japanese society, all competing to reframe Japanese national identity in the Postwar. 
The extent to which these narratives negated or incorporated the memory of the war itself differed 
from narrative to narrative, as did their success in positioning themselves as the dominant, 
convincing story of a people (Gluck 2003). 
In this case there was at least widespread recognition of the traumatic nature of the event which 
prompted the memory “repair work” (Neal 1998; 5) carried out in the Postwar (Gluck 2003). 
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However, this is not always the case, and the very question of what is allowed to be publicly 
acknowledged and commemorated as ‘traumatic’ is subject to the same questions of power and 
resistance explored earlier in this chapter. As Edkins remarks, “the way in which we acknowledge 
and describe what we call trauma can be very much influenced by dominant views, that is, by the 
state” (Edkins 2003; 11). Dawson’s exploration of the politics of Bloody Sunday in Northern 
Ireland demonstrates how the dominant political power – the British state – attempted to deny the 
traumatic nature of the experience of civil rights protesters on Bloody Sunday. In addition to the 
official narrative set out by the Widgery Tribunal, described by Dawson as a whitewash which 
actually served to intensify the feelings of trauma in affected communities, the very space in which 
the event occurred was changed almost beyond recognition by road-building and redevelopment 
programmes, effectively writing the trauma out of public space (Dawson 2005). 
So, traumatic events provoke a reframing of collective memory in affected groups, as communities 
seek to make sense of events, and weave them into familiar and constructive narratives of identity. 
Moreover, the acknowledgement or denial of an event as ‘traumatic’ in narratives of collective 
memory– and its subsequent inscription as such in the built environment – once again sheds light on 
the way that collective memory, and by extension identity, comes to be framed in public space. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Reviewing the breadth of literature regarding collective memory, with special attention to its 
relationship with the built environment, has amply demonstrated the challenges and opportunities 
inherent in considerations of collective memory as a concept. The greatest challenge is to move 
beyond overly reductive approaches, that either view collective memory as a monolithic discourse 
imposed and manipulated by elite groups in the service of their own interests; or that claim that only 
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‘counter’ or ‘popular’ memories which emerge from the street level can have any sort of claim to 
authenticity, as explored in section three of this chapter.  
Whilst these approaches, characterised here as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’, undoubtedly have 
considerable power when brought to bear as explanatory frameworks in the built environment, the 
real opportunity lies in bringing these two apparently opposing conceptions together in the same 
horizon of investigation. By interrogating the way in which ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ narratives 
of collective memory collide and interact in the built environment, the researcher can begin to 
unpack the ways in which narratives of memory (and their corollary, narratives of forgetting) are 
actively negotiated, framed and recorded in urban space. As explored in section four, this process is 
affected by, and produces significant effects on, the power relations, identity politics and 
experiences of radical change and trauma of any community engaged in the ongoing process of 
building and expressing its narrative of collective memory. 
One important feature of collective memory explored above is its relationship with the built 
environment, which has a particular role to play in mediating and expressing collective memory by 
presenting it as a concrete and timeless fact (Halbwachs 1992, Connerton 1989). For this reason it 
seems apt for researchers to pay particular attention to the experience of conflict in the urban 
environment, which is often devastating. This is not just because of the impact of war and violent 
conflict on the inhabitants of cities and towns, but because it could be interpreted as an attack on the 
very fabric of a community’s memory, and therefore, as we have seen in sections three and four 
above, its sense of identity (Bevan, 2007). If we understand conflict as a prime example of a 
socially traumatic event then, building on the ideas explored in section four, the experience of 
conflict on cities can be seen as doubly significant for urban societies. 
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Moreover, returning to the understanding of the built environment set out in the previous chapter - 
as a resource for power, a key element of the discourses of power that define the scope of available 
choices for the residents of that environment - means the interplay between collective memory and 
urban landscape becomes all the more important. The physical manifestations of collective  memory 
- be they official monuments or informal touchstones - are part of the ongoing processes of 
negotiating and mediating power through the city. As discussed above, these manifestations record 
certain configurations of power and social and economic capital, they concretise identity, and they 
serve to process trauma into coherent, productive community narratives. Urban commemorative 
spaces produce effects on city residents then, although - as this investigation will go on to show - 
these effects can vary wildly between residents. Thinking in terms of collective memory, then, gives 
the researcher an insight into all these processes. 
How authorities, and communities, manage the effects of conflict in the city is therefore a highly 
contentious process – as Nagel demonstrates, the reconstruction of post-war Beirut has highlighted 
urban memories of multiculturalism and openness in the new built environment – building public 
parks, squares and souks, and turned its back on memories of conflict by not according them room 
in the rebuilt public space (Nagel 2002). However, memories of war and its impacts on the fabric of 
urban life cannot be so easily written out of the city, and Beirut remains riven by segregation and 
(not always) latent conflict that is beyond the control of the Government (Nagel 2002.). This is one 
reason that the question of memory has been at the forefront of contemporary academic enquiry into 
urban conflict, with initiatives such as the ESRC Conflict in Cities and the Contested State 
programme putting notions of memorialisation and commemoration at the heart of their studies.  
Although the previous two chapters have developed a valuable theoretical framework within which 
to situate this investigation, this will be of little use without a thorough understanding of the 
!71
particular context of Osh as a research site. The Soviet heritage of Kyrgyzstan (and Osh in 
particular), its specific identity as a city of southern Kyrgyzstan, and its troubled and violent recent 
history all exert their own powerful influences on the lives of residents and power brokers living 
there today. Any attempt to understand current urban trends in Osh without situating them in this 
wider historical arc would be therefore be partial at best, and doomed to fail at worst. The following 
chapter will therefore attempt to sketch out some of the most powerful vectors of influence acting 
on urban life in Osh today in order to shed further light on the reconstruction of the city since the 
Events of 2010. 
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Chapter 4: Osh - A City at the Crossroads 
4. 1. Introduction 
Having explored the main theoretical concepts - collective memory, post-crisis reconstruction, 
power and the city - that underpin this research in the previous two chapters, we turn now to the site 
of this research project, Osh. Whilst this investigation strongly disagrees with those who criticise a 
case study approach as being overly specific or producing incomparable data (as will be seen in 
Chapter 5), it is unquestionably true that the particular historical, cultural and economic trajectory 
of Osh must be brought into the field of inquiry of any rigorous research project based there. Any 
attempt to understand memory and reconstruction and Osh would fail without understanding the 
processes that have shaped the city, and its residents. This chapter, then, seeks to provide a broad 
overview of Osh, and identifies some important forces which continue to produce effects in the 
contemporary city. 
As discussed in Chapter One, Kyrgyzstan has been subject to two instances of serious internal 
conflict in the past quarter of the century, both of which occurred in the country’s south, primarily 
in Osh Oblast’, but also in Jalalabad Oblast’.  The most recent, and most serious, outbreak of 3
violence has left lasting scars on both the physical cityscape of Osh city, and on the affective 
cityscape of its inhabitants, and is the subject of this research. This chapter aims to explore the 
context in which this violence occurred, and continues to produce effects. It will begin by setting 
out the historical background of Kyrgyzstan, and of Osh city in particular. It will then focus on three 
of the most common narrative tropes used to speak about Osh, which have been reproduced in great 
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 An Oblast’ is an administrative division of territory, roughly equivalent to a region.3
numbers of news articles, non-governmental reports and academic papers in recent years, and 
unpacking them in order to understand their history, their links with the violence in Osh and their 
impact on the people who call the city home.  
The first narrative of Osh, and one which likely frames the other two, is as a post-Soviet city. No 
report into the 2010 violence in Osh has been able to tell the story without first situating it in the 
ruins of th e Soviet Union.  Similarly, scholarly papers seeking to explore issues such as ethnicity, 4
security, boundary disputes, language and much more all begin by first restating Kyrgyzstan’s 
position as a post-Soviet space (Fumagalli 2007a, Tishkov 1995, Menon 1995, Korth 2005). The 
centrality of this narrative will be dealt with in the present chapter in two ways. Primarily, section 
3.1 will specifically explore the urban legacy of the Soviet era through a relatively narrow lense. It 
will ask how Osh was governed and developed as an urban place during the Soviet era, how this has 
changed in post-Soviet times, and what effects this has produced on the city and its inhabitants. But 
sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter, which explore two other commonly used narratives for Osh, 
will also make reference to the experience of Osh as a post-Soviet place. Such was the all-
encompassing nature of the Soviet project that it would be unrealistic to try and divide its effects 
into neat sections without making allowance for overspill between them. 
The second trope that has become almost shorthand for Osh, is that of an ethnically divided city. A 
brief survey of news reporting regarding Osh reveals a near unanimous view of the city as divided 
along ethnic lines, with Uzbeks on one side, and Kyrgyz on the other, inspiring headlines such as 
“Scars remain in Osh after ethnic violence” (BBC 17/11/11), “Signs of official bias and abuse 
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 See, for example, investigations into the 2010 violence in Osh and its aftermath by the 4
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC 2011), Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch 2011) and 
International Crisis Group (International Crisis Group 2012), or the Open Society Foundation’s 
comprehensive 2011 paper on peace promotion in Kyrgyzstan (Melvin/Open Society Foundations 
2011).
deepen Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic rifts” (New York Times 05/11/11), “Osh Mayor pushes ahead with plan 
to rehouse Uzbeks” (Telegraph 14/08/11). Similarly, every major report into the Osh events by an 
international non-governmental organisation (NGO) or inquiry commission describes the violence 
as inter-ethnic in nature (Freedom House et al 2012, Human Rights Watch 2011, International Crisis 
Group 2010, Amnesty International 2010, Melvin/Open Society Foundations 2011). How the city of 
Osh, and indeed southern Kyrgyzstan more widely, came to be viewed so consistently along ethnic 
lines, and how this affects prospects for peace there, is explored more thoroughly in section 3.2. 
Finally, Osh also seems to have a third identity that analysts and journalists alike have commonly 
used to write about the city – that of Osh as a city of Southern Kyrgyzstan (and by extension, a city 
of the Ferghana Valley so often identified as ‘troubled’ in international literature (Megoran 2007)). 
Once again, none of the significant journalistic, scholarly or NGO reports mentioned above are able 
to engage with Osh as a city without situating it as a specifically southern city. Whilst this may at 
first seem like a matter of simple geographical location and context setting, when seen in the light 
of domestic Kyrgyzstani politics with its long history of north-south tension, it assumes more 
importance, as will be demonstrated in section 3.3 of this chapter. Before moving on to investigate 
these narrative tropes in greater detail though, it will be useful to spend some time setting out a little 
of the history of Kyrgyzstan, and of Osh in particular. 
4.2 History 
4.2.1 Kyrgyzstan – a brief historical overview 
One of the five republics to make up Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan may be small, with a population of 
around 5.5 million (CIA World Factbook 2012), yet it occupies what has proved to be a strategically 
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important location, from the time of the silk route to the present day, with key geopolitical concerns 
being played out in neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan (Roy 2009). According to the 2009 census 
Kyrgyzstan has a diverse population, with the majority 70.9% ethnic Kyrgyz population existing 
alongside significant ethnic Uzbek (14.3%) and Russian (7.8%) minorities, as well as other smaller 
minority groups such as the Dungan, Turks, Uighurs and Tajiks (National Statistical Committee of 
the Kyrgyz Republic 2009).  There are two officially recognised languages in the country, with 
Kyrgyz being accorded a higher status as the state language, and Russian identified as an official 
language. Uzbek, the language of the country’s second largest ethnic group, has not been recognised 
as an official language, much to the displeasure of many members of the Uzbek community, mainly 
located in the country’s south (Bond and Koch 2010). Kyrgyzstan remains a relatively poor country, 
with almost 33.7% of the population living below the poverty line, and almost half the population 
engaged in agriculture (CIA World Factbook 2012). Crucially, it currently lacks the ability to 
exploit significant natural resources, unlike some of its Central Asian neighbours (Dannreuther 
1994), although experts believe at least 10% of the country’s GDP comes from a single, much 
disputed, gold mine Kumtor (Trilling 2014). In recent years Kyrgyzstan once again came to 
geopolitical prominence in terms of its strategic importance in the US led ‘war on terror’. Following 
September 11th the US used the Manas airbase in northern Kyrgyzstan as a base for its operations in 
Afghanistan, bringing it into competition with Russia, who still views the country as falling firmly 
within its sphere of influence and maintains its own airbase (named ‘Kant’) not far away (Roy 
2009). After several years of speculation and negotiation the Manas airbase closed in 2014, and all 
US troops were withdrawn from the country. 
Kyrgyzstan has a rich legacy of historical influences, being situated at the crossroads of powerful 
empires both ancient and modern, a legacy which has led some to comment that cultural syncretism 
is the very “hallmark” of the diverse Central Asian region of which Kyrgyzstan is an integral part 
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(Akiner 1994; 6). The region was conquered first by Persian then, from the 6th to 16th centuries, by 
Turkic invaders, both of whom have left indelible traces on the linguistic and religious heritage of 
Kyrgyzstan and its neighbours (Roy 2009, Ferdinand 1994). Today’s nation states of Central Asia 
are a more modern phenomenon. By the end of the 18th century political life centred around three 
structures that had formed in the region -  the Bhukara Emirate (mainly in modern Uzbekistan), the 
Khiva Khanate (situated south of the Aral Sea) and the Kokand Khanate (made up of parts of 
modern day Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) (Akiner 1994). From the early 19th century 
another influence was thrown into the mix, as Tsarist Russia extended its influence southwards, 
finally taking control of the last of the Khanates, Kokand, in 1876 (Akiner 1994). Although Russian 
control did bring about some modernisation amongst the urban elites of Central Asia, the pace of 
change in the region was slow until World War One (Akiner 1994). 
4.2.2 Soviet Kirghizia 
It was the advent of the Soviet Union in 1922 which brought Kyrgyzstan into being as a nation 
state, albeit one which was subsumed by this larger political structure. In 1924 Stalin initiated the 
process of national delimitation in Central Asia, leading to Kyrgyzstan’s constitution first as an 
Autonomous Province, then as an Autonomous Republic, and finally as a Union Republic in 1936 
(Akiner 1994). The process of national delimitation remains of crucial importance to political life in 
Central Asia today (Haugen 2003), and the continued significance of this process will be explored 
further in section three of this chapter. In short, this period saw the creation of territorial divisions 
associated with a particular dominant ethnic and linguistic group, leading to the establishment of 
five the ethno-nationally constituted republics that now make up Central Asia – Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Roy 2009). The borders of Kyrgyzstan 
finalised in 1924 remain largely unchanged to the present day (Akiner 1994). Thus, the experience 
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and legacy of the Soviet era is central to forming any understanding of life in contemporary 
Kyrgyzstan, from ethnicity, to urban planning to regional identity, as shall be demonstrated later in 
this chapter.  
Clearly the legacy of the Soviet era looms large over Kyrgyzstan; many elements of the 
contemporary Kyrgyzstani experience can be traced to the Soviet epoch. Kyrgyzstan’s economy has 
been directly shaped by its experiences in the Soviet era, for example. Under the Soviet Union the 
Kyrgyzstani economy followed a classic colonial model of centre and periphery, with the Central 
Asian periphery providing raw materials to the industrial, Russian centre (Akiner 1994). Kyrgyzstan 
therefore became fully integrated into the Soviet economic system of inter-republic trade, a fact 
which caused considerable trouble when the sudden demise of the Soviet Union left it exposed to 
the vagaries of a global marketplace for which it was entirely unprepared (Roy 2009). This situation 
was exacerbated by the sudden loss of Soviet subsidies, which had accounted for up to a quarter of 
Kyrgyzstan’s income up in the Soviet era, making it economically ill prepared for independent 
statehood, even by the standards of its Central Asian neighbours (Engvall 2007). 
The cultural impact of the Soviet period was also significant in Kyrgyzstan: as was common across 
Central Asia literacy rates soared, and was accompanied by the rise of Russian as the Soviet lingua 
franca (Hiro 2011), underpinned by the introduction of Cyrillic in place of Arabic or Latin script in 
1940, as part of a universal education system which was “saturated with ideology” (Akiner 1994; 
12). Islam was actively discouraged, with mosques and madrassas closed down or repurposed (Liu 
2012). Women were educated and encouraged to leave the confines of the home sphere, cast off 
their veils, join the workforce and participate in political life (Liu 2012, Akiner 1998). Traditional 
art forms were replaced with Western/Russian alternatives such as opera or ballet, and even people’s 
dress and body language became Russified (Akiner 1998). This was all part of what Hirsch has 
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termed the Soviet Union’s mission as a “modernising empire” concerned with inculcating in its 
subjects a modern Soviet identity (Hirsch 2005). Crucially, in the context of this enquiry, urban 
spaces underwent a similar process of change during the Soviet era, as Akiner (1998) explained: 
“In the cities, the change in orientation was emphasised by the new, international style architecture, 
with its use of gleaming, modern building materials, open public spaces and multiple windows – a 
self conscious statement of dissociation from the private, intimate scale of traditional urban 
planning, characterised by narrow, winding streets, lined with blind, mud-brick walls” 
This process of Sovietisation was also facilitated by the high levels of population exchange under 
the Soviet Union. Large numbers of ethnic Russians moved to Kyrgyzstan during the Soviet period, 
either to work, or as a result of the perils of hunger, war and Stalinist purges occurring in the west of 
the Union. Although the phenomenon of Russian migration to Central Asia had existed prior to the 
Soviet Union, this gained momentum following this time (Kulchik et al 1996). Other groups, like 
Ukrainians, Germans, Chechens and Koreans, were forcibly resettled in the region during the 
Second World War, and came to rely on Russian as the common language of survival in their new 
surroundings (Kulchik et al 1996). All of these distinct elements of the Soviet experience have left 
indelible traces on the landscape and experience of Kyrgyzstan today. As section three of this 
chapter will demonstrate, it should come as no surprise that one of the most important elements of 
the Soviet legacy in Kyrgyzstan, and in Central Asia more widely, has been the struggle to create a 
viable, and stable, national identity within the territorial boundaries carved out during the Soviet 
era. Having only existed as a modern nation-state since independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan’s post-
Soviet experience has, at least in part, been defined by the search for nationhood in the shadow of 
the hegemonic Soviet past. The country is not alone in this - across the Central Asian region the 
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immediate post-perestroika era was defined by a renewed focus on local ethnic and cultural 
identities, often termed as the “national revival” (Khan 2009 and 2010). 
What this means for Osh in particular - its identity as a post-Soviet city, the impact of soviet 
nationalities and ethnicities policy, and the country’s persistent clan politics - will be explored in 
greater detail in section three. However, in light of the significance of the Soviet era in shaping 
Kyrgyzstan as we see it today, it is apt to spend a little time first examining the debates surrounding 
the political trajectory of post-Soviet countries. 
4.2.3 Post-Soviet Transitions 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union attention was soon turned to understanding and qualifying 
the transitional period that former Soviet countries were entering into. As one journalist noted in 
what was then Czechoslovakia 1991 “A friend of mine has a thick file labelled simply “TD”. It 
contains invitations to conferences on the subject ‘Transition to Democracy’ in Eastern Europe. 
“TC” might be a more accurate label. What one can certainly observe in the whole of Eastern 
Europe, and in much of the Soviet Union, is the Transition from Communism.” (Garton Ash 2000; 
36). This vignette neatly demonstrates the neo-liberal consensus that swiftly emerged out of the 
ashes of Communism; that post-Soviet countries should be assisted in making the transition – 
presented as entirely natural – from a communist to a liberal democratic system, characterised by a 
free market economy and democratic polity (Pickles and Smith 1998, Carothers 2002). This belief 
was famously summed up by Francis Fukuyama’s premature declaration of the “end of 
history” (Fukuyama 1992).  
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However, the reality of the diverse experiences of post-Soviet countries (including Russia) in the 
decades since the end of the Soviet Union have undermined this tidy narrative, and compelled 
theorists to look again at what Carothers has criticised as the “democratic teleology” that 
characterised earlier responses to the challenge of theorising post-Soviet transition (Carothers 2002; 
7). For example, whereas the Baltic states appear to be more or less firmly on the path of liberal 
democracy, as symbolised by their entry into the European Union in 2004, Belarus has earned the 
dubious distinction of being Europe’s ‘last dictatorship’ (Taylor 2011), and the current crisis in 
Ukraine shows just how contentious this path can be. Furthermore, efforts to smoothly transform 
nations into fully functioning liberal market democracies have not always paid the dividends which 
were promised or expected. Indeed, many post-communist societies, including Kyrgyzstan, have 
witnessed a significant increase in poverty and inequality, which has undermined the strengthening 
and deepening of the liberal democratic project in these countries (Pickles and Smith 1998). 
In this way, then, the paradigm of post-Soviet transition that focussed on the seemingly inevitable 
progression of former communist countries into liberal democracies can be seen to be just as 
arbitrary and inflexible a framework to impose on the post-Soviet experience of Kyrgyzstan, as the 
five stage Marxist-Leninist perspective used to explain the country’s history and development in the 
Soviet era (Tchoroev 2002). A more fruitful approach would be to acknowledge the “path 
dependency” of post-Soviet countries (Pickles and Smith 1998; 14). That is to say, to step outside a 
reductive assumption that transition is “a one-way process of change from one hegemonic system to 
another” and instead consider the particularities of each case of transition, their impacts on each 
country’s current position (Pickles and Smith 1998; 2).  
Of course, the post-Soviet experiences of the Central Asian states are good examples of the benefits 
of this approach. Although subject to highly similar forces under the Soviet Union, they have taken 
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different paths in the two decades of independence that have followed it, with Tajikistan falling prey 
to a long and bitter civil war from which it is still recovering, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan not 
deviating far from the model of command economy and strongman leader they inherited from the 
Soviet period, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan experimenting with different levels of economic and 
political liberalisation (Gleason 1997). Of all five states, Kyrgyzstan moved the quickest to embrace 
the economic and political ideals of the West, adopting a constitution that led it to be labelled 
(somewhat hastily) “Central Asia’s island of democracy” (Engvall 2007; 36), and enthusiastically 
implementing International Monetary Fund-inspired economic liberalisation policies (Gleason 
1997; Akiner 1998). As President Akayev himself put it “I became convinced that the only way out 
of the blind alley the socialist economy found itself was the way of radical reform and liberalisation 
of the economy on the basis of market reforms” (Akayev 2001; xi). However, the Kyrgyzstani 
approach has not been an unqualified success – the economy continues to struggle even as the 
country’s resource-rich neighbours power ahead. Moreover, the country’s political life has been 
marked by a series of struggles to maintain democratic gains against creeping authoritarianism and 
corruption (see, for example, the revolutions in 2005 and 2010). It is unsurprising, then, that some 
analysts see increasing convergence in the stories of the post-Soviet Central Asian states, rather than 
the divergence that first seemed set to take root (Gleason 1997). 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan, like 
its Central Asian neighbours, found itself somewhat unexpectedly independent in August 1991 (Roy 
2009). Politically, the post-Soviet period has been something of a mixed bag in Kyrgyzstan. It was 
widely seen as the most democratic of the Central Asian republics in the years immediately 
following independence, thanks to its relatively liberal constitution (Jones Luong 2002). First 
President Askar Akayev, a physicist from the northern Chuy province who rose to power in the 
dying days of the Soviet Union, set about transforming Kyrgyzstan into a market economy, and 
!82
introduced a relatively liberal constitution (Gleason 1997). However, some fourteen years after 
independence Akayev still held the reigns of power, and the purse strings, in what was widely 
perceived to be an increasingly corrupt regime (Melvin 2011, Radnitz 2006). This led to the so-
called ‘Tulip Revolution’ of 2005, which toppled Akayev and installed a new President, Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev, a former Prime Minister who hailed from the country’s southern Jalalabad province 
(Melvin Op Cit, KIC 2011, BBC 29/04/10). By April 2010 concerns had once again become 
apparent about the rampant corruption and monopolisation of power in the hands of President 
Bakiyev. A fresh round of demonstrations beginning in the Spring of 2010 ousted Bakiyev, and 
replaced him with interim President Roza Otunbayeva (Melvin Op Cit, KIC 2011). Otunbayeva had 
served in both Akayev and Bakiyev led governments in her long political career, and agreed not to 
run in the 2011 elections in an attempt to usher in the country’s first peaceful transition of power 
since the fall of the Soviet Union (Telegraph 08/04/10). In 2011, these elections brought President 
Almazbek Atambayev to power - another Chuy native and former Minister and a colleague of 
Otunbayeva’s in the Social Democratic Party. As we shall see in section 3 of this chapter, these 
alternations in power are significant, since they are intricately linked to the patterns of clan politics 
and patronage ingrained in Kyrgyzstani politics, as well as the country’s problematic north-south 
divide. 
4.2.4 The City of Osh 
The city of Osh certainly presents a striking picture to the first time visitor, with the distinctive 
silhouette of Sulaiman mountain rising in the city centre, the dense neighbourhoods of mahalla 
housing surrounding it, and the slash of green running through the heart of the city signalling the 
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path of the Ak-Bura river and the parks that run along it.  Osh is frequently presented as one of 5
Kyrgyzstan’s most historical cities, and an important stop on the ancient silk road – a legacy 
underlined by the Government’s decision to celebrate the city’s 3000th anniversary in 2000 (Liu 
2012). Situated in the south of the country, in the fertile and ethnically diverse Ferghana valley, the 
city grew rapidly during the twentieth century, from a population of 33,315 when it became a 
provincial centre in 1939, to 258,000 in 2009 (Liu 2012, National Statistical Committee of the 
Kyrgyz Republic 2009). Osh also holds particular legal position along with Bishkek as a city with 
Oblast’ status and the Southern Capital of Kyrgyzstan. As will be discussed in more detail later, the 
city has long been distinguished by its strong Uzbek identity. Situated only a few kilometres from 
the border with Uzbekistan, Osh’s Uzbek legacy has left its mark on almost every aspect of the city, 
from the ethnic make up of its population (which the 2009 census put at 44% Uzbek), to the 
aesthetics of many central neighbourhoods, to the many cafes and restaurants selling plov (a rice 
dish) and samsy (savoury pastries) - foods that are most commonly identified as Uzbek.  
Well before the advent of the Soviet period Osh had been subject to successive waves of 
development and urbanisation, building its identity first as an important silk road trading post home 
to a significant bazaar (Zakharova 1997), then as a seat of learning and Islamic culture (Amanbaeva 
and Abdullaev 2000; Zakharova 1997). The expansion of imperial Russia into Central Asia was to 
write another chapter in the development of the city, with the construction of army barracks and the 
Russified new town, which crucially expanded the city to take in the right bank of the Ak-Bura river 
as well as developing neighbourhoods to the south (Zakharova 1997). However, it was under the 
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 The mahalla is a key feature of the urban landscape of Osh. As we shall see in Chapter 9 a 5
mahalla is a particular form of largely Uzbek urban neighbourhood, with its roots in the peasant 
community which traditionally regulated daily life (Kulchik et al, 1996), normally characterised by 
narrow streets and low-rise houses organised inwards around spacious, secluded, courtyards (or 
hovli) (Liu, 2012).
Soviet Union that the city was to encounter its most far reaching and fast paced development. 
During the process of national delimitation the status of Osh was a subject of much debate, however 
it was eventually decided that the city be attached to what was then Kirghizia, since it was in need 
of an industrial centre in order to ensure the Soviet project of progress through industrialisation 
could be met (Reeves 2011).  
The Soviet era saw the city become more industrialised, with an important textile factory being 
established in the city centre, along with silk, turbine, vodka and other factories. Simultaneously, 
the city’s swelling population led to the construction of Soviet style apartment blocks in the city 
centre (in place of some existing low level Uzbek mahalla neighbourhoods), and the expansion of 
the city limits towards the mountains to its south, and the Uzbek border to its north (Liu 2012). 
Today, the city centre is defined by its huge bazaar, which stretches along the river just north of the 
city centre and has replaced the Soviet era factories as the economic heart of Osh in the post-Soviet 
period.  All in all, the diverse forces acting on the development of the city during the period of its 6
rapid growth in the 20th and early 21st centuries have had something of a patchwork effect. Seen 
from the convenient vantage point of Sulaiman mountain, the mixture of Soviet era tower blocks, 
traditional mahalla neighbourhoods and recent novostroiki buildings, alongside green spaces 
explained by the kholkoz farms that used to exist there, or the moratorium on building on land 
affected by the UNESCO world heritage site around Sulaiman mountain, has a striking effect. 
Indeed, one respondent remarked that it made the city look more “gerrymandered” than it really is 
(IV09).  
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 Unfortunately another increasingly important factor in the economic life of the city is the drugs 6
trade, and linked organised crime, as the city (and surrounding region) finds itself a key staging post 
for drugs being smuggled out of Afghanistan sometimes called the ‘Osh knot’ (UNODC 2012)
Osh has been buffeted by successive logics of development, from the silk road trade, to Russian 
invasion, the control economy of the Soviet era and the free market of the independence period. 
Coupled with the natural constraints presented by its very geography, with the Uzbek border to the 
north, and the rocky hills rising to the south east and the constant threat of seismic activity, the 
cityscape has a number of stories to tell. The next section of this chapter will explore three of the 
most pervasive narratives used to speak about Osh - as a post-Soviet city, an ethnically divided city 
and a southern city. These frames of reference are frequently used to explain the city everywhere 
from academic articles to chaikhana (tea house) discussions between friends. It is therefore 
imperative that they are explored here in order to contextualise the analysis that will come later. 
4.3 Key narratives for framing Osh 
4.3.1 Osh: a post-Soviet City 
The first lens commonly used to describe Osh is that of a post-Soviet city. This is unsurprising - as 
demonstrated in the preceding section, the Soviet project had a massive impact on the development 
of Kyrgyzstan as a country within the USSR. However, the urban legacy of the Soviet Union is also 
quite specific, and merits further investigation here. In Soviet thinking the city occupied a central 
role as a tool of the overall Soviet project; one element of the all-encompassing political, economic 
and spatial change that Soviet leaders hoped would, in time, bring about a socialist state (Pallot and 
Shaw 1981). In short, “land development was a part of the ideological machine of social and 
economic regulation” (Golubchikov 2004; 231). 
The city occupied a key strategic position in Soviet thought, since it presented a number of 
opportunities to achieve two crucial goals; combatting inequality and increasing productivity.  To 
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Soviet leaders, the concentration of the capitalist elites and private property in towns and cities 
needed to be combated in order to reduce inequality between urban and rural areas (Pallot and Shaw 
1981). Moreover, a high concentration of the population in urban areas would also give all citizens 
equality of access to resources through spatial rearrangement of the city (Ibid). Similarly, high 
density urban settlements allow citizens to participate more easily in industrial production to the 
best of their abilities. As Pallot and Shaw put it “The Soviet view, therefore, is that communism 
means the equal ability of all to enjoy access to society’s resources according to their needs, [and] to 
participate in social production according to their various abilities (...). Spatial planning should 
therefore be adapted to these goals, for the fact of location should not be allowed to interfere with 
any of these rights” (Pallot and Shaw 1981; 11). The city was therefore a vital front in the battle to 
achieve Soviet modernity.  
By putting the city in the service of these goals, the Soviet era therefore witnessed an explosion in 
urbanisation and industrialisation of urban spaces across the Union (Tsenkova 2006), the legacy of 
which can be clearly remarked in today’s post-Soviet towns and cities, including Osh, whose 
population rose almost five fold between 1904 and 1989 (Zakharova 1997). It will, therefore, be 
useful to examine in greater detail the what effects Soviet urban policy had on cities and how it 
achieved these effects. This will be relevant to the current situation in Osh since, as Stanilov 
reminds us, “The way in which urban space is used can also determine the level of social integration 
(or segregation) in a given region or nation” (Stanilov 2007; 5). Furthermore, the abolition (and 
subsequent reintroduction of the land market) has had a significant impact on the spatial patterns 
and experiences of urban dwellers in a city where space has long been at a premium (bounded as it 
is by the border with Uzbekistan to the north, and the rising valley walls to the south) (Liu 2012). 
Since Soviet cities were often subjected to particularly “heavy handed” efforts to manage their form 
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and spatial organisation as part of a specific ideology (Liu 2012; 4), then it is reasonable to surmise 
that this process continues to influence the life of the city today. 
Various features of Soviet (and more widely, socialist) cities are commonly identified by scholars of 
the former Soviet Union. Firstly, they were compact, with dense housing areas and a clear “urban 
edge” (Hirt 2006; 465), although many were plagued by housing shortages throughout the life of the 
Soviet Union (Gentile and Sjoberg 2006). As mentioned above, economically they were dominated 
by manufacturing and heavy industries (such as the silk , cotton and turbine factories built in Osh), 
with little in the way of retail or diversity of service provision (Hirt 2006, Tsenkova 2006). Whilst 
aesthetically the Soviet cityscape has been denounced as a monotonous and “bland version of 
Modernism”, there was a commitment to creating large-scale civic spaces which “expressed the 
socialist commitment to the civic realm” (Hirt 2006; 465-6). Osh’s central square, with its large 
space used for rallies and celebrations overlooked  on one side by a towering statue of Lenin, and 
the  other by the hulking municipal building, is emblematic of this aesthetic quality. 
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Figure 5. Lenin  statue in the central square , during Victory Day celebrations 2013 (Source: 
Author’s own) 
The Soviet city could be described, then, as a dense but highly industrialised space where urban 
form was dictated by the Soviet ideals of civic equality and effective production, rather than more 
individualistic notions such as service choice. Interestingly, Gentile and Sjoberg note that despite 
the Soviet aim of using the city as a means of decreasing inequality, the problem of ethnic 
segregation in fact persisted in cities throughout the Soviet Union, and this was certainly the case in 
Osh (Gentile and Sjoberg 2006). 
When it came to planning, urban considerations were just one element of the larger system of 
economic planning in the Soviet Union – put simply, “urban planning was subservient to the 
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complex hierarchy of economic planning” (Golubchikov 2004; 231). This had a number of 
implications: firstly, it created a highly centralised system of planning, with planners at the 
periphery implementing centrally imposed decisions (Stanilov 2007, Tsenkova 2006). Secondly, 
since all land was owned by the state, there was no land market – in Osh, for example, citizens 
applied to the Gorispolkom (City Executive Committee) or Domkom (Housing Committee) for a 
home or land to build on, rather than purchasing a flat or plot themselves (Liu 2012). This also 
meant no planning legislation was required, giving planners a purely technical role, with very little 
legal expertise (Golubchikov 2004). Unsurprisingly, such a centralised system engendered very 
little competition, and did not allow for public participation in planning processes and decisions 
(Golubchikov 2004, Stanilov 2007).  
When the Soviet Union began to crumble in 1989, this brought with it a seismic shift in the way 
cities were managed. By the time Kyrgyzstan became independent in 1991 a “paradigm shift” had 
occurred in former Soviet cities which would have consequences for their future development 
(Stanilov 2007; 5), and Osh was no exception to this. Tsenkova offers a useful model to describe 
forces acting on post-Socialist cities, and their effects: 
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Fig. 6: Transitional forces in post-Soviet cities (Tsenkova 2006; 24) 
This model shows three transitions at work: the political shift from totalitarianism to democracy; the 
economic shift from a control to a market economy; and finally the “quiet revolution” of 
decentralisation (Tsenkova 2006; 23), a change which, as we shall see, is of considerable 
importance to urban planning. Of course, as noted earlier in this chapter, it is simplistic to view the 
experience of post-Soviet countries as a successful transition to democracy. Still, it is important to 
be aware of the impact of some degree of movement away from the Soviet form of totalitarian 
government on the post-Soviet urban experience. Certainly these transitions can be observed in the 
legal framework governing urban planning in Kyrgyzstan since the end of the Soviet Union. 
Amongst the numerous new laws and regulations promulgated in this period several stand out. The 
newly written Constitution soon enshrined the respect of private property rights in Kyrgyz law, 
whilst also setting up a decentralised system of governance through representative bodies at the 
local level (UNECE 2010). The Land Code of 1999 set up a framework for the transfer of land 
ownership and rights, and defines the institutions responsible for the transfer and administration of 
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land (UNECE 2010, Kaganova et al 2008). The Law on Town Planning and Architecture delegated 
authority for these activities to local authorities and the State Agency for Architecture and 
Construction, as well as clarifying the distinctions between different kinds of urban and rural 
settlements (UNECE 2010). These changes in the legal framework both drove and responded to the 
challenges of liberalisation, democratisation and decentralisation set out above. 
However, Hirt also reminds us that post-Soviet (and other post-Socialist) cities have not solely been 
subject to the transition out of the Soviet era. They have also been buffeted by the diverse processes 
of globalisation, as have the capitalist cities of the world (Hirt 2006). Thus, Tsenkova’s model of 
triple transition could be set inside Hirt’s two-track model, which attributes change in post-Socialist 
cities such as Osh to both their transitional experiences and the forces of globalisation. Crucially, 
though, Stanilov asserts that whatever the differing national contexts and various speeds of change, 
the “principal direction” of spatial transformation in post-Socialist cities has been “remarkably 
similar” (Stanilov 2007; 6). 
So, what kind of city has been forged by these forces of transition? Probably the most important 
change to the urban fabric of post-Soviet cities in general has been the introduction of a land and 
property market, and therefore the rise of privatisation, since its knock-on effects can be felt in 
every part of city life.  This is why Stanilov has described “the main direction of urban spatial 
restructuring” as “a transfer of assets, resources and opportunities from the public to the private 
realm” (Stanilov 2007; 11). Privatisation through the introduction of a market economy can be 
linked to most of the features in the table below. For example, privatisation of land and buildings, 
and the private sector’s key role in new construction has brought pluralism in architecture, where 
once the Soviet version of Modernism dominated (Hirt 2006). A summary of common changes in 
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post-socialist cities - many of which will become familiar in the empirical chapters of this thesis - 
can be found below: 
Fig. 7: Post-socialist urban transformations in CEE cities (Stanilov 2007; 9) 
As the table above demonstrates, the dizzying rise of the private sector in the IMF supported 
“market euphoria” of the 1990s (Golubchikov 2004) also led to a number of negative consequences 
for the city, including pollution, growing inequality and urban poverty (Tsenkova 2006). These 
negative consequences can, at least in part, be attributed to what Stanilov has termed “the retreat of 
planning” in the post-Soviet era (Stanilov 2007; 9). The tensions generated by this impending 
transition were all too clearly demonstrated in Osh, where in 1990 concerns regarding state 
allocation of land for housing for Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities sparked violence that would lead 
to the deaths of hundreds of people, and the armed intervention of Soviet troops (Liu 2012, Tishkov 
1995). 
Generally city planning in the former Soviet Union has been characterised as “laissez-
faire” (Tsenkova 2006, Hirt 2006, Golubchikov 2004). In practice, this means a number of things. 
Positive Characteristics Negative Characteristics
URBAN PATTERNS
• Break-up of mono-centric model
• Diversification of mono-functional areas
• Revitalisation of some urban districts
• Improvements in building standards
URBAN PATTERNS
• Chaotic development patterns
• Suburban sprawl
• Depopulation of city centres
• Decline of socialist housing estates
• Derelict industrial areas
• Surge in illegal construction
URBAN IMPACTS
• Increase in individual standards and choices
• Increase in home ownership rates
• Diversification of market choices
• Increase in shopping opportunities 
• Increase in personal mobility
URBAN IMPACTS
• Decline in communal living standards
• Loss of open space
• Decline in public service provision
• Privatisation of public realm
• Increased congestion, air and noise pollution
• The costs of sprawl
• Social stratification
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Perhaps most significantly, the era of central planning had come to an end, with responsibility for 
town planning being transferred to local authorities (Tsenkova 2006). This is certainly the case in 
Osh - Chapter 6 of this thesis will show how the city’s Mayor has assumed a central role in city 
planning. Generally speaking the balance of power in setting the agenda for urban development has 
shifted accordingly from large centrally devised projects, giving way to small to medium sized 
projects driven by the private sector, making the most of new land markets (Hirt 2006). It is 
important to note, however, that the distinction between the public and private sector has often been 
blurred in the post-Soviet context, with high ranking public officials intricately linked to the private 
enterprises tasked with delivering these projects (Chapter 6 will return to this theme through the 
figure of former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov).  This shift has brought both positive and negative 
consequences; on the one hand, it has encouraged greater public participation in the planning 
process, often via non-governmental organisations, although this is often not particularly far 
reaching (Stanilov 2007). On the other hand, the authority of planners – and by extension of 
planning laws and regulations – has been seriously diminished, which has led to a considerable rise 
in illegal and semi-legal construction projects and settlements (Stanilov 2007, Golubchikov 2004) 
such as the novostroiki that have sprung up around Osh and Bishkek. In all, the laissez faire nature 
of urban planning in the immediate post-Soviet context led to a system, and an urban environment, 
which was more diverse but also more fragmented, and lacking in strategic direction (Stanilov 
2007). Kaganova, Akmatov and Undeland have highlighted one important consequence of this 
approach in southern Kyrgyzstan, demonstrating the damagingly high levels of potential revenue 
the cities of Osh and Jalalabad have lost through the inconsistent, incorrect and negligent 
application of planning regulations in the years since independence (Kaganova et al 2008). 
In more recent years there has been a movement back towards the recognition that government 
oversight does have an important role to play in urban planning, especially with regards to curbing 
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the excesses of a market driven system (Golubchikov 2004, Stanilov 2007). The laissez faire system 
has not eliminated all the problems of the Soviet city, and has in fact introduced some new 
concerns. Moreover, weak governance and a convoluted and often confusing planning system has 
often fostered a culture of corruption and cronyism in post-Soviet urban planning that has 
increasingly frustrated urban citizens (Ibid). For this reason, many cities are now implementing the 
traditional model of General Plans, and others have introduced strategic plans, with the aim of 
ensuring that future urban development is carried out according to an overarching city strategy 
(Stanilov 2007).  
It is in this context that urban planning in Osh city currently takes place. The city has a number of 
frameworks in place to enable urban planning in addition to those mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
These include land zoning regulations instituted in 2003 (UNECE 2010) and a Strategic Land 
Management Programme (Kaganova 2008), whilst a city master plan is reputedly under 
development, as shall be discussed at some length later in this thesis (UNECE 2010). Principles 
have been enshrined in law relating to state repossession of urban land in order to facilitate large 
scale city development projects (USAID 2011), and offices of the State Registration Service act as a 
hub for registration, mapping and valuation of land (USAID 2011). But despite the existence of 
these new tools and legal structures, planning in Osh remains plagued by the challenged described 
above - a lack of sufficient funds and implementing capacity, widespread corruption and rent 
seeking activities, and a mistrust of authorities. In the case of Osh, these problems are compounded 
by the fact the city now finds itself in the aftermath of serious conflict; as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, planning in a post-crisis environment clearly entails its own set of challenges. 
What is more, the question of ethnic identity also plays an important role in urban life in Osh, as 
shall be explored in greater detail in the following section. 
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4.3.2 Osh: An ethnically divided city 
The most prevalent view of Osh, and of the 2010 violence, is rooted in the notion of the city as 
ethnically divided, on a faultline between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek citizens of Kyrgyzstan. As such, 
accounts of the violence situate the city close to the border with Uzbekistan, on the edge of the 
diverse and apparently fragile mix of ethnicities that make up the Ferghana Valley. Articles and 
reports underline the fact that Osh and Jalalabad Oblasts are home to a much higher proportion of 
ethnic Uzbeks than the northern regions, and point to the seemingly age old and insurmountable 
differences between the nomadic , mountain dwelling Kyrgyz and their sedentary Uzbek 
counterparts in the valleys.  Ethnicity undoubtedly impacts life in Osh - people use it to explain 7
statements about themselves and their and lifestyle (“Uzbek people are hardworking”, “we Kyrgyz 
are mountain people” or “you don’t have to pay [the police] if you’re Kyrgyz, but if you’re Uzbek 
you do” are all statements from interviews carried out in this research, for example). The city itself 
still bears the marks of ethnic division - graffiti denoting the ethnicity of a buildings inhabitants is 
still visible, along with ethno-nationalist slogans daubed on numerous city centre walls. Schools are 
classified as Kyrgyz language, Uzbek language or Russian language. As Chapter  9 will show in 
great detail, neighbourhoods and housing types are strongly associated with ethnic groups. Official 
identity documents record the holder’s ethnicity alongside their nationality. However, it is important 
not to fall into the trap of seeing ethnicity as the only causal factor when thinking about Osh. Whilst 
ethnicity did undoubtedly play an important role in the conflict in Osh (the patterns of violence in 
2010 support this) and continues to inform life in the city today, it would be reductive to view the 
conflict, and by extension the city, in solely ethnic terms. Some have pointed out that in fact Uzbeks 
and Kyrgyz are very similar when it comes to many of the markers traditionally used to try and 
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 For a representative example of such reports see International Crisis Group 2012, Amnesty 7
International 2010, BBC 2011, Telegraph 2010, Shishkin 2014.
denote ethnicity, such as religion and language (Ismailbekova 2013). Moreover, focussing on ethnic 
difference and conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh obfuscates both the long periods of 
peaceful coexistence between these two groups (Megoran 2013), and the existence and experiences 
of other ethnic  groups present in Kyrgyzstan, such as Russians, Dungans and Meshketian Turks 
(Dukenbaev and Hansen 2003). So, there is a balance to be struck when investigating the city, one 
that acknowledges the central role of ethnicity in Osh, but not to the detriment of other important 
factors. 
How, then, has ethnicity come to be seen as such an important prism for understanding Osh, and 
what can this reveal about life in the city today? Once again the impact of the Soviet era looms 
large, since the terms in which ethnicity is widely understood in Central Asia today were introduced 
then. It was with the arrival of Soviet ethnographers in the 1920s and 1930s that the people of the 
Ferghana Valley and elsewhere were separated into ‘Uzbek’ and ‘Kyrgyz’ groups – the names 
having little meaning before that time (Hirsch 2005, Hanks 2011, Dukenbaev and Hansen 2003, 
Tishkov 1995). As discussed earlier, at this time Soviet Socialist Republics were formed around 
these ethnic groups, following the explicit link drawn in Stalin’s Soviet nationalities policy between 
language and ethnicity (or nationality, to use the Soviet term) (Slezkine 1994). Several theorists 
have pointed out the practical elements of national delimitation as a policy. For example, Hirsch has 
demonstrated that the so-called ‘nationalities question’ actually played a central role in the 
formation of the Soviet Union, helping to reconcile Bolshevik politics of anti-imperialism with the 
desire to keep the territories contained within the old Tsarist Empire (Hirst 2005). Elsewhere, 
Haugen has also emphasised the process’s importance as a practical measure to overcome potential 
local cleavages that might threaten the stability of the nascent union (Haugen 2003).   The 
overarching features of Soviet nationalities policy can be summarised as the following: 
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 • The territorialisation of ethnicity – under the “ethnofederal” structure of the Soviet Union, 
autonomous territories were each linked to a ‘titular’ nationality that had primacy in that 
territory (Faranda and Nolle 2010, Slezkine 1994, Khazanov 1995). 
 • The belief that ethnicity was inextricably linked with language, and that an ethnic group 
spoke a common language (Slezkine 1994, Khazanov 1995). 
 •  The creation of a link between the political status of a given ethnicity (or nationality) and 
the level of autonomy, and therefore privilege, its members could attain. This system 
differentiated between natsiia (seen as the most developed peoples), natsional’nost’ (seen as 
underdeveloped nations) and narodnost’ (ethnic groups, perceived as having the lowest 
prestige) , affording decreasing levels of autonomy to each (Khazanov 1995, Tishkov,1999). 
 • The establishment of the practice of stating a person’s nationality/ethnicity on their 
passport and other official documents (Faranda and Nolle 2010, Dukenbaev and Hansen 
2003) 
The legacy of these policies can also be seen in the terms used to describe nationality and national 
belonging in Kyrgyzstan today – this was the moment that “nationalism as a belief system 
developed among Central Asian groups” (Haugen 2003: 7). For example, the conflation of ethnicity 
(based on common language) with nationality, and persistent references to the special status of the 
‘titular nationality’ in a given state (ie. The Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan) date from this period (Tishkov 
1999, Hanks 2011). What is more, the boundaries that determine that Osh sits 10km within 
Kyrgyzstan, rather than across the border in Uzbekistan, were drawn up by these same Soviet 
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ethnographers in the process of ‘national delimitation’ that took place between 1924 and 1927 
(Reeves 2009, Liu 2012). There is considerable disagreement regarding the motivations which 
governed national delimitation, with some writers attributing malicious intent to the process and 
others, as shown in the previous paragraph, seeking to place it within the larger context of the early 
Soviet Union’s attempts to reconcile Marxist doctrine with the realities of building and governing a 
new, and massive, geo-political entity.  Whatever the motives, Hirsch (2005) notes that the very 8
process of supporting or contesting decisions made during delimitation in fact served to integrate 
local elites further into the mechanisms of power and decision making within the Soviet Union. 
What is clear, is that the cumulative result of these heavy-handed Soviet interventions in the 
constitution of ethno-national identity in Central Asia, and in the Ferghana Valley in particular, has 
meant that it has become a region where, in Reeves’ words, “territory and ethnicity are both 
symbolically linked and discursively over-determined” (Reeves 2009; 1281). But what effects has 
this over-determination produced on peoples’ experiences in Kyrgyzstan, and in Osh in particular? 
Numerous theorists have noted the striking theme of ‘national revival’ that came to the fore across 
Central Asia following the advent of perestroika, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Hirsch 2005, Khan 2009 and 2010). This trend, which saw the symbolic use of ethnicity and 
cultural heritage to justify political authority over a given territory, gave rise to a situation which the 
“past becomes even more real than the present” to many (Khan 2010: 70). The most striking 
consequence of Soviet nationalities policies in Kyrgyzstan has been the exclusionary effects they 
have produced on ethnic minorities in the country, and especially the largest of these minorities – 
the Uzbeks. For example, by affording the ‘titular nationality’ in Kyrgyzstan a privileged status, 
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 See Reeves 2011 for a nuanced discussion of the motivations behind and impacts of the process 8
of national delimitation in relation to ethnic relations in Osh.
there began a process of “Kyrgyzification” of positions of power and influence in the multi-ethnic 
Kyrgyz SSR, that carried over into the newly independent state through such rules as the 
constitutional requirement that all Presidential candidates speak fluent Kyrgyz (Dukenbaev and 
Hansen 2003; 18, 22). This process of “titular ethnicisation” took place across the region, not 
simply in Kyrgyzstan (Khan 2010: 76). The exclusion of Uzbeks from positions of power that 
began in the Soviet era therefore continued to be a feature of independent Kyrgyzstan (Bond and 
Koch 2010).  
Furthermore, initiatives aimed at defining and popularising a national identity in independent 
Kyrgyzstan increasingly moved away from the inclusive approach initially predicated in President 
Askar Akayev’s slogan “Kyrgyzstan – our common home” towards a more narrowly defined and 
exclusionary view of national belonging (Melvin 2011; 10, Liu 2012). The promotion of exclusively 
Kyrgyz national such as the Manas epic poem, or the 19th century leader Kurmanjan Datka, as the 
cultural and historical building blocks around which the fledgling Kyrgyz state could be built is 
ensuring that minorities such as the Uzbeks are being excluded not only from the corridors of 
power, but also from the national ‘story’ (Liu 2012, Hanks 2011).  In recent years, this process of 9
nationalistic myth building has been carried out with increasing intensity thanks to the increasing 
popularity, and influence, of nationalist political parties such as the Ata-Jurt (or Homeland) party 
(Melvin 2011). Interestingly, a very similar process of ‘Uzbekification’ of national heroes and 
symbols such as Tamerlane was simultaneously underway in neighbouring Uzbekistan (Liu 2012, 
Adams 2010). Crucially, Megoran has characterised the kind of nationalism at play in Kyrgyzstan 
as “profoundly insecure” about the viability and very survival of the Kyrgyz state (Megoran 2012). 
In his words “It is absolutely crucial to grasp this for, as will be seen in the following sections, it 
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 It is worthwhile noting that the Manas epic was originally promoted by President Akayev as a 9
symbol of multiethnic harmony, but has come to be widely understood in a narrower sense in 
Kyrgyzstan today (Megoran 2012, Cummings 2013).
explains to a significant degree the difficulties that the sizeable Uzbek minority presents to the 
Kyrgyz nationalist project” (Megoran 2012; 16).  
Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan are doubly problematic. They have not been able to participate in symbolic 
nation building processes in Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan, since they form part of what Khazanov 
estimated in 1995 to be 60 million people stranded outside the borders of their ethno-national 
homelands (Khazanov 1995). This situation, a direct legacy of the borders and nationalities set out 
in the Soviet era, has led many ethnic groups to find themselves excluded twice over, welcome in 
neither the country of their citizenship nor that of their ethno-national identity (Liu 2012, Khazanov 
1995). For the Uzbek community of Kyrgyzstan, President Karimov has made it abundantly clear 
that his responsibilities end at Uzbekistan’s borders, and that he has no interest in integrating or 
representing Uzbek communities in other countries (Bond and Koch 2010). This leaves a sizeable 
ethnic minority in Kyrgyzstan stranded – excluded from positions of power, and from the process of 
nation building in Kyrgyzstan, and simultaneously distanced from the other ethno-political 
community they might expect to represent their interests. The experience of ethnic Uzbeks in 
Kyrgyzstan has been mirrored by other minority groups across Central Asia, whose autonomy has 
largely been limited to the cultural realm for fear that any other kind of autonomy (poitical, for 
example) would be dangerously destabilising to the relatively new nation state (Khan 2010). 
Of course, this kind of ethnic tension and exclusion does not lead inexorably towards ethnic 
violence. Some writers have pointed to the role of “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” (Bond and Koch, 
2010: 535); individuals in positions of power within a community or group, who are able to 
mobilise people around the banner of ethnicity in order to achieve a specific goal (Megoran 2012; 
Bond and Koch 2010). Once again, this links back to the all pervasive legacy of the Soviet era. As 
Haugen notes, it was at this time that control or ownership of political resources became linked to 
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one or another ethnic identity, meaning that where previously conflicts had been about control of 
resources, these were now inextricably linked with the notion of ethnic identity (Haugen 2003). 
This is all the more important in the context of Osh, given the vitally important role of clans and 
patronage networks in daily and political life in the region – a phenomenon that will be explored in 
greater detail in the next section. 
4.3.3 Osh: A Southern city 
The final narrative that is often applied to Osh, is its status as a southern city. The city is thus 
inextricably bound up in the web of clan politics and north-south tension that has defined politics in 
Kyrgyzstan since independence and that, as discussed earlier in this chapter, was seen by many to 
be an important factor in the 2005 and 2010 revolutions. Osh has been the administrative centre of 
Osh province since 1939, and was declared the ‘second capital’ of Kyrgyzstan in 2000, during the 
3000 year anniversary of the city (Liu 2012; 85). The significance of its southern identity comes not 
only from its geographical location, but also from the way this relates to persistent clan structures in 
the country. In this respect Osh is part of what Doolotkeldieva has defined as the “crucial but rarely 
explained phenomenon of localism” that characterises Central Asian politics more widely 
(Doolotkeldieva 2013: 88). The complex linkages between regional and clan identities, and patron-
client relations in Kyrgyzstan have a considerable impact on political, economic and social life in 
the country, and as such have been a subject of study by numerous theorists (See Radnitz 2010, 
Megoran et al 2013, Jones Luong 2002, Collins 2006, and Schatz 2004). 
Broadly speaking, the forty “tribal unions” of Kyrgyzstan are divided into three confederations: “On 
kanat (Right wing), Sol kanat (Left wing), and Ichkilik (Neither)” (Temirkoulov 2004; 94). Of these 
confederations, Sol kanat represents clans from the country’s north (Chui; Talas; Issyk-Kul and 
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Naryn), whilst On Kanat and Ichkilik represent the south (Osh; Jalalabad and Batken) (Bond and 
Koch 2010). As well as having a territorial element, some theorists point to a historical animosity 
between the northern and southern clans, with the northern groups having been quicker to align 
itself with Tsarist Russia in the 19th century, whereas southern groups remained aligned with the 
Khokand khanate, and thus resisted Russian rule (Morozova 2010, Temirkoulov 2004, Bond and 
Koch 2010). Clans continue to be of great importance in the economic and political life of 
Kyrgyzstan today (Fumagalli 2007b, Collins 2006, Schatz 2004). It might have been expected that 
their importance would have diminished during the Soviet era, as the Soviet leadership attempted to 
stamp out pre-modern forms of political organisation. Conversely, however, Kyrgyzstan’s clan 
structure emerged from 70 years of Soviet rule stronger than ever, partly due to the introduction of 
collective farms (Kolkhoz), which often regrouped members of a clan in one location, and 
reinforced ties between them (Temirkoulov 2004). Moreover, many people in Kyrgyzstan 
increasingly came to rely on clan ad kinship ties as a coping mechanism in the face of severe 
shortages that characterised the Soviet economy (Bond and Koch 2010).  
Of course, historical animosity aside, tension between northern and southern clan confederations, 
and between clans within these confederations, most likely results from the fact that they are all in 
competition for the same pot of relatively limited resources (Collins 2002). As Hierman has noted, 
in semi-authoritarian regimes such as Kyrgyzstan two distinct but linked spaces of competition 
exist; “(1) a hidden, informal arena where elites compete directly with one another over access to 
state resources and (2) a public arena where elites appeal to voters and other constituents” (Hierman 
2010; 247). In the case of a society such as Kyrgyzstan, such elites are presented with a ready-made 
constituency, or resource, to which they can appeal in both the hidden and public arenas of political 
competition (Hale 2005). In this way, the competition between northern and southern elites for 
access to state resources and power encompasses people at every level of clan networks 
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(Temirkoulov 2004). Although some theorists, such as Jones Luong, ascribe this to regional 
networks rather than clan affiliations the central theme of competition for resources is the same. 
This intense competition for resources can be witnessed in the recent oscillations in power between 
President Akayev (a northerner), to President Bakiyev (a southerner), to interim President 
Otunbayeva and President Atambayev (northerners).  
Radnitz’s (2010) analysis of the 2005 ‘Tulip Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan goes further in examining 
how relations between elites and clans or other local and regional community groupings relate to 
national politics. Using the term “subversive clientelism” he described how wealthy elites situated 
outside the regime in Kyrgyzstan cultivated local support bases that could be mobilised to protect 
their position should they perceive it to be under threat. Given that formal institutional arenas of 
redress, such as the justice system, are too weak or too closely linked to the regime to adequately 
protect these actors they instead seek to “create a social support base by making material and 
symbolic investments in local communities” (Radnitz 2010: 5). Within this reciprocal arrangement 
the client communities gain access to resources, and can be mobilised by the patron against the 
regime when necessary. Clan structures facilitate this process, providing a pre-existing community 
that the patron can appeal to. Radnitz asserts that this  model helps to explain why previously 
politically inactive communities marched on municipal offices in great numbers during the 2005 
unrest, and crucially why others did not (Radnitz 2010). Although this interpretation has been 
criticised by some as giving insufficient weight to the agency of communities and clans 
(Doolotkeldieva 2013), his analysis  remains of central importance in demonstrating the continued 
influence and role of clans in contemporary Kyrgyz politics.  
So, again it is apt to ask what specific effects this phenomenon brings about in Osh itself. Firstly, it 
moves the city (as it does the entire country) further away from a system of representative 
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democracy, and towards a system where voting, and indeed all engagement with the political 
system, is personalised (as Collins has noted, the strength of personalised voting is remarkable in 
Kyrgyzstan, even in a region characterised by patronage and clan politics) (Collins 2002, Radnitz 
2006). This means that many people, in both Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities, have no way of 
interacting with power other than through intermediaries from their clan based networks (Fumagalli 
2007a). What is more, this is a reciprocal arrangement; representation to power comes at a price for 
members of these communities, who are expected to mobilise in support of their clan elites when 
called upon (Hierman 2010, Temirkoulov 2004). This reinforces the kinds of ethnic divisions and 
sense of social separation explored in the previous section – crucial in an ethnically diverse city 
such as Osh, as communities interact with elites and leaders drawn from their own clan (and 
therefore from their own ethnic group), rather than engaging with wider rallying ideologies. 
Furthermore, by dint of the division between northern and southern clan confederations, 
communities in Osh are encouraged to buy into a narrative of “southern nationalism” and the fight 
against “humiliating ‘southerners’ by the ‘northerners’” through their actions in mobilising in 
support of their clan elites (Morozova 2010; 71). In turn, this situation opens the door to the rise of 
divisive, but highly successful, figures such as current Osh Mayor Melis Myrzakmatov, whose 
personalised brand of southern and Kyrgyz nationalist politics have led to accusations that he is 
running Osh as highly lucrative personal fiefdom - something that will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter Six. 
A further complicating factor in this picture is the fact that Osh’s Uzbek community has in fact 
often aligned itself with the Northern clans, particularly during the Akayev Presidency (Liu 2012, 
Fumagalli 2007b). This has been in part due to Akayev’s stated aim of protecting the multi-ethnic 
character of the country (Fumagalli, 2007b), and partly as a system of checks and balances against 
the power of the southern clans against the Uzbek community (Melvin 2011). The decision of 
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Uzbek groups to intervene in support of the (mainly northern) transitional government, and against 
the family of the ousted President Bakiyev (a southerner)  in Jalalabad province in summer 2010 
can be attributed to this. However, in this case the gamble of offsetting local Kyrgyz power in Osh 
by seeking an alliance with northern Kyrgyz power seemed to backfire and add fuel to the fire of 
accusations of disloyalty against Osh Uzbeks (Melvin 2011). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter, as wide ranging as it is, only begins to scratch the surface of the social, political and 
historical context of Osh. Without the constraints on time and length imposed in the context of this 
thesis, more could be written about the pre-Soviet era, for example, or the shifting role of religion in 
the city. However, for the purposes of this investigation, examining some of the most common 
tropes used to speak about Osh - as a post-Soviet city, a southern city and an ethnically divided city 
- is a crucial step. As well as contextualising this inquiry, this problematises some of the most 
commonly held views of the city, presenting a more nuanced picture of the influences acting on Osh 
today, and the effects they produce. This brief overview has shown how urban change in Osh is 
framed by the physical, cultural and legal legacies of the Soviet era, just as it is shaped by ethnic 
and clan affiliations, and shifting patterns of intra-national politics. Most importantly, it reminds the 
researcher not to rely on reductive causal explanations in Osh - the violence there should not be 
seen as the result of some ancient ethnic hatred, or as the inevitable consequence of post-Soviet 
collapse. Rather, events in the city are taking place within a complex contextual web of cause and 
effect, drawing on all of the themes explored above, and likely others besides.  As such, it will be 
vital in this investigation to consider narratives of collective memory and instances of post-crisis 
reconstruction and regeneration in the same manner. They do not occur in a vacuum, and need to be 
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considered in relation to the issues explored in this chapter if we are to hope to fully understand 
them. 
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Chapter 5: Research Methods 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction, this research project aimed to explore the post-crisis reconstruction 
and urban change that took place in Osh following the violence that broke out there in 2010. In 
order to achieve this aim it asked a number of interlinking questions. Firstly, quite simply, it asks 
how has this reconstruction taken place - what has been rebuilt, and what other changes have been 
effected in the urban fabric of Osh - since such information has scarcely been recorded in the public 
domain so far. It also explored the relationship between memory and the urban environment, asking 
how and what people use the built environment to remember, and for what reasons,. It sought to 
uncover some of the unspoken outcomes and power relations ingrained in planning and 
reconstruction decisions in Osh, unpacking how different groups are affected by such decisions in 
different ways. Finally, it asked how the reconstruction and ongoing redevelopment of the city 
should be characterised - as a continuation of the violence of the Events, as a response to this 
violence that sought to protect the city’s heterogeneity, or as a restructuring of patterns of diversity 
in the city. As demonstrated in the literature review that preceded this chapter, this approach brings 
together themes as diverse as urban planning, collective memory, and post-conflict and post-soviet 
contexts. As such, it was important to adopt a research methodology that successfully addressed 
these themes whilst simultaneously enabling meaningful and successful research into the questions 
at hand.  
Given this research’s focus on questions of memory, power and how people experience the city, 
then, it was apposite to adopt a qualitative approach to this research - after all, collective memory is 
hardly something that can be counted or measured using quantitative methods. Situating this 
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research project within a qualitative research framework meant adopting an ontological approach 
that acknowledged the possibility for multiple truths and realities to emerge in the research site 
(Creswell 2012: 20), something that seems particularly important when dealing with such 
something as subjective and varied as memory and urban experience. That is to say, a qualitative 
approach seeks to engage with the messiness and complexity of real life (Limb and Dwyer, 2001), 
accurately reflecting what Nietzsche termed “the rich ambiguity of existence” (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
237) rather than reducing it for the sake of theoretical elegance. Although the qualitative approach 
has in the past faced criticism over perceptions that it is somehow less scientifically rigorous than 
other methods, this investigation supports the position of writers such as Flyvberg (2006) and 
Gormley and Bondi (1999) who refute this accusation on the grounds that qualitative 
methodologies’ insistence on reflexivity and a robust consideration of researcher positionally in fact 
make them, when well done, eminently rigorous.  
Taking into account the constraints on time and funding inherent within the bounds of the PhD 
process, along with my commitment to undertaking detailed research that would really dig down 
into the fine grain of people’s experiences of the post-crisis city, it was apparent early in the 
research design process that a comparative or large scale study involving numerous research sites 
would not be appropriate here. Instead, the most fruitful approach was to focus on one case study; 
the city of Osh. Case studies can be defined quite simply as the “detailed examination of a solitary 
exemplar” (Ruddin, 2006: 797), and this attention to detail reflects the wider commitment of 
qualitative methodologies to grasp the fine detail of the research subject, whilst simultaneously 
allowing the researcher to narrow their field of enquiry to a manageable size. Although the use of 
case studies has attracted some criticism over whether they produce generalisable knowledge, 
Flyvbjerg rejects these criticisms, demonstrating that carefully chosen case studies (“critical 
cases” (Flyvberg 2006:230)) can enable fruitful generalisation of findings. He goes on to 
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demonstrate how the detailed nature of case studies force researchers to be more rigorous since case 
study research often allows participants to “talk back” and correct researcher bias (Flyvberg 2006: 
236). Perhaps the greatest strength of case study research, however, is simply in allowing the 
researcher to present the rich complexity of reality, rather than summarising or simplifying it for the 
sake of convenience (Ruddin, 2006).  
5.2 Responding to the research context 
Doing research in Osh, however, posed a number of distinct challenges to the researcher, and it was 
important to take into account the particularities of Osh as a research site in order to select the most 
appropriate research methods from the wide spectrum under the banner of the qualitative approach. 
These particularities included, primarily, the “closing” nature of the political context in Kyrgyzstan; 
the ‘post-conflict’ status of the city (and the ongoing social conflict still present there); and the 
configuration of gender roles and other power relations in Kyrgyzstan (and in particular in the south 
of the country) as they related to my own position as a researcher. These will be explored in a little 
more detail here below. 
While Kyrgyzstan should not at the time of this research have been considered an authoritarian or 
“closed” research context (indeed, as described in Chapter 4, the country has generally been the 
most open of the central states in the post-Soviet era), there is some merit in situating it as a 
“closing” context, to adopt Koch’s terminology (Koch 2013). Directly before and after my main 
fieldwork period in Osh, researchers working there were arrested by the security services 
(International Crisis Group 2012;  Kloop 2013), whilst observers have expressed concerns that the 
country’s “democratic gains are backsliding” after the State Committee for National Security 
(GKNB - the successor of the KGB) sued a prominent journalist for defamation (Trilling 2014). 
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Certainly, these concerns became very real to me during the course of my fieldwork, firstly when I 
was called in for questioning by the GKNB in Osh after a controversy at a local language centre in 
which I was teaching, and later when one of my research assistants - a young Uzbek student - was 
stopped by the police on his way home one night and warned to stop working with the ‘English 
journalist’. It was at this point that I ceased all research activities, deeming the risk of persecution 
by state security services too great to my assistants and participants. This ‘closing’ context, then, 
has a considerable impact on research design. If, as Gentile has so rightly explained, the “bare 
minimum” standard of research in such contexts is that “we must ensure that the integrity and 
security of our research contacts not be compromised by our activities” then thorough risk 
assessment and careful, reflexive research design, and a strategy for when things go wrong is an 
absolute necessity (Gentile 2013: 426. See also Romano 2006, Dowler 2001). This is especially true 
since so many research methods have been developed in relatively ‘open’ contexts; it is vital to 
reflexively interrogate the assumptions inherent in them in order to be sure that they would be 
appropriate in a more authoritarian research  landscape (Koch 2013).
The second important contextual aspect to impact on research design in Osh is the fact that the city 
finds itself in the aftermath of a recent violent conflict, and in the grips of considerable ongoing 
social conflict. To use Galtung’s terminology, a negative peace reigns in Osh; outright violence may 
be largely absent but the city is still marked by tension and conflict (Galtung 1969). Clearly, this 
tension is in some ways linked to the ‘closing’ context and intrusive presence of state security 
agencies described above. It also produces important effects of its own on the way research can be 
carried out in the city. For one thing, conflict sites are often under-researched due to their 
inaccessibility, and the inaccessibility of participants within these sites - especially those from 
marginalised communities (Clark 2006). Cohen and Arieli summarise the difficulties of undertaking 
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research in sites of serious and recent conflict well. Having discussed the importance (and 
difficulty) of connecting with participants who have gone “underground” because of conflict, 
overcoming mistrust and avoiding the attentions of potentially problematic security actors (Cohen 
and Arieli 2011: 425), they go on to detail some of the ways this can impact the actual process of 
doing research; 
 “Social research in an environment of conflict involves several methodological challenges. 
These are projected onto the researcher’s tasks of identifying research populations, mapping 
subjective perceptions on conflict, gaining familiarity with the needs, interests and concerns of the 
human research population, and assessing the quality of information received. While the 
interpretation of data and ethical challenges of research in conflict environments have been 
discussed, political scientists have reflected less on the strategies they use to collect data in conflict 
settings” (Cohen and Arieli 2011: 425) 
So, undertaking research in a conflict affected setting not only requires the researcher to address 
issues of ethics and replicability and rigour of data, it also demands that they think carefully about 
the methods and strategies they will use to gather data in the field. Both Clark and Cohen and Arieli 
have identified the use of Snowball Sampling Methodology (SSM) as one way of adapting research 
methods to a conflict context. SSM, they argue, helps to overcome mistrust since respondents the 
researcher has been referred to them by someone they already know (Clark 2006). It enables the 
researcher to locate and access participants who may otherwise have been impossible to speak with, 
or wary of the researcher (Clark 2006). It is an ideal strategy to use in a context when mistrust is 
high and research populations have retreated for safety reasons, then, though it is vital to be wary of 
the possible research bias inherent in this method. Relying on a ‘gatekeeper’ to introduce potential 
research participants can mean that the gatekeepers own preferences or social background end up 
disproportionately represented in the research sample (Cohen and Arieli 2011). During my own 
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fieldwork in Osh I became aware of just such a trend emerging within my research which led me to 
make the changes to my recruitment strategy that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In addition to this, the particular social and cultural circumstances of the research site - and 
crucially the way in which I as a researcher relate to this context - were also vitally important 
factors in the choice of research methods. As discussed in Chapter 4 Kyrgyzstan (and particularly 
the more conservative south) is a more socially conservative country than the UK. Gender relations 
tend to be more patriarchal, and stricter Islamic social norms are becoming increasingly widely 
adhered to (as shall be explored further in Chapter 7). It is also a poor country, with 38% of the 
population living under the poverty line, and a  Gross National Income (GNI) of just $3070 per 
capita in 2013 (World Bank 2013). It was reasonable to expect whilst planning this research that all 
of this would contribute to a certain configuration of power relations, perceptions and expectations 
between myself as a young, white, female, non-Islamic researcher from a rich Western country, and 
my research participants. It was also reasonable to expect that these configurations of power 
relations would shift according to the participants with whom I was interacting. As such, it was vital 
to build a clear consideration of my own position as a researcher  within power relations pertaining 
to the global north/south divide, gender difference, class and education into the research design 
from the start (Sultana 2007). Such a critical engagement with my positionality does not erase these 
power relations entirely, but should at least serve to minimise their impact by making them visible 
(Gormley and Bondi 1999). The appropriate research methods for this context would, then, allow 
for an ongoing process of critical reflection around the power relations at play in the research 
process (indeed, such a process adds to the overall rigour of the research, as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter). Moreover, they should not reduce this to an overly simple binary of ‘powerful 
researcher’ and ‘disempowered research subject’ - as Sultana states (and as I was to find on so many 
occasions during my field research) “power relations can work both ways” (Sultana 2007: 380). 
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5.3 Research design 
Taking into account the specificities of the research context (the ‘closing’ research environment and 
ongoing social conflict), and understanding the importance of keeping a critical eye on my own 
positionality in the research process, led me to identify a strategy that would enable me to access the 
participants and information I sought, whilst also ensuring that this was done in a safe and ethical 
manner for all concerned. This research project was carried out, then, on the basis of ethnographic 
fieldwork carried out primarily over a period of 4 months from March - June 2013., and supported 
by a preliminary visit in July and August 2012. This ethnographic fieldwork was supplemented by a 
series of semi-structured interviews designed to uncover detailed information about the ways in 
which the material environment of Osh had changed  since the violence of 2010, and how these 
changes had affected the people living there. This dual approach had the merit of being flexible, 
reflexive and sensitive to the context in which it was being carried out.  
So why focus on these two research methods in particular? Ethnography is an inductive process, 
which seeks to create meaning from the phenomena it observes rather than vice versa (Blommaert 
2006). It is concerned with “situated knowledge” (Taylor 2002; 3), produced by the researcher’s in-
depth, and often lengthy, engagement in the community they are researching, and extensive use of 
observation, often supported by interviews and other investigative tools (Lillis 2008). The aim of 
such a long term engagement is to allow the researcher to gain a highly detailed view of the minute 
of daily life, enabling greater access to the data, whilst retaining some measure of the distance 
which facilitates the empirical analysis of any data which has been gathered (Blommaert 2006). As 
such, the presence and position of the researcher is acknowledged as important in ethnography, 
leading the discipline to challenge notions of researcher objectivity, explicitly bringing the figure of 
the researcher, their background, personal perspectives and preconceptions, into the frame of 
reference (Lillis 2008, Maybin and Tusting 2011). This approach aims to use the detailed data 
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gathered at the local, or micro, level to understand and explain phenomena at the wider, macro level 
(Heller 2011, Silverstein 2003). Crucially, this responds to a number of the challenges set out above 
- a longer term, on the ground engagement with ordinary people helps to overcome the mistrust and 
difficulties in accessing participants inherent in closing and conflictual research landscapes. It 
stresses the importance of acknowledging the positionality of the researcher, and values building 
mutually respectful research relationships over faster ‘hit and run’ research techniques. Since four 
months is probably some way shy of the optimal period of time over which to carry out an 
ethnographic study, I decided to supplement this with a series of semi-structured interviews starting 
around six weeks into my fieldwork period. This six week delay was designed so I could build 
observations from the early stages of my fieldwork (on everything from subject matter, to security, 
to social customs) into the interview design. Semi-structured interviews can be a powerful research 
tool. They allow participants to express what they feel is important rather than being restricted by 
the interests or bias of the researcher, whilst still being comparable by dint of the pre-identified 
areas of discussion the researcher anchors the interview around (Cohen and Crabtree 2006). 
Although the researcher prepares a number of core questions or themes in advance, the interview is 
still free to progress in unpredictable directions. As Wengraf warns, however, this less structured 
approach to interviews entails no less work on the part of the interviewer - “they are semi-structured, 
but they must be fully planned and prepared” (Wengraf 2001: 4). 
It is worth mentioning here that I had at several points during the research process considered 
employing other supplementary research methods in this project, notably the use of walked 
interviews with GPS positioning to create individual maps of ‘safe’ and ‘no go’ areas in the city, and 
the use of visual research methods to elicit responses during interviews. For the former, it became 
clear during initial scoping meetings with scholars and international organisation representatives in 
Bishkek in 2012 that this would likely be something that neither research participants nor local and 
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national authorities would be comfortable with due to concerns about spying and surveillance. On 
their advice I decided not to pursue this avenue any further. With regards to the use of visual 
methods during interviews, I did trial this tool during my three earliest interviews, asking 
participants to show me where they lived by drawing a map, with the hope of eliciting a series of 
maps of the city and spaces participants perceived as safe or unsafe. Unfortunately, this intervention 
during the interview seemed to interrupt the flow of conversation without bringing any great 
additional insight, and after three attempts I decided not to continue using this method. On 
reflection, I believe this to be because I had not given enough thought to the way I should frame the 
request to draw a map, the timing of this request, and the materials I provided. I remain convinced 
that using visual research methods in a more considered and better designed manner could uncover 
fascinating new insights in this research, however, and would be keen to pursue this in a future 
research project.  
5.4 Gathering and analysing data 
Using the methods outlined above, I was able to undertake a two month period of initial scoping 
research in Bishkek and Osh in July and August 2012, during which I carried out interviews with 11 
researchers and representatives of international and non-governmental organisations familiar with 
Osh. Following on from this, I undertook 4 months of ethnographic research in Osh in 2013, which 
I recorded through notes in a fieldwork diary, as well as via photographs and the collection of 
secondary data such as visual data and media sources. During this period I also carried out 52 
interviews with international and non-governmental organisation workers and residents of Osh. 
These interviews were recorded via dictaphone where possible, however in many cases the 
participants were not comfortable with being recorded in this way. In this case I took detailed notes 
during and after our conversation, which I then cross checked with my research assistant 
immediately afterwards to ensure that I hadn’t left out or misunderstood any important details. As 
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much as possible I endeavoured to include short verbatim quotes in these notes. These interviews 
were carried out in one of four languages, according to the preference of the participant - English, 
Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek. When the interview was carried out in English, and in some cases later 
in the fieldwork period when my confidence in my own spoken Russian had improved, I carried out 
these interviews directly. However, when they occurred in Kyrgyz, Uzbek or sometimes in Russian, 
I undertook these interviews with the assistance of a local research assistant fluent in that language. 
The experience of working with local research assistants, and their impact on my research, is an 
important issue, and one that will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of this chapter. 
As stated in the previous section, semi-structured interviews with local residents only began after I 
had spent around 6 weeks living in Osh. This period allowed me to refine the list of questions I wish 
to put to respondents, as well as allowing me vital time to become more acquainted with the 
security situation in the city and basic social conventions to ensure I respected during interactions 
with my research participants. This initial period also allowed me to meet and develop friendships 
with the individuals who would go on to become ‘gatekeepers’ in my research, facilitating my 
recruitment of participants via SSM. Interviews with these participants would take place in a 
location of their choice (unless they preferred that I suggest the location), usually a cafe, restaurant 
or park in the centre of town, but sometimes also in their home. After running through the purpose 
of my research, and discussing a number of issues pertaining to research ethics (again, I will return 
to the question of research ethics in the final section of this chapter), interviews would proceed, 
structured around a number of key questions. These questions always included the following:  
• Where did the participant live?  
• What parts of the city would the participant visit in a normal week, and where would they rarely 
or never go? 
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• How had the city changed in the time they had lived there?  
• How did they think the city would change in the future?  
• How did they think the city should change in the future? 
Whilst the use of SSM proved invaluable to my research and enabled me to meet and interview a 
great many respondents in what remained a challenging research environment, I became aware of 
an increasing bias within my research sample during my third month in Osh. Since my two most 
active gatekeepers were both university educated professional women, I found that the participants 
they introduced me to were also overwhelmingly university educated. Interestingly, although both 
gatekeepers were also female and Uzbek, this did not seem to affect the people they introduced me 
to, who represented a fairly even cross section of genders and ethnicities. Since my other major way 
of meeting participants had been through the universities in which I was providing free language 
classes, I became concerned that my sample contained a disproportionate number of highly 
educated respondents, and very few who had not attended, or were not in the process of attending, 
university. In order to counteract this, I decided to introduce a new interview strategy. This involved 
identifying a street with the aid of my research assistant, then walking along the street, stopping to 
carry out shorter interviews with people we met along the way. These interviews again centred 
around the questions set out above, although often the second question would be dropped for 
reasons of time. In total 14 interviews were carried out in this manner, in 3 different 
neighbourhoods. These interviews typically enabled me to speak with respondents from a different 
socio-economic background to those identified through SSM - respondents included several 
housewives, a woman selling sweets in a park, and an unemployed labourer. Although they were not 
as in-depth as the more formal interviews (some of which stretched to more than an hour), they 
nevertheless provided valuable snapshots of three neighbourhoods. Although I had been planning to 
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carry out more interviews of this kind, alongside further in-depth interviews identified through my 
gatekeepers and my work at the universities, unfortunately I had to pull back from these ‘pro-active’ 
research activities in early June due to security concerns. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
following attention from the GKNB and a warning to one of my research assistants by the local 
police, I decided that it would be prudent to scale back my research activities in order not to place 
my research participants and assistants in a potentially harmful position. 
Upon returning to the UK at the end of my fieldwork period, I transcribed all interviews, with a 
Bishkek based translator transcribing and translating those that were not in English, and typed up 
the notes and reflections I had gathered in my field diary. This body of data was then analysed 
through a process of detailed and repeated reading in order to identify key themes and repeated 
narratives across the data. These themes formed the basis of a spreadsheet into which the data was 
transferred, including thematic headings such as ‘Has the city become better or worse’, ‘Normally 
visit’, ‘Never visit’ and ‘Hopes for the future’, as well as allowing me to highlight useful quotes in 
each section.  
Using this spreadsheet then allowed me to analyse each data set according to ethnicity, age and 
gender, digging deeper into the information I had gathered. Crucially, I did not attempt to analyse 
the data according to a pre-existing theory or framework, but instead tried to uncover trends and 
patterns from within the information I had gathered. I chose not to use a pre-existing software 
package such as NVivo in the analysis process, partially for reasons of practicality (I undertook the 
analysis from a number of computers, not all of which had this software available), and partially as 
I felt that building my own spreadsheets was a useful part of the analytical process which 
encouraged me to engage deeply with the data. 
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Figure 8: Screenshots of spreadsheets used during the data analysis process. 
5.5 Challenges and lessons of the research process 
Carrying out this research process presented a number of challenges. Whilst I believe that overall 
the approach adopted here was both appropriate and successful, there were certainly elements that 
required adaptation during this process (such as correcting the bias in participant recruitment, as 
discussed above), and others that continued to provide food for thought long after I had left my 
research site. These challenges, which largely centre around the questions of how to carry out truly 
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ethical research, and how to carry out research using interpreters, will be explored in more depth in 
the following section.  
5.5.1 Informed consent and participant safety 
The University of Birmingham and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, who funded 
this research) both require that research projects under their aegis undergo a process of ethical 
review to ensure that they are transparent, professional and above all, do not cause harm to research 
participants (University of Birmingham 2014, ESRC 2012). One significant part of the review 
process this project underwent focussed on the need to ensure respondents give informed consent 
regarding their participation - in the ESRC’s own words “participants must normally be informed 
fully about the purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation 
in the research entails and what risks, if any, are involved” (ESRC 2012). A common response to 
this requirement - and one which was encouraged by my own ethical review board - was to develop 
an information sheet to be shared with potential participants (including details on the aim of the 
project, and how to withdraw if they so desire), along with a form to be signed by the participant 
demonstrating their informed consent to take part in the project. However, on my arrival in Osh it 
became apparent, after numerous discussions with researchers (both local and international) living 
there, that within the specific research landscape of Osh this may not in fact represent the most 
ethical and effective approach. This was largely due to the mistrust and fear of security services 
described earlier in the chapter. Many participants, although keen to speak with me, were not 
comfortable with me recording the interview on a dictaphone (one asked me not to even take notes 
in public, leading me to scurry to the bathroom to take down precious quotes half way through our 
interview). Given this caution, asking them to sign a document confirming their participation 
seemed both insensitive and unrealistic. Indeed, one local NGO representative warned me off such 
an approach very early in my stay in Osh, describing how she herself had been subject to intense 
!121
police scrutiny after her name had been found in documents belonging to an arrested foreign 
researcher several months previously. 
On the basis of this, I decided not to use participant information sheets and consent forms, replacing 
it with a verbal consent system instead. In this, I explained the purpose of my research, along with 
procedures for withdrawing their data should they change their mind, at the start of each interview 
and asked them to verbally state that they understood and were happy to continue, recording this on 
the dictaphone whenever I was allowed to record the interview this way. This approach had two 
major advantages; firstly it was less threatening to participants who were rightfully concerned about 
their anonymity and personal safety. Secondly, it ensured that I took the time to discuss the purpose 
of my research in detail with each participant, really ensuring that they understood the commitment 
they were making, rather than simply fobbing them off with a piece of paper they may have felt 
pressured to read quickly. In this way, recording verbal consent may also have helped to counteract 
problematic effects of a potentially imbalanced power relationships between the figure of the 
educated Western researcher and some less educated or confident participants. So, whilst this may 
be an imperfect solution - it doesn’t provide the concrete paper trail of informed consent 
represented by information sheets and forms - in many ways this actually felt like a more ethical 
and more considered way of carrying out research in Osh, and certainly one that was more likely to 
meet the ultimate goal of ethical research frameworks; to protect research participants.  
The challenge of ensuring no harm was caused by my research also extended to my research 
assistants. Although I speak Russian to an intermediate level, I was aware that this would not be 
sufficient to carry out in-depth interviews in Osh. For this reason, I decided to work with two 
research assistants - one young Kyrgyz woman (Cholpon) and one young Uzbek man (Daniyar), 
both of whom also spoke fluent Russian as a second language. Neither was a professional 
interpreter, since the constraints of my funding meant I was unable to afford such rates, instead both 
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were students at a local University, who spoke excellent English and had been recommended by 
mutual friends. I had recruited two assistants due to the particular linguistic context in Osh. Osh is a 
trilingual city, in which most citizens understand all three main languages (Kyrgyz, Uzbek and 
Russian), but in which language has been inextricably caught up in the identity politics that have 
overshadowed life in the city since the violent riots of June 2010 (Canning 2013). As such, I was 
repeatedly   told during my initial research in 2012 that ethnic Kyrgyz residents would be most 
comfortable speaking with an ethnic Kyrgyz translator, just as ethnic Uzbek residents would prefer 
to communicate with an ethnic Uzbek translator. During our work I requested that where possible 
(if the respondent was fully comfortable expressing themselves in Russian) they carried out 
interviews in Russian, in order that I could follow the gist of the conversation. 
The importance of understanding, and managing, the potential risk to the interpreters and translators 
that we work with is probably the most important lesson to come out of my time spent in 
Kyrgyzstan. Although our ethical review process places a lot of emphasis on the need to protect and 
inform research participants, no mention is made of steps we might take to protect interpreters 
(indeed, no such steps were required in order to complete the ethical review process for my 
fieldwork). I had my first hint as to why this might prove problematic in week 3 of my research, 
when I visited the local branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with Cholpon to try and 
gain the necessary permissions to interview someone from the Mayor’s office. During the course of 
what was at times a quite bad tempered interview, Cholpon was asked by the MFA representative to 
provide her name, contact details and University, and sternly told that they considered her 
“responsible” for me (Field notes, week 3). This situation clearly made both myself and Cholpon 
uncomfortable, and having not considered the risk of such an eventuality, I was unprepared to deal 
with it in a satisfactory manner. Cholpon dutifully handed over her details, but when we discussed 
the incident later we agreed that in the future I should intervene to ensure it was clear that I held 
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sole responsibility for my conduct and actions in the course of my research, and to shield Cholpon 
from the scrutiny of the authorities. 
Worse, however, were the events that occurred in week 12 of my research, and which I have already 
mentioned caused me to stop carrying out interviews. The day after Daniyar and I had been working 
in an Uzbek neighbourhood, he called me in the evening to say he had been stopped by the police 
on his way home from University, interrogated about my work, and warned not to help me again. 
Although he remained calm, it was clear he was concerned and rightfully so; Osh has been plagued 
by police discrimination and brutality against the Uzbek community, especially young men, since 
the 2010 events (Amnesty International 2010). I felt devastated, and guilty, that my actions had put 
Daniyar in such a risky situation, and all the more concerned that I had no strategy in place to deal 
with such an eventuality. Again, my field notes from the time show how this caused me to reflect on 
my practices as a researcher, and how these could be improved: 
“Daniyar’s situation reminds me of my responsibility as a researcher to protect RAs/interpreters. 
They are in the firing line – up to me to ensure I assess risks sufficiently, and take steps to ensure 
they are not placed in difficult or uncomfortable situations.”(Field notes, week 12) 
Although Daniyar wasn’t contacted by the police again, I decided that this situation, and the fact 
that I didn’t have a credible strategy in place to deal with it, meant that it would be irresponsible, 
and unethical, to continue to expose either of my interpreters to such a level of risk by bringing 
them to the attention of the police. This is certainly one area of my research design that I believe 
should have been considerably stronger. 
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5.5.2 Language barriers 
As discussed above, my language skills (or lack thereof) meant that I decided to employ two 
research assistants to help with interpretation during my fieldwork in Osh. When I first decided to 
carry out fieldwork in a country where I did not speak the language fluently, I was concerned that 
my lack of language skills would prove a barrier to my research, for a number of reasons. I worried 
that I would be unable to build a rapport with interviewees, that I would miss out of the fine detail 
of interactions, and that my independence and spontaneity as a research would be limited by the 
necessity of working with an interpreter. Certainly, my field notes show that these frustrations did 
play a part in my experience of doing research in a foreign language. In week two I was concerned 
that I was missing out on “the sense of solidarity/being an insider” that comes from sharing a 
language with those around you; in week three I was worried that the presence of an interpreter in 
an interview “Creates a confusing power dynamic in interviews – who is leading the research? Who 
should the participant reply to?” (Field notes, week 2). By week 11 my Russian language skills had 
improved to the point where I felt able to do some interviews on my own (provided it was 
recorded), with my field notes revealing that it “Feels great to be able to speak and connect directly 
to people”, and reveling in the flexibility and freedom this gave my research schedule (Field notes, 
week 11).  
At first glance, then, the ability to speak directly to research participants seems to be greatly 
preferable to speaking through an interpreter. However, my field notes also reveal a number of ways 
in which being a linguistic outsider actually appeared to benefit the research process. Firstly, I had 
been concerned prior to arriving in Osh that my choice to learn Russian might be interpreted as 
having chosen the language of the colonial oppressor.  In fact, it soon became clear that in the 
politically charged linguistic context of Osh, many people felt the fact that I communicated in 
Russian or English meant that we were communicating on a “neutral middle ground (Field notes, 
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week 7). This feeling was compounded through conversations with other researchers, who did 
speak Kyrgyz or Uzbek, and recounted the difficulties of trying to figure out which is the correct 
language to address someone in without causing offence, and the times they had been reprimanded 
by friends and respondents for mixing up Kyrgyz and Uzbek words in their speech (Field notes, 
week 2). Moreover, whilst being an outsider undoubtedly feels uncomfortable, this can itself bring 
useful insights. I noted on a number of occasions that by “playing up the stupid outsider role” (Field 
notes, week 2), and by asking for extra linguistic clarification, I was able to elicit extra information 
from respondents keen to make sure I really understood the situation in Osh (or at least, their 
perspective on it). So, whilst it may seem frustrating not to speak all the local languages in your 
field site, there can actually be hidden benefits to this that researchers should be aware of and seek 
to maximise where possible. 
More importantly, though, my experience of working with Cholpon and Daniyar fully supports the 
view of translators and interpreters as cultural brokers and producers of knowledge (Turner 2010; 
Edwards 1998). One incident in particular, recorded in my field notes, demonstrates this well, and 
occurred when I was carrying out interviews in an Uzbek neighbourhood with Daniyar: 
“Visiting Mahalla [Uzbek neighbourhood] with Daniyar and see 4 aksakal [elderly men] sitting on 
a tapshan [raised dining platform] in a courtyard, talking. I think this would be a really excellent 
opportunity for an interview, but am pulled past by Daniyar. We stop just past the entrance to the 
courtyard, out of sight, and F points out the carpets and fabrics hanging up along the yard – says 
this signifies a death in the family recently, and that the aksakal are there for the funeral. Would 
have been highly inappropriate to barge in and start asking questions, which I would have done had 
Daniyar not been there.”(Field notes, Week 9) 
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Daniyar’s intervention in this case not only prevented me from making an embarrassing cultural 
faux pas, but also allowed me to learn more about the different ways in which Mahalla space is used 
in the production of social life in these neighbourhoods. Daniyar and Cholpon also actively 
participated in the production of knowledge in other ways – both became interested in the research, 
and actively sought out information independent of our time together, that they would then 
enthusiastically tell me about at our next meeting. Cholpon even went so far as to write one of her 
University papers about the legality of the construction of a park within the boundaries of the 
UNESCO world heritage zone around Sulaiman-Too mountain. Similarly, one of the most 
interesting days I spent in Osh came when Cholpon suggested she walk me through the 
neighbourhood near her University, taking me through back streets and near deserted areas I might 
otherwise never have stumbled across. These experiences gave me a powerful appreciation of the 
role that interpreters and translators can play in collaboratively producing knowledge, and the 
importance of being open to this possibility as a researcher. 
Recent literature on the use of translators/interpreters also recommends that researchers widen their 
consideration of power and positionality in fieldwork to consider how it applies to translators/
interpreters (Temple and Edwards 2002; Berman and Tyyska 2011), and once again my time in Osh 
suggests that such a step is vital. Whilst I had taken steps in this direction, by ensuring I used a 
Kyrgyz interpreter when I interviewed Kyrgyz respondents and an Uzbek interpreter for Uzbek 
interviews, on reflection this actually led me to play down other elements of Cholpon and Daniyar’s 
positionality that came to have an influence on their work. For example, Daniyar’s position as a 
relatively wealthy young man from a respected family (along with his very respectful approach to 
respondents) helped to ensure that our street interviews in Uzbek neighbourhoods were largely 
successful. Conversely, the strongly paternalistic culture of Kyrgyzstan sometimes created 
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challenging working conditions for Cholpon as a young woman (especially when we visited city 
representatives in week 3). Speaking with another foreign researcher’s local assistant revealed 
similar tensions, as she explained the problems she faced as an in-migrant from the village to the 
city, and how this affected her relations with long-term city dwellers, revealing another level of 
positionality that I hadn’t considered. 
Quite early on, I also had to reassess what I had assumed to be the power relationships between 
myself and my interpreters. When I decided to work with local interpreters, my first concern had 
been to ensure I paid them a fair wage and provided good working conditions. Daniyar, however, 
refused to accept any payment for his services, telling me he came from a wealthy family, and that 
to him the experience of working with me, and practicing his English with a native speaker, was 
more valuable to him (Field notes, Week 2). Similarly, over the four months I spent working with 
Cholpon, I found that she increasingly used me as a strategy to present a different point of view 
(usually in the guise of a well travelled western expert) in arguments with her more traditional 
family (for example, about whether she should travel to work in the USA for the summer). Both 
cases forced me to reassess my previously lazy assumptions about where I stood in relation to 
Daniyar and Cholpon. Rather than automatically placing myself in the role of the reluctant patron, I 
came to appreciate that our working relationship was far richer and more complex than I had 
initially understood. 
5.6 Notes on the presentation of data within this thesis 
Finally, before moving on to the empirics chapters it is important to note a number of points about 
the way data is presented in the text. Firstly, all quotes are anonymised, with respondents assigned 
different names throughout the text. This was important in order to allow participants to speak 
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freely about very sensitive issues without fear of repercussions. A schedule of interviews containing 
further information can be found in the appendices of this thesis. Secondly, as discussed above, 
interviews were carried out in four languages, with some being transcribed and translated into 
English at a later date. For this reason, some quotes employ idiosyncratic turns of phrase or idioms 
that may seem surprising when presented in English. In order to make clear what language the 
speaker was using during the interview, then, the reference following each quote will include a 
letter (E for English, R for Russian, K for Kyrgyz and U for Uzbek) denoting the language the 
interview originally occurred in. 
Having established the theoretical and methodological basis for this investigation, then, it is now 
time to explore the findings generated by this research project. The next chapter will begin by 
setting out how the urban landscape in Osh has changed in the years since the events, focussing 
especially on a number of initiatives introduced as part of the immediate post-crisis response, and 
ongoing city master-planning activities. It will then move on to give an initial insight into the 
widely differing ways in which these changes have been perceived by city residents. Finally, it will 
spend some time introducing the figure of Melis Myrzakmatov, the former Mayor of Osh, whose 
figure looms large over efforts to reconstruct and develop the city’s landscape in recent years. 
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Chapter 6: Post Conflict Reconstruction and Regeneration in Osh 
6.1 Introduction 
The first challenge of writing about post-crisis reconstruction and urban development in Osh since 
the 2010 Events is simply to record what has been done in the years following the violence, as this 
information is not easily accessible. As such, a large part of this research project (especially in its 
earlier stages) was devoted to imply trying to unearth what has been achieved in this regard. This 
was by no means straightforward: numerous actors have been involved at different points of this 
process and, as shall become clear in this chapter, it has often been difficult to distinguish between 
reconstruction efforts and the ongoing development of the city (an important finding in its own 
right).  
This chapter, then, serves a number of vital purposes in the context of the overall investigation. 
Firstly, it tries to set out the substance and logic of the reconstruction efforts that followed the 2010 
violence. This entails determining the main actors involved, the main actions undertaken, 
establishing the logic driving these actions, and identifying some of the controversies and tensions 
that sprang up around them. Given the constraints on length inherent in this thesis, the chapter goes 
on to focus on one element of reconstruction efforts - housing and shelter - in order to present a 
more detailed snapshot of these issues in practice. The overview of physical reconstruction work in 
Osh presented in this chapter has been drawn from documents in the public domain, internal 
documents acquired over the course of field research, and interviews carried out with individuals 
involved in the reconstruction process, as well as observation of reconstruction projects in Osh 
itself. 
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Secondly, this chapter acknowledges the impossibility of separating reconstruction efforts from the 
wider context of ongoing urban planning in Osh, as embodied by the city Masterplan. This 
document - itself a holdover from the Soviet tradition of urban planning described in Chapter Four - 
manages the feat of being absolutely central to the project of city planning in Osh and a complete 
mystery to most of the city’s residents. Even though, as we shall see through a case study on the 
redevelopment of Osh’s Monueva Street, this document is already having a great impact on the 
physical redevelopment of the city, the municipal authorities have declared it to be a secret 
document, and refused to share the details of its contents with residents or concerned local and 
international organisations. As such, the information presented in this chapter has again been pieced 
together from interviews carried out with key stakeholders involved with the planning process in 
Osh, as well as publicly available documents and media statements. 
Finally, having established this overview of physical interventions in Osh’s urban environment 
since 2010, the chapter will then move on to consider the central question of how Osh residents 
have perceived these changes. Although Chapters 7 - 10 will delve into this issue in more detail, it 
will be fitting to sketch out some broad brushstrokes of residents’ reactions to urban change in this 
chapter, as this will provide a useful framework within which to consider the following chapters. 
One especially striking element of these reactions has been the strong identification of changes in 
the urban environment since the Events as the responsibility (for better or worse) of former Mayor 
Myrzakmatov, and the chapter will end by reflecting a little on the significance of this. 
6. 2 Post-crisis reconstruction responses in Osh 
In the three years following the June Events, the urban landscape of Osh saw a large number of 
interventions aimed at repairing the damage done to the city and improving it - to return to the 
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terminology introduced by theorists such as Charlesworth (2006) and Pelling (2003) in Chapter 
Two, ‘building back better’. These interventions included the construction of new housing blocks, 
and the reconstruction of existing housing stock damaged or destroyed in the violence. Cultural 
venues such as the Uzbek Music and Drama Theatre and the Kirgizia Theatre were also restored, as 
was the Alisher Navoi monument that stands opposite the entrance to the bazaar on Navoi Street. As 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, five new monuments were erected in the city; two 
commemorating the June violence, and three celebrating figures from Kyrgyz history and culture. 
Numerous parks were rehabilitated, such as the one in Oshsky microdistrict at the junction of Kara-
Suuskaya and Masalieva streets, and across the city street lights, traffic lights and bus shelters have 
been improved, and in many cases installed for the first time. These measures represent a mix of 
immediate post-crisis response, and longer term efforts to rebuild a safer city. They have largely 
been funded by international donors and international organisations; for example, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have 
funded much of the shelter provision and reconstruction, and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has supported several projects regarding the rehabilitation of 
parks, and the provision of street lighting and traffic lights, amongst other things.  
In order to coordinate the different actors involved in this process, and to attempt to respond swiftly 
to the challenge of reconstructing Osh and Jalalabad, the interim government of Kyrgyzstan 
established the State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development (SDRD) through resolution 
485 on June 21st 2010. The SDRD’s mandate was then reinforced in the following month by 
resolution 121 of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Directorate was assigned a number 
of key functions, namely the co-ordination of all actors involved in the reconstruction efforts (such 
as international organisations, NGOs, donor governments, the Kyrgyz government and the local 
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authorities); the management of funds allocated to the reconstruction process; and attempts to drum 
up further investment into the rehabilitation of areas affected by the June events (Satybaldiev 2010).  
The SDRD had a wider mandate than simply the physical reconstruction of Osh and Jalalabad - as 
its work progressed it was given responsibility for promoting peace building and reconciliation 
through its work in affected areas. However, in the immediate aftermath of the violence, the 
Directorate focussed on beginning the repair and rehabilitation of structures which had been 
seriously affected by the violence. Specifically, it prioritised the following key areas: housing, 
schools and other educational facilities, healthcare and social facilities, municipal buildings, and 
infrastructure (Satybaldiev 2010). Unfortunately, despite its prompt establishment, the work of the 
SDRD was dogged with accusations of the kind of corruption endemic in public bodies in 
Kyrgyzstan - as one senior international organisation representative put it, the Directorate was 
“hamstrung by organisational constraints and by corruption” (IV56, E). This assessment was shared 
by another local NGO representative, who complained about the misuse of funds and corrupt 
practices rife within the organisation (IV29). 
6. 2.1 Starting reconstruction - housing first 
Despite these shortcomings, the SDRD remained the focal point of reconstruction programmes in 
Osh, and soon identified housing as the most pressing reconstruction need in the city. The need for 
reconstruction of the urban fabric of Osh was clear and urgent in the aftermath of the June violence. 
Whilst estimates of the number of buildings destroyed in Osh and Jalalabad and their surrounding 
areas vary from 2,323 (Satybaldiev 2010) to 2,843 (KIC 2011), all agree that the vast majority of 
damage was done to housing stock, with estimates ranging from 1,893 (UNHCR) to 1,975 
(Satybaldiev 2010). Of these, the lion’s share of the destruction took place in Osh city and the 
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surrounding areas: between 1,446 (UNHCR 2012) and 1,576 (Satybaldiev 2010) homes. As the 
UNHCR estimated the average household size in damaged homes to be 7.4 persons, this meant that 
between 10,700 and 11,662 people were directly affected by the loss or extreme damage of their 
home (UNHCR 2012).  
It is worth noting here that the particular geographical arrangement of Osh city and the surrounding 
Kara-Suu district (part of Osh Oblast’) can lead to some confusion regarding the location of 
damaged homes. Although the SDRD estimated that there was a roughly equal number of homes 
destroyed in Osh city and Osh Oblast’ (776 and 800 respectively), it is likely that a large number of 
the destroyed houses allocated to Osh Oblast’ formed part of the urban conglomeration of the city. 
The complex territorial limitations of the Osh municipality and Kara-Suu region have led to one 
NGO representative remarking that the city 
“looks more gerrymandered than it is” (IV09, E).  
Figure 9. Map showing electoral precincts of 
Osh city (red) and contiguous urban areas 
classified as villages (yellow) (Source: 
Eurasianet) 
Put briefly, this means that some urban areas at 
the heart of the city, such as the mahallas to the 
north of Sulaiman mountain, which are entirely 
contiguous with the rest of the city, are not 
legally and administratively part of Osh city (see Figure 8). Of course, this de jure separation does 
not prevent residents of these areas participating in the daily life of the city of which they are a de 
facto part. Crucially, many areas contiguous to the city, but not officially part of it, suffered greatly 
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during the June events - for example the houses along Abdukhadirov/Navoi street, or along 
Pamirskaya street heading out of the city. 
With this in mind, when this investigation refers to reconstruction in Osh it refers to reconstruction 
happening within the parts of the city administratively classified as villages in Kara-Suu district as 
well as those that legally form part of the municipality. Since the body charged with managing and 
implementing reconstruction after the events was mandated to work in Osh City, Osh Oblast’ and 
Jalalabad City, it was also able to work across these administrative boundaries. Another factor 
which made the need for swift reconstruction of housing all the more pressing following the June 
violence was the weather. The temperature in Osh regularly reaches the mid-30s in July and August, 
before dropping rapidly throughout the Autumn to temperatures that dip below freezing at night 
time by the beginning of December. Such extremes in temperature make the need for the swift 
provision of shelter obvious (IV56).
In order to address housing needs, the SDRD established two departments focusing on this; one 
with responsibility for building entirely new homes, and a second to rebuild damaged and destroyed 
homes (IV14). Information materials provided to Osh residents by the SDRD in the Autumn of 
2010 give a useful insight into the kind of work being carried out by the directorate at this time. 
These pamphlets provide details of multi-storey buildings being constructed in Osh and Jalalabad, 
along with the cost of each contract and the company responsible for construction, including a 75 
apartment housing complex on Razzakov Street, 64 and 60 apartment complexes in the Anar 
microdistrict in the West of the city, and a 70 apartment building on Masalieva Street. They also 
provide information about the programme to provide transitional shelter, including progress reports 
and information on how to access loans to aid housing reconstruction. Finally, they give details 
about the SDRD’s equality policies, and hotlines and a physical address where residents can access 
more information, advice or report complaints regarding the conduct and work of the Directorate.
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Figure 10. English language version of SDRD outreach materials (Source: Author’s own) 
6.2.2. Reconstruction of housing - Phase One 
Focussing on one element of the post-crisis reconstruction process in Osh - the reconstruction of 
destroyed and severely damaged homes -  allows us to make more clear some of the key decisions 
and compromises being negotiated during this process, and what they meant to affected residents. 
This element of the reconstruction process took place over two broad stages; first came the 
provision of shelters to meet residents’ immediate needs.  This was followed by a second stage, in 
which support was provided towards the reconstruction of permanent housing. The UNHCR 
estimated that around 90% of the houses affected by the Events fell into the categories of either 
“major damage” or “complete destruction” (UNHCR 2012: 10). 
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Following the June events international organisations and NGOs responding to the unfolding crisis 
used the cluster system established for post-crisis contexts in order to coordinate their response 
more effectively. This system identifies eleven thematic and operational areas of importance in the 
post-disaster context, with one organisation taking the lead in co-ordinating the organisations 
participating in each cluster. In the case of Osh in 2010, the shelter cluster was led by UNHCR, and 
included the Danish Refugee Council, Catholic Relief Services, Care International and ACTED, 
working in co-ordination with the SDRD once it had been established (UNHCR 2012).  
As a senior member of the shelter cluster explained in 2012, the organisation’s original plan for the 
shelters they wished to construct in Osh and Jalalabad comprised of a three room structure, with 
each room measuring 14 metres squared, and a small semi-enclosed porch at the front. These plans, 
he explained, were soon scaled back due to concerns about available materials and timeframes, 
resulting in a compromise design of a two room brick structure measuring 28 metres squared, to be 
built on the site where the recipient’s home had previously stood. Around two thousand of these 
structures had been built by the onset of winter in November 2010, an achievement  the 
representative ranked as one of the best of his career in the humanitarian sector (IV56). UNCHR 
documents also show that this approach was informed at least in part by an attempt to build in 
participatory planning approaches, such as those advocated by Sammuels (2010) and Siriwardena 
and Haigh (2011), to the designs. Focus groups were held with affected communities in which their 
expressed preferences - for brick built homes on the foundations of their original houses, and for aid 
to be distributed in materials rather than cash (to lessen the danger of money being siphoned off 
through corrupt practices) - were integrated into the final plans for reconstruction (UNHCR 2012). 
Two aspects of this first phase approach stand out as significant; the decision to construct shelters 
on the same sites as destroyed homes, and the choice of brick as the principal building material for 
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these shelters instead of a material such as panel board, which is often used in the construction of 
such interim shelters. Although this second decision can in part be attributed to concerns about the 
upcoming winter, both owe a great deal to a different goal; to reassure the affected population, and 
safeguard their space in the city. One former SDRD worker, Meder, clarified the decision to build 
brick shelters right on the site of residents’ former homes through the psychological effects it had on 
these residents, saying they believed “if there was a concrete foundation, nobody would dare touch 
them” (IV14, R). For people still reeling from the horror of the June events and the violent loss of 
their home, the use of brick was both comforting and symbolic. Brick shelters were perceived as 
less temporary and more difficult to remove or destroy than their panel board counterparts. The 
decision to build shelters in the sites formerly occupied by destroyed homes further added to this 
sense of reassurance, reaffirming these residents’ physical presence in the city so soon after many 
had been forced to flee for their lives. This reflects Connerton’s assertion, as explored in Chapter 3, 
that the built environment can be used to lend permanence to a group’s memories, identity and 
feelings of belonging. This sentiment was echoed by the shelter cluster representative, who himself 
explained that the decision to build brick shelters represented a wish to “ground the Uzbek 
community”, and prevent them from being pushed from the city centre (IV56, E). Intriguingly, the 
SDRD and UNHCR representatives I spoke with both claimed that they had been responsible for 
the decision to build with brick, and implied that they had needed to fight to impose this choice on 
the other actors involved. 
6.2.3. Reconstruction of housing - Phase two 
Having met the immediate shelter needs of the affected population in time for winter, the focus then 
shifted to the longer term reconstruction of damaged housing. This process was undertaken by the 
SDRD in collaboration with a number of donors and implementing organisations, notably the Asian 
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Development Bank (ADB), which funded the reconstruction of a significant number of homes in 
Osh and Jalalabad through a $28 million grant to the Kyrgyz Government. The second phase of 
reconstruction commenced in April 2011, and eventually resulted in the reconstruction of over 1500 
houses, and the repair of around 100 more (ADB 2013). Whilst funding and support for this 
programme was provided by the ADB, implementation was carried out by two non-governmental 
organisations working in partnership with the SDRD; ACTED and the Danish Refugee Council. 
(Ibid). 
Simply put, this phase of reconstruction allowed recipients to choose from a range of eight housing 
designs that had been approved by the city architecture office, measuring up to 100 metres squared. 
Meder explained that the size of the reconstructed building was a function of the size of the 
destroyed home. For example, if this had measured 80 metres squared, then its replacement would 
measure the same size. However if, as he estimated was the case for around 5% of the destroyed 
houses, it had measured over 100 metres squared, the reconstruction would be capped at an upper 
limit of 100 by the SDRD (IV14). Houses were again rebuilt on the sites that the damaged 
structures had stood on and, where possible, reused the existing foundations as part of the new 
structure. Decisions about which houses were eligible for reconstruction aid were made by a multi-
stakeholder board in which the SDRD, municipal government and donor organisations all 
participated. (Ibid) 
This programme featured a number of elements at the forefront of post-crisis reconstruction practice 
in recent years as already described in Chapter 2 of this thesis. These were self-build projects, in 
which architectural plans and good quality materials were provided to residents who are then 
expected to undertake the construction process themselves. In those cases where households were 
deemed to be especially vulnerable, or unable to carry out the reconstruction themselves, extra 
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money was provided for them to hire labourers to carry out the work for them. The use of such self 
build projects is not only cost effective, but encourages recipients of reconstruction aid to take more 
ownership of both the process and final project, helping to empower them in the aftermath of a 
traumatic event which has been distinctly disempowering for so many residents (Clarke et al 2010). 
Reconstructed houses also represented an attempt to implement the principle of building back better 
in Osh. An ADB representative who had previously worked in the aftermath of serious natural 
disasters around the world proudly told me that he was confident that in Osh they had achieved this 
aim. Better quality materials had been used in the new homes, he explained, the eight approved 
designs met stringent construction standards, and perhaps most importantly, the new buildings 
incorporated structural measures to withstand the seismic stress common to the region (IV11). Of 
course, this understanding of building back better as using better quality materials and designs is 
somewhat narrow when compared to the vision of the peace building architect advanced by 
Charlesworth (2006). 
It is really at this moment that the relation between the post-crisis reconstruction processes and the 
ongoing planning and regeneration processes advanced by the municipal authorities in the city as a 
whole begin to interact in an increasingly complex and sometimes problematic way. The 
administrative boundaries discussed at the beginning of this chapter became especially significant at 
this point, as reconstruction within areas that fell under the administrative purview of the then 
Mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, were liable to delays that were repeatedly attributed by my 
interviewees to Myrzakmatov’s own ideas about development in the city centre. These ideas, as we 
shall see later in this chapter, differed significantly to those represented by the SDRD led 
reconstruction efforts. Indeed, the Mayor’s input into the reconstruction process was characterised 
by one donor organisation as “throwing up as many roadblocks as he could” (IV11, E), an 
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assessment which was echoed by the majority of the individuals engaged in the reconstruction 
process I spoke with. 
Two issues were repeatedly raised by respondents in reference to these delays; the so-called ‘red 
line’ delineating where residents should and shouldn’t build in order to respect the city Master Plan, 
and the difficulty of obtaining the correct registration papers for properties in the city. The infamous 
‘red line’ denotes areas in Osh on which construction is not allowed. These areas are apparently due 
to be redeveloped as part of the proposed master plan to facilitate, for example, the widening of 
certain central streets or the construction of new multi-storey buildings in the city centre. Since the 
city master plan has not been made public, in spite of repeated requests by local and international 
organisations, it is unclear how residents should know whether or not their property is affected by 
the red line. The question of whether or not to rebuild houses over this boundary provoked much 
discussion within the SDRD. The Municipality’s position was clear - one of the city’s Deputy 
Mayors, Taalaibek Sabirov,  went on record to state that houses rebuilt in contravention of the city 
master plan would be liable to demolition, asserting “We say, ‘Yes, let’s restore the homes,’ but only 
temporarily. When implementing the Master Plan, some houses will have to be destroyed. They will 
be destroyed according to the laws of the Kyrgyz Republic” (Trilling 2011). Such a temporary 
restoration of housing, however, was not an attractive option. This ran counter to the expectations of 
donor organisations, who demanded value for money, (IV62) and would also undermine the positive 
psychological effects of the provision of stable housing as described above. Eventually, “after a lot 
of arguments” the SDRD decided to rebuild homes were they stood - taking into account the red 
line where possible, but building across this boundary where there was no other choice (IV14, R). 
Rebuilding a house was only half the battle, however. The registration of buildings also represented 
a significant struggle, and was considered to be a serious issue by almost every actor involved in the 
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reconstruction process that I spoke with (IV56, IV63, IV11,  IV09, IV10). Problems obtaining the 
correct registration and ownership documents for a property were attributed to a number of factors 
in my discussions. For some, the Uzbek community (disproportionately affected by property 
destruction during the violence) remained too wary of official bodies to risk engaging with them to 
obtain the correct documents (IV55). Another blamed a registration process that is “cumbersome 
and unclear” along with a continued preference amongst the population at large to manage housing, 
land and property issues along informal lines, or according to customary law (IV63). Many also 
underlined the lack of political will on the part of the municipal authorities to facilitate the 
registration process, suggesting that this was now being used as a political tool and delaying tactic 
to favour the kind of development supported by the city authorities (IV56, http://
www.eurasianet.org/node/63951). Indeed, one international organisation representative expressed 
her concerns about the possible political nature of this problem, saying the local authorities used to 
“close their eyes” where properties were not correctly registered, but had taken a far stricter 
approach since the events of June 2010 (IV63, E). As Weizman has so amply demonstrated in his 
work on Israeli planning practices, property registration processes and other seemingly 
straightforward elements of urban planning and regulation can be used for powerful discriminatory 
and political purposes (Weizman 2007). In all likelihood the reality in Osh probably reflects a 
combination of all of these factors. 
Interestingly, another international organisation employee working in Osh pointed out that this issue 
- incomplete documents and unclear property registration - was not restricted to the domain of 
private individuals. He identified the lack of clear information regarding land ownership, zoning 
and legal status of publicly owned land as one of the biggest obstacles to reconstruction he had 
encountered - perhaps a result of the well documented swing towards largely unregulated “laissez 
faire” planning in the immediate post-Soviet era (Stanilov 2007).  Using the example of a large 
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scale sanitation project he was currently overseeing, he explained how the loss of many relevant 
documents in the post-Soviet era was making his work difficult; 
“No one knows if the land we need to buy to build the plant is agricultural (and therefore subject to 
a moratorium on transfer to industrial use) or riverain. People are sure that it is government land, 
but they don’t know to which department it belongs (…) This makes reconstruction very 
complex” (IV11, E) 
For private individuals, possession of the correct registration documents for their homes had 
become particularly important in the aftermath of the June events. Firstly, those people whose 
homes were destroyed or damaged in the violence needed to be able to prove their ownership of 
these properties in order to access aid in rebuilding them. Secondly, valid documents would be 
necessary in order to receive fair compensation for the destruction of buildings (including some that 
were rebuilt in the post-crisis reconstruction effort) demolished as part of ongoing city 
redevelopment projects rolled out since 2010. The case of Monueva Street, which will be explored 
in more detail later in this chapter, amply demonstrates how these two situations can intersect. 
Suffice to say that two years after the beginning of phase two of housing reconstruction in Osh, 
registration of properties remained a thorny issue. 
6. 3. The Osh City Master-plan 
A few weeks after I arrived in Osh, it became something of a tradition amongst members of the 
international community in the city to greet me with the words ‘Have you seen it yet?’, as they were 
aware of my wish to see a copy of the city’s much vaunted general’ny plan, or master plan for 
development. The plan had become notoriously difficult to track down; speaking candidly in his 
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office one day, one international organisation representative in Bishkek likened it to the Loch Ness 
Monster (IV56), whilst another questioned whether such a document even existed as such, 
suggesting it may be a cover for a “piecemeal” programme of development (IV05, E). When I asked 
why the plan was such a closely guarded secret a variety of answers were proffered. One NGO 
worker active on the issue informed me that the local authorities insisted that all 10000:1 scale maps 
in Kyrgyzstan were restricted (imagine my surprise, then, to see just such maps on the walls of the 
architecture department of a local University a few weeks later). At the city architect’s office I was 
told that the plan couldn’t be made public until it had been approved in Bishkek (IV13, IV62). 
Another member of the international community complained that the Mayor’s office had promised 
to make the plan public nine months previously, but that this was apparently being held up by 
“technical issues” (IV06, E). At a round table meeting regarding human rights and urban planning 
former Mayor Myrzakmatov himself is reported to have explained that the plan was not being made 
public due to the “strategic information” it contained about the city’s infrastructure (Personal 
Communication 2014). 
But beyond these jokes, theories and explanations lies a very real problem. By August 2012, during 
a preliminary fieldwork visit to Osh, evictions were already taking place to allow for the widening 
of a road in the city centre, Monueva Street. This project was being presented by the city authorities 
as the first step in the implementation of the Master plan, a document that the overwhelming 
majority of people in Osh had never seen, much less been consulted about. One representative of a 
local NGO later recalled being allowed to look at the plan on boards set up around a stuffy, airless 
room during a roundtable meeting with municipal representatives (including the Mayor himself) in 
2012 (IV52). Another international worker noted that her predecessor’s notes recorded seeing a 
copy of the plan several years earlier, before the June Events (IV06). For the most part, however, 
the plan remained a closely guarded secret even as it was being implemented. 
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Obviously this situation presents a serious problem to a researcher concerned with planning and 
urban change in Osh. How can one write about the potential impact of urban planning on a city’s 
residents when the plans themselves are secret? This was the challenge faced during the course of 
this research when it became clear that no copy of the plan was publicly available, and that the 
Mayor’s office was unwilling to even agree to a meeting, let alone reveal details of the plan. Efforts 
to obtain copies of the plan from the national archives in Bishkek and the Russian State Library in 
Moscow also proved fruitless, since neither institution was able to locate a copy of the plan, or any 
related documents. Other local and international organisations with an interest in the plan confirmed 
that they too had been unable to obtain a copy in Bishkek (though they had not attempted to get a 
copy in Moscow). For this reason, the approach taken in this project shifted to focus on drawing up 
a picture of the general principles guiding the Municipal authorities’ interventions in the urban 
landscape, and by extension the master plan, from information in the public domain, interviews 
with individuals with first hand knowledge of the plan, and observation of public infrastructure and 
development projects being carried out in the city during the fieldwork period. Although this 
approach hasn’t allowed for a presentation within this thesis of the fine-grained detail of the 
proposed development of Osh that the master planning document itself would provide, it has 
enabled the elaboration of a compelling picture of the kind of city the Mayor’s office wishes to 
create through the Master Plan.  
6. 3.1. Aims of the Master Plan 
All respondents agreed that the Master Plan was not a new document, rather it is an updated version 
of a Soviet era plan. This would place Osh firmly within the wider trend of a return to a master 
planning method in former Soviet cities following the laissez faire approach that characterised the 
!145
initial post-Soviet period (Golubchikov 2004, Stanilov 2007). Despite seemingly widespread 
confusion regarding precisely which Soviet plan it was based on, the city architecture office and 
academics involved in the development of the plan all assured me that it had been developed on the 
basis of the the 1985 plan (IV12, IV13). Such revisions were necessary, they explained, because the 
previous plan had been written taking into account a potential city population of 300,000, whereas 
they now believed the city could grow to between 600,000 and 800,000 by 2025, numbers that the 
Soviet era plan simply was not designed to accommodate (Ibid). Interestingly, neither the academics 
nor the architecture office mentioned another pressing reason to update the Soviet plan that Meder, 
the former SDRD worker explained: 
“The problem of the Master Plan is, when it was the Soviet Union, the Master Plan was created in 
quite another way; it was a time when no land was private property and that’s why the Government 
could create any Master Plan. But nowadays  the Master Plan has to take into consideration one’s 
private property, and the city, before creating a Master Plan, has always to think over if they have 
enough money to realise the Master Plan. And… of course, a city develops and changes greatly year 
after year because this market environment makes the city develop. It doesn’t matter if the 
municipality or city hall wants it or not, a city will develop because people are coming, migration is 
increasing, people have to live somewhere, feed their family; one wants to sell, another one to work 
(…) nowadays, as it was in the Soviet Union, it is impossible to create the Master Plan for the 
whole city for thirty years ahead” (IV14, R) 
In short, the entire context in which urban planning takes place has changed from a command 
economy without private property, to a market economy where people’s rights to private property 
must be respected. Meder’s statement implicitly acknowledges the triple transition highlighted by 
Tsenkova as driving urban change in post-Socialist cities; systemic political change, systemic 
!146
economic change, and decentralisation of power (Tsenkova 2006). As such, the Master Plan - 
indeed the entire planning process - needs to be adapted to fit these new circumstances. 
Unfortunately, Meder believed that the Master Plan hadn’t  got to grips with this new reality, and 
noted grimly that voicing these opinions had made him very unpopular with the city authorities 
(Ibid). Instead, the municipal authorities advanced a different narrative to explain the changes they 
planned to introduce in the city. As well as accommodating its swelling population in an effectively 
functioning and comfortable city, the Master Plan is presented as the means to achieving certain 
policy goals regarding Osh’s identity and role in modern Kyrgyzstan. 
These aims are most clearly expressed in a policy document issued by Melis Myrzakhmatov’s office 
(but removed from the city website since the election of a new Mayor) The Renaissance of Osh - 
The centre for the development of the southern region of Kyrgyzstan (Development plan for the 
period 2010-2015). This wide ranging document (here translated from the original Russian) set out 
the Myrzakhmatov administration’s understanding of the challenges facing the city and details the 
steps they believe would be necessary to meet these challenges in the domains of security, economic 
and social development, cultural and spiritual development, and urban planning. The document sets 
out the Mayor’s wish to situate Osh as “a centre of the Kyrgyz state and culture” and economic 
driver of the country’s populous southern region (The Renaissance of Osh), matching its 
administrative status as Kyrgyzstan’s southern capital. It sets out a number of aspirational 
statements to this end; 
“2.1: The vision of the future city of Osh as the centre of development in the southern region of 
Kyrgyzstan 
• Osh will be the foundation stone for development of the country, a bulwark of the state in the 
south of Kyrgyzstan 
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• Osh will be the business, spiritual, socio-cultural and scientific centre of the Fergana Valley 
and of Central Asia. 
• Osh will be a contemporary dynamic city, with a traditional and spiritual identity, and an 
attractive business community, drawing in investors, tourists and pilgrims. 
• Living in Osh will be comfortable, prestigious and interesting. The city will create effective 
opportunities for the education, careers and economic activities of the inhabitants of the 
region.” (Ibid) 
What these relatively vague statements mean for urban planning becomes clearer later in the text, 
where a number of measures are proposed, including the demolition of traditional housing forms to 
make way for high-rise buildings and wider roads, with the ultimate aim of enabling “a gradual 
change of the “village structure” into an urban way of life and into business activity of a 
contemporary nature” (Ibid). According to this the southern capital should look less like a village, 
and more like a modern city (a narrative that will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 9). These 
beliefs were echoed by the city architecture office and academics I spoke with, who hoped to see 
the “rural buildings” (IV12) of the city centre replaced with something they perceived as more 
modern as the plan progressed. Of course, the replacement of the ‘rural’ and ‘old fashioned’ with 
the ‘modern’ was a key component of Soviet era Master Plans as well (French 1995). 
6. 3.2. Achieving these aims 
The implementation of the proposed city Master Plan is expected to meet three aims; to 
accommodate the city’s rapidly growing population; to reassert Osh’s status as the Southern Capital, 
a city of significant historical, political and economic significance; and to create a place defined by 
a modern, urban lifestyle rather than a rural way of living. But how does it propose to achieve these 
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aims through concrete interventions in the city’s urban landscape? A number of construction and 
infrastructure projects have been proposed (or in some cases undertaken) by the Municipal 
authorities since 2010 that advance these aims, and can be taken as indicative of the measures 
contained in the Master Plan. These are as follows. 
Water provision and sanitation 
With the support of a large international donor organisation, work has already begun to improve the 
provision of clean, reliable drinking water in the city through the rehabilitation of current 
infrastructure and construction of a new reservoir (IV11, IV13). This is especially important in a 
city like Osh, which is often subject to water shortages in the summer, and where some 
neighbourhoods such as On Adir have to bring in all their water by truck. 
Expansion of the city boundaries, subsuming certain surrounding villages 
In The Renaissance of Osh the city authorities spell out their wish to expand the city’s territory to 
the South in order to create new residential zones, although exactly which areas should be included 
is not made clear (The Renaissance of Osh).The city Architect’s office was more precise, stating 
that this expansion would be towards the farmland of the South West, notably integrating the 
villages of Teuleken, Japalak and Papan into the city, and denying that other villages lying to the 
north (Kyzyl-Kyshtak, Nariman and Sharq) were slated for similar inclusion (IV13). The inclusion 
of Papan on this list is significant. Papan lies around an hour south of the city, and would not be an 
obvious candidate for inclusion in the municipal boundaries were it not for the fact that it also 
includes the reservoir which is currently responsible for Osh’s water supply. 
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Renovation of public spaces and parks 
One of the most visible changes in Osh’s cityscape in recent years has been the work to renovate the 
city’s parks and public spaces. Indeed one donor organisation representative estimated his body had 
funded the rehabilitation of 30 urban parks since the June Events, and throughout the period of my 
fieldwork efforts were ongoing to install new paving and seating (decked out with the obligatory 
tunduk decorations - representing the top piece of a yurt) in the popular Navoi Park (IV09). Again, 
this focus on improving green spaces and parks is foreshadowed in the Renaissance of Osh, which 
suggests replacing buildings situated in earthquake sensitive zones with “open social welfare spaces 
(parks, squares etc)” going on to assure the reader that “there will be improved provision for the 
implantation of green spaces in accordance with existing standards” (The Renaissance of Osh).  
Construction of high rise buildings in the city centre, preferably instead of traditional low-rise 
housing 
The question of high-rise housing, the reasons some in Osh support it, and the impact it could have 
on life in the city will be explored further in Chapter 9, since the discourse surrounding high-rise 
and low-rise building types provides an illuminating window onto urban issues in Osh. In terms of 
the aims of the Master plan however, this is one of the central ways in which the municipal 
authorities proposed to meet the aims of modernisation and regeneration in Osh. Whilst little has 
been constructed as yet (with the exception of some 5-6 storey block built after the Events) 
individuals from both the city Architect’s office and the Architecture department at Osh 
Technological University were united in the opinion that this represented the best option for the city 
(IV12, IV13). Once again, this matches the vision set out in the Renaissance of Osh, which 
identifies the “construction of modern multi-storey buildings and structures” as a proposed result of 
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the plan, whilst simultaneously calling for the apparently dangerous and unsanitary single storey 
dwellings occupied by a large part of the city’s population (Renaissance of Osh). 
Figure 11. Map showing key roads to be widened in Osh (Source: GoogleMaps, with author’s edits) 
Widening of key arterial roads 
Finally, in response to what one respondent called the city’s “greatest problem”, a programme of 
road widening has begun to be implemented in order to relieve traffic jams in the city centre (IV12). 
As part of this process Akburinskaya Street, which runs parallel to the Ak-Bura river through the 
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centre of Osh, has already been renovated, and at the time of my field research work was well 
advanced on widening and resurfacing Monueva Street, which would link Akburinskaya street to 
routes out of the city, without having to pass through the crowded bazaar. Work was just beginning 
on two further streets in this area - Oshskaya and Karasuuskaya - with the apparent intention of 
relieving the considerable congestion in the bazaar area. Another representative of a local 
organisation working quite closely with the municipality on this issue stated that once these were 
complete the focus would switch to widening Navoi and Abdukhadirov Streets, also situated in the 
city centre (IV10). 
As the element of the Mayor’s plans for city development that has so far progressed the most in 
Osh, the question of street widening can give a useful insight into some of the issues and challenges 
that attempts to implement a city Master Plan could well involve. The case of Monueva Street 
provides a useful snapshot in this regard. 
6.3.3. Case Study: Monueva Street 
Monueva Street is a small street in the heart of Osh, home to a predominantly ethnic Uzbek 
community living in traditional low-rise, walled housing compounds. Set back one block from the 
bustling central bazaar, it links Masalieva Street, one of Osh’s main arterial roads, to the newly 
renovated Akburinskaya street that runs through the city’s heart. The widening of this street, then, 
would link these roads, alleviating pressure on Masalieva Street by allowing drivers to traverse the 
city without having to pass by the chronically congested Navoi Street in the bazaar, and was 
referred to by one respondent as the “first step” in the wider implementation of the Master Plan 
(IV62, E).  However, the project to widen Monueva Street also required the demolition of a number 
of inhabited houses. Although  no-one I spoke with in Osh was able to give me the exact number of 
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houses demolished, one international organisation representative in Bishkek suggested that 22 
homes had been knocked down, of which 4 were in fact houses that had been rebuilt by 
international donors following the June Events - a vivid example of the clash between different 
attempts to ‘build back better’ discussed earlier in this chapter (IV55). Of course, any development 
that involves expropriation of property is likely to be a complicated, and often controversial, 
process. In Osh the widening of Monueva Street brought to light three main issues: the fear that the 
demolitions were ethnically motivated, the perceived poor quality of the area families were 
relocated to, and concerns regarding due process and fair compensation to those who had lost 
property. Although Chapter 9 of this thesis will address the question of housing and its symbolic 
meanings in greater detail, it is worth spending a little time on the issue here in order to shed some 
light on the processes behind construction and redevelopment in Osh. 
Figure 12. Construction in Monueva Street April 2013 (Source: Author’s own) 
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I first came to hear about the demolitions on Monueva Street when a number of international 
organisation and NGO representatives used the case to illustrate their concerns that the Master 
planning process was being caught up in the problematic question of ethnicity in Osh (IV55, IV61, 
IV63). Certainly the Uzbek community has been disproportionately affected by the developments 
on Monueva Street - all of the householders to lose property were ethnic Uzbeks. However, the 
overwhelming impression of those closest to events on Monueva (from international and local 
organisations supporting residents and lobbying the Municipality, to residents themselves) is that 
ethnicity was not the driving force behind the decision to widen this street. As one high ranking 
international organisation worker put it, somewhat cynically, “no one played the ethnic card” (IV63, 
E). Whilst the fear amongst the wider Uzbek community in Osh may be that Monueva Street 
residents have lost their homes by dint of their ethnicity (IV14), this view didn’t seem to be shared 
by the Monueva residents themselves (IV09, IV62). Amongst these residents there is an acceptance 
that the work was probably necessary, but that the process should have been managed better. One 
woman whose house was still standing but slated for demolition at an unspecified future date 
explained further; 
  
 “Development is good, but the authorities need to consult with the population first - they 
should ask people’s opinions and permission before doing something. For example, here on 
Monueva Street they just arrived one morning and said that the houses would have to be 
demolished. There was no information, no warning” (IV34, U) 
Perhaps some level of consultation and information dissemination with city residents would quell 
fears in the wider Uzbek community that the Master Plan is specifically targeting them. 
Unfortunately, the head of one local organisation confided to me that she had made precisely this 
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recommendation to the Mayor’s office without success. Giving out information about future 
demolitions, they feared, would only cause “panic” in the population (IV10). The contrast between 
these two positions is striking - whilst Monueva residents wished to be more involved in the 
planning process, the Municipality appeared to perceive a more collaborative approach as 
dangerously destabilising. As Healey has demonstrated, the process of planning can in some ways 
be as important as the outcome, and this certainly seems to be the case with regards to Monueva 
Street (Healey 2006). Here residents were often pragmatic about the need to widen the road in a part 
of the city where streets often become clogged with traffic, but concerned about the way in which 
they were excluded from the planning process, their voices never heard and information withheld.  
Whereas wider stakeholder inclusion in the planning process would have encouraged sharing of 
opinions and information, the lack of collaborative planning encouraged distrust and concerns that 
the plans were ethnically biased. Linked to perceptions that the development of Monueva Street 
targeted the Uzbek population are the serious concerns raised about the area of the city that affected 
homeowners have been relocated to. Walking in Monueva Street on a fiercely hot day in May, I 
came across a family loading bricks from the rubble of their home into a flat bed truck. These 
materials would be used to build a new house in On Adir, the large Uzbek neighbourhood situated 
on the South-western fringe of Osh where Monueva residents had been offered new land to build 
on. This was far from a like-for-like swap, the family complained “The place they want us to move 
to has no water, no electricity, it is 20 kilometres from the centre of town,  when our previous 10
house was at the centre. It was comfortable, convenient, close to the market” (IV31, U). 
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 This is likely something of an exaggeration - the southernmost (and therefore furthest) tip of On 10
Adir is around 10 kilometres from the central bazaar.
This family’s frustration was mirrored across the city. One respondent described the area where land 
has been allocated to Monueva residents as being “like the surface of the moon” (IV09, E), whilst 
another local human rights worker lamented the lack of basic amenities such as water and electricity 
there. If the decision to widen Monueva Street was probably not driven by the wish to move Uzbeks 
out of the city’s historic centre, then the decision to relocate families to such a remote part of town 
certainly does nothing to dispel impressions to the contrary. As one international community 
representative working on the issue put it, it’s not the plan itself which is the problem, but “what 
comes after” (IV06, E). To return to Bollens’ four models of planning, an apparently ‘neutral’ 
planning strategy which focusses only on technical questions and fails to consider the wider socio-
political context of development may produce ‘partisan’ effects (Bollens 1998). 
The final issue that caused friction during the development of Monueva Street was that of fair 
compensation for loss or damage of property. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this can be a 
particularly difficult undertaking in Kyrgyzstan; many households lack correct or up to date 
documents for their homes (IV09, IV62), and this problem is compounded by the absence of an 
adequate legal framework in place with which to carry out the expropriation of property and 
subsequent compensation (IV62, IV63). The case of Monueva Street has been no different in this 
respect. Initial compensation offers to the street’s residents were low - purposefully so according to 
observers (IV09) - to the despair of residents. One woman complained that her offer wouldn’t even 
cover the cost of the roof she had installed in her previous home, even after it had been raised 
significantly (IV31). Recognising this as a serious concern, local and international organisations 
intervened to offer legal advice to residents and set up an independent valuation mechanism, 
resulting in a significant rise in the value of compensation packages (IV52, IV10). Moreover, this 
legal assistance was then extended to residents of other streets slated for development (notably 
Oshskaya and Karasuuskaya streets) to ensure that they have the correct paperwork and accurate 
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valuations before the municipality comes knocking (IV09). Whilst the outcome in this case has 
been largely positive, it is likely that without the interventions of these organisations residents 
would have been forced to accept drastically lower compensation for the loss of their homes, which 
could have deepened perceptions of victimisation yet further. 
Overall, then, Monueva Street offers a mixed picture of the way that future development may pan 
out in Osh. In terms of ensuring legal due process and meeting international standards, some 
international representatives expressed satisfaction that Monueva Street had in some ways been a 
dry run that had enabled them to set up useful mechanisms and learn lessons for the next round of 
development (IV62). They also acknowledged that the municipality had, to some extent, tried to act 
according to due process - these were not violently forced evictions, and there was some 
compensation (Ibid, IV06). At the same time, however, one senior international actor warned that 
attempts to reward these positive steps may backfire resulting in the local authorities feeling they 
can get away with acting with less care when the next wave of demolitions rolls around. There was, 
she warned, a “balancing act” to be mastered here (IV06, E). 
When it comes to ethnicity, it is clear that the development of Monueva Street has 
disproportionately affected one ethnic group living in Osh. Many Uzbek families living on the street 
have lost their homes and  found themselves relocated to the outskirts of the city, whilst others live 
with the knowledge their home may be next to be demolished. Whether this has been undertaken 
because of their ethnicity (as some feared) or simply through necessity (as others believed), the 
result does not look good. It has fuelled concerns that Uzbeks are being driven from the traditional 
heart of the city, with planning being used as a political tool in pursuit of “cultural 
cleansing” (Bevan 2006: 25, Weizman 2007). Since future street widening is also likely to take 
place in centrally located, largely Uzbek, neighbourhoods, it is easy to see how this could have a 
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deleterious effect on interethnic relations in the city. In this way urban planning in Osh is now 
acknowledged by international aid organisations as both a response to and potential cause of 
conflict in the city (IV63). This is far from the ideal of the architect as peace builder, and closer to 
the picture painted by Bollens and Weizman in which urban planning can be used as a tool of 
domination, control and even violence by one community over another (Weizman 2007, Bollens 
1998). 
Finally, the case of Monueva Street can give us an insight into the approach the Municipal 
authorities are likely to take with regards to the implementation of other elements of the Master 
Plan. Residents were given very little information regarding the proposed developments until the 
municipal authorities arrived on the street to being the project. This lack of information was a 
source of great distress to residents on the street itself, and has led to concern in the wider city 
(especially among Uzbeks) that the same could happen to them. These concerns, and the rumours 
that go hand in hand with them, could be mitigated by providing information about future 
developments to the public. However, despite the repeated requests of local and international 
organisations, the Municipality has so far declined to make details of the plan public and undertake 
consultation on it. Indeed, even the relatively simple suggestion put to the Mayor’s office by one 
highly regarded local organisation - to put up information panels warning residents which streets are 
affected by the plan - was dismissed by the local authorities (IV10). 
This overview of reconstruction and regeneration projects since the 2010 violence sheds light on a 
number of important issues in Osh that speak to the wider issues of post-crisis reconstruction 
discussed in Chapter 2. Firstly, it underlines how difficult (and indeed, how ill advised) it is to try to 
separate post-crisis reconstruction initiatives from the ongoing urban development projects that 
preceded and followed the crisis, as the two will necessarily affect each other, both in the short and 
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long term. Perhaps it is better to see them as part of a continuum, where ‘normal’ urban 
construction, development and regeneration projects will gradually come to replace post-crisis 
reconstruction projects as the driving force for urban change as time passes. This is important. As 
we shall see in Chapters 7 - 10, both post-crisis and ‘peace time’ changes in the physical fabric of 
Osh are affecting the way residents experience the city, and its prospects for building sustainable 
peace, so both should be considered here. Secondly, this overview reminds us of the politicised 
nature of any intervention in the built environment, something which was explored in detail in 
Chapter 2. In this case, developments in Osh have hinted at the use of physical reconstruction 
projects as an instrument of peace building or human rights in the way that Charlesworth (2006) and 
Healey (2006) have advocated for (for example, the international community’s concern with 
‘grounding’ the Uzbek community in the city). But they have also revealed a potential as a 
discriminatory tool, reminiscent of Weizman (2007) and Bollens’ (1998) concerns, as some 
residents of Monueva Street and members of the wider Uzbek community clearly fear. What is 
perhaps most interesting is that these different understandings of construction and reconstruction in 
Osh are being applied to the same projects and spaces, creating a tension about the purpose, 
meanings and effects of changes being introduced in the cityscape. This tension will be at the heart 
of the following chapters, where the focus shall be on some detailed case studies of places in Osh. 
Finally, the sections above have begun to demonstrate the role that collaborative planning - or even 
just transparency in planning - could have in lessening fear and tension and building more 
sustainably peaceful places in what is an already highly charged situation (Healey 2006). 
Unfortunately, however, there seem to have been few attempts to implement such an approach, 
particularly on the part of the municipal authorities. 
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6.4. Public perceptions of change in Osh  
The previous sections have set out some of the key changes in the urban fabric of Osh in recent 
years, as well as those changes the local authorities would like to see occur in the near future, as the 
city has attempted to come to terms with the twin challenges of responding to the June 2010 
violence and pursuing its development goals. What has not been clear so far is how these changes 
have been perceived by the city’s residents. The next section of this chapter seeks to give a brief 
overview of this question, based on 40 interviews (some involving multiple participants) carried out 
with non-elite actors in the city in Spring 2013. As mentioned in the previous chapter, interview 
participants were quite representative of the ethnic and gender make-up of Osh, and included a wide 
spread of ages and occupations. Of course, using such a small sample size means that these findings 
are by no means exhaustive, nor can they be deemed to be constitute an accurate survey of public 
opinion in Osh at the time. They do, however, accurately and briefly reflect the substance of the 
many discussions I was party to during four months of ethnographic fieldwork in Osh in 2013, and 
provide a thumbnail sketch of people’s views of change in Osh in recent years. 
Overall, resident perceptions of urban change in Osh were deeply mixed. Reading across the 
interviews carried out with residents of the city for this research, respondents were evenly split 
between those who generally expressed a belief that the city had changed for the better, those who 
believed it had changed for the worse, and those who didn’t express an overwhelming opinion for 
the worse or better (only one respondent stated that the city simply hadn’t changed at all). 
This eloquently demonstrates the tension which exists at street level - most people agree that the 
city has changed in recent years, but they do not agree about the vector of this change. Digging a 
little deeper into this data is revealing, though not conclusive; although both the positive and 
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negative change groups were drawn from a wide range of ages, those who believed the city had 
become better were mostly ethnic Kyrgyz (8 out of 13, with one respondent whose ethnicity was 
not disclosed) and female (10 out of 13). Conversely, those who believe the city had got worse were 
mainly drawn from national minority communities (10 out of 13) with slightly more men 
represented (8 out of 13). Again, whilst far from exhaustive, this data does support the prevalent 
impression I gained during my time in Osh - that minority communities were in general less happy 
about the direction of change in Osh than members of the titular nationality (Kyrgyz). That women 
were more happy about these changes than men was not something that was immediately apparent 
during fieldwork, and only emerged though analysis of the data in the UK. This represents an 
intriguing finding, and one that will be examined in the next Chapter. Asking if people were 
optimistic or pessimistic about the city’s future elicited a similarly mixed response, with 9 
respondents saying they were optimistic, and 7 reporting that they felt pessimistic. Once again, the 
optimistic group was mainly composed of ethnic Kyrgyz (7 out of 9), and the pessimistic group of 
minority members (4 Uzbek and 1 Russian out of a total of 7 respondents). 
Since the majority of residents reported perceiving some kind of change in Osh in recent years, it 
was pertinent to ask how they thought the city had changed. Respondents identified a wide variety 
of changes, both positive and negative. Amongst the positive changes identified by respondents the 
most commonly identified developments were the enhancement of parks and green spaces, the 
improvement of roads in the city, and the creation of new buildings (although no one building was 
consistently identified), new monuments and new bus stops. When it came to negative changes 
respondents frequently highlighted the loss of jobs and factories in Osh, the decline of 
multiculturalism in the city, and the rise of what was perceived as a poorer ‘mentality’ amongst 
residents. 
!161
Only two of these responses seemed to be particularly tied to one ethnicity in particular - only 
Kyrgyz respondents pointed to the existence of new buildings or new monuments in the city as 
evidence of positive change. All other indicators of change listed above where reported by fairly 
mixed groups of participants. Similarly, there was a generally even mix of ages and genders 
represented in those reporting the positive and negative changes set out above, with the exception of 
those lamenting the loss of jobs and factories in the city, and the decline of multiculturalism, who 
tended to be drawn from respondents aged at least 30 and over (and therefore old enough to 
remember the city under the Soviet Union first hand). One striking element of the perceived 
changes set out above is in their nature. Those things identified as positive developments are all 
noticeably concrete and easy to identify in the cityscape: Renovated parks, better roads, new bus 
stops, buildings and monuments all represent tangible and visible changes in the fabric of the city. 
In contrast to this, the negative changes identified by respondents are much less visible. The decline 
in employment opportunities, multiculturalism and ‘mentality’ of residents cannot be quite so easily 
read from the physical fabric of the city (although as we shall see from the following chapters, that 
is not to say that these issues are not intricately bound up in Osh’s bricks and mortar).  
One reading of this could be that recent relatively minor changes in the landscape of the city, such 
as the renovation of bus stops and parks, have been effectively deployed by the city authorities to 
satisfy residents’ appetites for change, without addressing larger underlying issues such as 
unemployment and interethnic tension that many citizens believe are undermining Osh’s future. 
Given the focus amongst many city residents on the recent developments in the centre of Osh, it is 
no surprise that another very strong message emerged from these non-elite interviews. This 
narratives identified Mayor Melis Myrzakmatov as the driving force of positive change in the city. 
Expressed in 12 separate interviews by respondents of all ages and genders, crucially this was an 
overwhelmingly Kyrgyz message - of these 12 respondents 10 were ethnic Kyrgyz, one did not 
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disclose his ethnicity, and one was Uzbek. Given the strength of this message, it is worth spending 
some time focussing on the figure of the former Mayor and his relationship with urban planning in 
Osh. 
6.4.1. Melis Myrzakmatov: Building popularity in the city 
Melis Myrzakmatov is perhaps the pre-eminent figure in Osh’s political landscape in recent years, a 
politician as lauded by some as he is hated by others. Appointed by former President Bakiyev in 
2009 Myrzakmatov was, until he lost his position in the elections of early 2014, the only Bakiyev 
appointee to outlast his regime. Although the government did try to oust him soon after the June 
events, he proudly proclaimed in August 2010 that the decisions of the northern provisional 
government didn’t carry the same weight in the south, and carried on as Mayor of the city 
regardless of the wishes of Bishkek (Kommersant 19/08/10, accessed 02/04/14). A self proclaimed 
nationalist (Ibid) Myrzakmatov authored a book about the June events, In search of Truth, in which 
he placed the blame for the violence squarely on the shoulders of Uzbek separatists, going so far as 
to claim that thousands of Uzbek troops had massed on the border, ready to support their 
compatriots in Osh (Megoran 2012, ICG 2012). The international inquiry set up to investigate the 
violence in Osh noted wryly in its final report that “The nationalist rhetoric of the Mayor of Osh, 
Melis Myrzakmatov, was not conducive to the calming of inter-ethnic tensions” (KIC 2011, iv). 
This hints at the divisive way in which Myrzakmatov is viewed by many; a strong leader who sticks 
up for the south and gets things done (as many local residents were keen to tell me), or a nationalist 
whose interventions actively marginalise the city’s Uzbek population, further undermining 
prospects for sustainable peace in the city (ICG 2012). In addition to concerns regarding his 
nationalist politics, rumours have long swirled around Myrzakmatov’s links to organised criminal 
groups operating in Osh, especially those controlling the highly lucrative drugs smuggling routes 
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that pass through Osh on the way from Afghanistan to the West (Freedom House 2012; Markowitz 
2013). Myrzakmatov is undoubtedly a wealthy man, with considerable business interests stretching 
from the vast Kara-Suu market to the Osh Tataan indoor shopping centre in the south of Osh. 
During this research the Mayor was repeatedly and forcefully evoked as the driving force behind 
urban redevelopment in Osh. He was “doing everything to change the city” (IV15, E), and had 
“built in two years what it would take other mayors ten years to build” (IV42, K). Kanykei, a 
middle-aged Kyrgyz woman working to support her son’s education abroad in Cyprus exhorted 
“Write this down! You must go back to your country and tell people that we have such a man [as 
Melis Myrzakmatov] in Kyrgyzstan. If only we had three or four like him Kyrgyzstan would be a 
great country” (IV41, E). From an old lady selling sweets from a makeshift stall in a city centre 
park to the offices of the city architect, the message was the same (at least amongst the ethnic 
Kyrgyz population of the city) - Mayor Myrzakmatov was changing the city around them. Of 
course, Myrzakmatov is far from the first Mayor in possession of a forceful personality to be so 
identified with initiatives in the city they serve - one need look no further than London’s ‘Boris 
Bikes’ for an example of this closer to home. However, in the case of Osh, the perception of 
Myrzkmatov as personally responsible for (re)construction in the city appears to go further than 
this. In this his approach was far closer to that of former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, as we shall 
see later in this Chapter. Time and again respondents would tell me of Myrzakmatov “he built the 
park where we are sitting now” (IV43, K);  “he is building things for young people (…) he has also 
built the tallest building in Osh” (IV45, K); “he’s improved the roads” (IV48, R); “He’s 
modernising buildings” (IV15, E). Everything from clearing stalls away from crowded roads, to 
building monuments, to putting up street lights and renovating public parks and squares was 
personally attributed to the Mayor rather than to the Municipality more broadly. Indeed, one 
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respondent went so far as to suggest that Myrzakmatov might be paying for these developments out 
of his own pocket (IV17).  
Given that many of these projects were in fact funded and managed by international donors working 
in the city, Myrzakmatov’s ability to present them as his own achievements to such a large portion 
of his domestic audience was a source of frustration and no little concern amongst international and 
NGO representatives in Osh, who were wary that their efforts to improve living conditions for city 
residents might inadvertently bolster the popularity of such a controversial figure (IV06). These 
concerns seem well founded: many Kyrgyz respondents gave a very specific timeframe for when 
Myrzakmatov had begun to enact these improvements in the cityscape - the last 2-3 years, in other 
words since the June Events (IV12, IV13, IV18, IV19). Although it was this violence that 
precipitated the involvement of many of these organisations in Osh itself, Myrzakmatov seemed to 
be reaping the benefits of this work in terms of his popularity and standing with many city 
residents. This exchange between two ethnic Kyrgyz teachers of English, Aigul and Zhyldyz, is 
revealing of this trend; 
 “Zhyldyz: I can say we are lucky with our … etot mer [trans. this Mayor]… Mayor! With our 
 Mayor, he did a lot  of things. In spite of, in 2010 we had just a great tragic war between 
 nations, and he … it seems to me that during three years, it doesn’t trace from that tragedy. I 
 think that in spite inside of that persons this can live forever, for somebodies, but just now 
 we visually cannot see it. 
 Interviewer: Ok, so since the events the city has become better? 
 Zhyldyz: Yes! Become better, and the city is growing day by day 
 Interviewer: That’s good. And this is because of the Mayor? 
 Zhyldyz: Yes 
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 Aigul: Mayor is working greatly, the other Mayors who had worked before, so they didn’t  
 do… 
 Zhyldyz: Anything! 
 Aigul: … many things for people. Now this Mayor is doing all, he with his initiative, erm, he 
 built some sculptures 
 Zhyldyz: Monuments, monuments” 
 (IV19, E) 
For Zhyldyz and Aigul, the Mayor has through his own hard work and agency, managed to erase the 
scars of the June Events from the urban landscape (if not from people’s memories) in three short 
years, a feat they doubt any of the city’s previous Mayors could have achieved. Never mind that 
many individuals involved in the reconstruction effort had complained to me that Myrzakmatov was 
a hindrance to this work rather than a help (as seen earlier in this chapter), to many ordinary Kyrgyz 
residents of Osh, the three years since the June violence had helped cement Myrzakmatov’s 
reputation as someone who could get things done in Osh. This reputation is especially important 
when we consider the rapid downturn in quality of life, and the quality of the material environment, 
that followed the end of the Soviet Union in Kyrgyzstan. Seen in this context, Myrzakmatov’s 
apparent ability to achieve visible and tangible results in the city impressed even respondents who 
were otherwise uncomfortable with his nationalist leanings. One respondent to eloquently describe 
this tension between discomfort at the Mayor’s politics and happiness that he appeared capable of 
changing things was Tolkun, a Kyrgyz man in his 50s. Elsewhere in our interview Tolkun would 
express his sadness at the loss of Osh’s culture of interethnic tolerance, and argue passionately that 
physical traces of the city’s diversity should be preserved, but when it came to the Mayor he was 
keen to stress his achievements, saying; 
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 “So, our Mayor he is… though people think that he is a nationalist, so, he’s made more than 
others for the city. He changed the city, it became brighter and it was constructed. He does 
everything for the city. He went against the system” (…) at the beginning, before the events, he was 
considered a nationalist. They said, they said that his guys killed Uzbeks, and other things… but…
erm… I don’t think it’s true that he went out and killed somebody. Maybe he frightened somebody. I 
don’t know - maybe he has a clandestine group, maybe he even has yakuza,  I don’t know. But his 11
contribution… A person who does not work never makes a mistake. So maybe he does make 
mistakes - I can’t say that he is an ideal man. But he has a desire to change the world, to change the 
city” (IV25, R) 
Tolkun, then, was willing to accept that the Mayor might threaten people, might even be part of a 
serious organised crime syndicate, as long as he gets things done in the city.  
This picture of Myrzakmatov is reminiscent of another powerful post-Soviet Mayor about whom far 
more has been written, and the comparison is instructive. Yuri Luzkhov was Mayor of Moscow 
from 1992 to 2010, a period during which the city underwent immense transformation in all 
spheres, not least its physical face. Using his extensive power over life in the city (what one 
observer termed “hyper mayoral powers” (Cecil 2011: 77)) Luzhkov embarked upon a series of 
massive construction projects aimed at meeting the city’s desperate need for residential 
accommodation, and reclaiming Moscow’s place, and self image, as a national and global 
powerhouse (O’Loughlin and Kolossov 2002). The ability to push through these projects - again, 
against the often chaotic background of post-Soviet Russia - allowed Luzhkov to cultivate an image 
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 This refers to the well known Japanese organised crime syndicates called ‘Yakuza’, roughly 11
equivalent to the Italian ‘Mafia’ or other organised crime groups. 
amongst residents of a man who gets stuff done. Writing in 1999, seven years into his time in office, 
Jensen described how Luzhkov’s attention to the smaller scale elements of the urban landscape 
encountered by ordinary muscovites in the course of their daily lives cemented this reputation; 
 “The Mayor has a reputation of getting things done - even to the smallest detail - never mind 
exactly how. Luzhkov has spent lavishly in support of culture and the arts. He has fixed broken 
street lamps, filled potholes, repaired sewers, restored crumbling historic facades, and ordered 
shopkeepers to install Christmas decorations outside their businesses” (Jensen 1999: 84) 
The existence of tangible proof of the city’s renewal in the everyday life of city residents, from 
street lighting to potholes to Christmas decorations, perhaps made these same residents more 
willing to overlook the accusations of extensive links with the criminal underworld and vast 
personal economic gain (by dint of his wife’s massive construction business) that dogged Luzhkov 
throughout his administration (Cecil 2011, Jensen 1999). Certainly, it is a model that Myrzakmatov 
seemed keen to follow in Osh, where praise for road surfacing or mandatory neighbourhood 
cleaning initiatives he had announced far outweighed concerns about alleged criminal links or 
conflicts of interest in my conversations with city residents. Luzhkov’s many interventions in the 
physical landscape of Moscow, then. can be seen to have served a number of purposes. They 
improved the image of the city for which he was responsible, thus improving his own image and 
popularity, whilst the very ability to effect these changes also served as a continuous reassertion and 
demonstration of his own power. Through these interventions Luzhkov was also able to reward his 
own constituencies in the criminal, economic and political spheres that had sustained him in power 
for so long, whilst simultaneously enabling his own attempts to capture a share of the resources. It 
is for this reason, then, that Jensen has described Luzhkov’s mayoralty as “patrimonialism in one 
city” (Jensen 1999: 94). Further parallels between the approach of the two Mayors can be found in 
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Golubchikov’s description of the Luzhkov administration’s approach to the city’s Masterplan. 
Although this plan, elaborated and adopted in 2000, was open to public consultation for one month 
(whereas the Masterplan in Osh remains secret), Golubchikov reports that no “intensive” public 
discussions took place about this, and there is no evidence that anything changed in the plan as a 
result of this consultation (Golubchikov 2004: 241). Instead, he writes, “It seems that the vision of 
the General Plan by Mr Luzhkov and his government is that it is not a public good but Moscow 
government’s property. They have created the plan and have got the exclusive authority to 
implement and modify it—if necessary, bypassing the formal procedures and ignoring the opinion 
of local residents” (Ibid). Substitute ‘Myrzakmatov’ for “Luzhkov’, and ‘Osh’ for ‘Moscow’, and 
this sentence would represent a fair assessment of the Osh authorities’ attitudes to the city 
Masterplan so far. 
Myrzakmatov, then, is not alone in trying to instrumentalise the built environment in this way. He 
has followed in the footsteps of others, such as Luzhkov, in using construction projects in Osh to 
underpin his reputation as someone who gets things done. What is more, he is a shrewd enough 
politician to marshall the benefits from projects that he himself is not actually responsible for - such 
as the many donor and NGO funded projects that have sprung up in Osh since the June Events - and 
use these to further burnish his reputation as a man of action. By presenting real and tangible 
changes in the quotidian environment of Osh, he has won over large sections of a city weary of 
post-Soviet decline and underachieving politicians. As mentioned at the start of this section, there is 
a strong ethnic element to the question of Myrzakmatov’s supporters too. Almost every resident 
who expressed support for the then Mayor, a self proclaimed nationalist, in our conversations was 
ethnic Kyrgyz. Given that some of the most striking developments in Osh so far, such as the 
rehabilitation of the park at the corner of Karasuuskaya and Zainabedinova streets, and Razzakov 
!169
Park a little further up the road, have occurred in strongly Kyrgyz areas of the city, there is more 
than a little suspicion that Myrzakmatov was using such projects to reward what he saw as his 
natural constituency. This would certainly conform to the patterns of patronage politics described in 
Chapter 4, which are common in Kyrgyzstan (Fumagalli 2005). When compared to the demolitions 
taking place in strongly Uzbek areas such as Monueva Street, and seemingly proposed in the city 
Masterplan, such a suggestion becomes all the more compelling. 
Of course, there is one final striking parallel between the cases of Myrzakmatov and Luzhkov. For 
all that their strategies may have earned them popularity and power in their own cities, this did not 
protect them from dismissal by the central power, the President. However, these actions did produce 
- and continue to produce - effects on the residents who live in the environments they created. In 
Osh, Myrzakmatov’s use of city planning and construction to underpin his own position can help to 
explain the politicisation of the planning process, and the widespread fears that the Masterplan may 
be ethnically motivated. It is for this reason that the following three chapters will focus in more 
closely on three specific areas where change has either occurred or been planned in the urban 
landscape of Osh in the years since the Events; the bazaar, monumental space, and housing. These 
chapters will detail what change has occurred - and is planned for the future - in each space, what is 
the reasoning behind these changes, and how these changes are being experienced by the people 
that live in and use these spaces. Undertaking in-depth investigations into specific elements of the 
urban landscape will provide greater insight into why resident reactions to urban change in Osh has 
been so mixed, and ask what this can tell us about struggles over power and identity in the city. 
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Chapter 7: Case Study - Solving “our Bazaar problems”: Young 
women negotiating public space in Osh 
7.1. Introduction
The question of ethnicity will come to the fore time and again in this thesis, as it does in writing 
about Osh more generally. Given that violence along ethnic lines has flared up in the city twice in 
recent history, this is perhaps understandable. But as we saw in Chapter 4, it would be a mistake to 
believe that this is the only issue producing effects in Osh today. To focus on ethnicity at the 
expense of other identities and rallying points that are meaningful to the city’s population would 
risk both essentialising ethnic identity in Osh, and attributing all problems to this one source, 
overlooking other important forces and lines of fracture at play. For this reason, this chapter steps 
away from the question of ethnicity a little to refocus on the question of gender -  specifically, how 
might women be experiencing space in Osh differently to men, and how are changes in the city 
affecting this? The notion of the gendered city as a space which both reflects and contributes to the 
construction of the social organisation of gender relations was introduced in Chapter Two. The 
gendered city was introduced there as a prime example of the way in which urban spaces constitute 
part of a discourse of power - in this case patriarchal power relations. This chapter will pick up this 
theme by interrogating one space in the city detail - the central bazaar - paying particular attention 
to the shifting role it plays with regards to men and women in Osh. As we shall see, the bazaar is 
literally and metaphorically central to life in the city, and as such provides a particularly fruitful 
space to ask how people in Osh relate to such an important place, and how this is evolving in the 
post-Events era.  
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The centrality of the bazaar can perhaps best be evoked by a vignette from the field. My first 
impression of Osh’s sprawling bazaar was of a confusing, disordered place, one that didn’t conform 
to the shape or layout of markets I had known elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan or further afield. At first 
glance I felt I had little hope of learning to navigate it. Yet by the end of my stay, I had come to 
understand its layout well enough to know where to buy the best kurut (a kind of small, hard sour 
cheese snack) and other distinctive local milk products, as well as which stalls were likely to stock 
more exotic vegetables early in the season. I could guide visitors to the area of the bazaar, a few 
steps from Alisher Navoi street, where traditional Kyrgyz clothing and musical instruments could be 
bought, or lead them up through the bustle of the food stalls on Oshskaya street to the lagman  12
restaurants beyond. This previously illegible space, full of the basic substance of daily life in Osh, 
had become legible to me.  
Figure 13. The central bazaar 2013 (Source: Zach Kra mer) 
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 Lagman  is a kind of noodle dish popular in Kyrgyzstan.12
Over time I also came to understand what couldn’t be bought in the bazaar: For example the 
traditional Ikat patterned Uzbek cloth that nowadays would require a trip outside the city to the even 
larger Kara Suu bazaar, though it used to be sold in Osh. I came to discover that away from the busy 
main alleyways, there remained large sections of the market where stalls stood empty, deserted after 
the 2010 violence, or where people simply didn’t visit very much anymore (such as the spice stalls 
in the covered section on the left bank of the Ak Bura river). Later in my stay I witnessed first hand 
as stallholders desperately pulled their wares out of the way of the steamroller being used to prepare 
the ground for the new road being laid along Oshskaya street, through the heart of the bazaar (part 
of the Mayor’s road widening initiative discussed in Chapter 6). These ongoing works made food 
shopping into an ever changing obstacle course, as impromptu bridges were set up over new 
drainage pipes and water channels being dug along the road sides.  
Figure 14. Stallholders in the central market pack their goods next to a steamroller, 2013  
(Source: Zach Krahmer) 
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Throughout, it seemed to me that the bazaar is not only a subject of change - whether from post-
Soviet economic liberalisation, the 2010 riots or current construction projects - but also a witness to 
these changes. The products on sale, the people selling them, and the shifting areas of focus within 
the bazaar itself all bear witness to developments in the wider city. Perhaps this is why in my early 
weeks in the city one of my research assistants, Cholpon, insisted on guiding me on a walk through 
the bazaar. Starting at Kara-Suuskaya street, and progressing through the near deserted Jayma 
clothing bazaar, before cutting through a nearby mahalla and emerging onto Oshskaya street, where 
food stalls lined the sides of the road all the way to the junction with the busy Navoi street. As we 
walked, she reflected on the sights and sounds we passed, touching on everything from the violence 
of 2010 (the scars of which are still visible from the scorched walls of former stalls in sections of 
the market), to the ever-present problem of corruption, and the controversial figure of Mayor 
Myrzakhmatov.  
Figure 15. Map showing the location of the central market, and the route of my walk with Cholpon  
(Source: GoogleMaps with authors edits) 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7. 2 Thinking with the bazaar 
Cholpon’s insistence on using the bazaar in order to explain the city is a perfect example of the 
phenomenon of “thinking with the bazaar” identified by Liu (Liu 2012; 31). Put simply, this refers 
to the way that Osh residents repeatedly use the bazaar as an “idiom” to explain issues and trends in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan (Liu 2012; 21). Liu vividly evokes the diverse forces  acting on Osh, and 
how they play out in the space of the bazaar: 
“Strolling the central bazaar, one witnesses the hawking of local and global commodities; the 
conversion of foreign currencies; the jostling of different ethnicities, languages, lifestyles, and 
professions; the juxtaposition of new affluence and widespread poverty; the precarious balance 
between the opportunities of innovative enterprise and the nostalgic yearning for state 
paternalism.” (Liu 2012; 21) 
And yet the bazaar is more than simply a convenient space within which the interaction and 
negotiation of these forces can be observed. Liu demonstrates how to residents of Osh, speaking 
about the bazaar becomes a way of speaking about and explaining questions as wide ranging as the 
political and economic transition from the Soviet socialist system to western style capitalism, or 
perceptions of contemporary public morality. In this way Liu recounts how elderly Uzbek residents 
would illustrate their concerns about declining standards of public morality, by insisting that 
stallholders in the bazaar could leave their goods unattended at night in the pre and very early 
Soviet era, without having to worry they might be stolen (Liu 2012; 32). Such narratives 
demonstrate how the bazaar has come to be a lieux de mémoire for many in Osh. To return to Nora’s 
words, it serves as a “material, functional and symbolic” site through which these residents can 
remember what it means, and has always meant, to be from Osh (Nora 1996: 14) 
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Although Liu focuses more specifically on Osh’s Uzbek community, it became clear through this 
research that this mechanism of thinking with the bazaar, and its role as a touchstone of memory, 
continues to be employed by many residents in the city today. Everyone from teenage Kyrgyz girls, 
a middle aged Uzbek man and an elderly Tatar lady used the trope of the bazaar to explain their 
experiences of contemporary Osh in their interviews. The aim of this case study, then, is twofold; on 
the one hand it will seek to identify which narratives residents are using the bazaar to recount and 
explain, and how these are being expressed through the space of the bazaar. At the same time, it will 
reflect on how changes in the bazaar since the 2010 violence, and those planned for the future, 
interact with and affect these narratives, and the people expressing them. Before that, however, it 
will be useful to consider why the bazaar occupies such a central position in people’s conceptions of 
Osh. 
7. 3. The bazaar at the heart of Osh 
The bazaar is central to life in Osh in a great many ways. First and foremost, it is a vastly significant 
source of income and employment in the city, especially since the closure of the factories of the 
Soviet era (Liu 2012). What is more, it is the city’s most important shopping destination, where 
residents can purchase everything from food, to clothing, household goods and toiletries, as well as 
larger items such as prams, musical instruments or electrical goods.It serves as an informal 
information point, and all day long a PA system broadcasts announcements and small ads 
throughout the market. As such, it is visited by large numbers of Osh residents everyday. Indeed, in 
conversations with respondents the bazaar was the single destination that most people reported 
visiting in a “normal week”, regardless of age, gender or ethnicity. 
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It is also geographically central, stretching northwards along the banks of the river Ak Bura from 
Alisher Navoi street. Zakharova (1997) explains how the bazaar historically formed one of the two 
main hubs around which the city developed (the other being the Sulaiman mountain) in her book 
The historical-architectural development of the city of Osh. Here she describes how the buildings 
that were constructed around the bazaar represented the most architecturally significant in Osh, 
comprising “architectural jewels” such as the Alymbek Paravanchi Datka Madrissa (Zakharova, 
1997: 69). Although these buildings were destroyed during the Soviet era, their legacy remains in 
the central position of the bazaar in contemporary Osh (Zakharova 1997). 
  
The bazaar also informs the historical identity of the city, and has often been invoked by historians 
(and local residents) seeking to situate Osh in a wider historical context. The bazaar is heralded as 
physical proof of the city’s identity as a “fabled silk road city” (Hanks, 2011: 177). It testifies to the 
city’s past glories as “the greatest scientific-cultural and economic centre in 
Kyrgyzstan” (Amanbaeva and Abdullaev, 2000), and one of the most important centres on the 
legendary silk road trading route (Malabaev, 2000). Furthermore, the bazaar speaks to the history of 
the city in another way. It is used to explain the unique ethnic and cultural identity of Osh, 
especially by authors seeking to underline the considerable periods of interethnic peace and 
harmony the city has known. As such, the bazaar represents the central point of a system of 
“symbiotic economic interdependence” that benefited both the urban Uzbek residents of the city 
and the nomadic Kyrgyz herdsmen from the surrounding region (Megoran, 2013; 896. Kenensariev, 
2000). Crucially, Megoran has stressed the bazaar’s central positioning in traditional proclamations 
of good interethnic relations between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities, encapsulated in the 
previously often repeated statement “Our bazaars are one” (Megoran 2010). These explanations of 
the bazaar as the keystone of mercantile and interethnic transactions in the city’s past represents one 
reason why Liu has characterised the bazaar itself as an “idiom of exchange”, though he noted that 
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this function was severely undermined by the violence of 2010, which hit the bazaar hard (Liu, 
2012: 21). 
The central role of the bazaar in Osh’s history and identity is not lost on its residents today. Sitting 
in a city centre cafe one evening Tolkun, a middle aged Kyrgyz man, broke off from reminiscing 
about a youth spent listening to bootlegged Rolling Stones albums to set out his vision for Osh’s 
future. Tourism would be key to growing the economy, he explained, but if city development 
continued among its current path there would be nothing left for the tourists to see. Taking up the 
popular reprise of Zadneprovsky’s estimate of the city’s age, he explained: 
“It turns out that Osh is a more ancient city than Rome, one of the ancient cities in the world, but 
we have no evidence. In spite of these stones which are exhibited in the museum, we have no other 
evidence. They razed the bazaar, which…er…it had existed for 300-400 years. It is for sure, on this 
place was a bazaar, an ancient one, one of the ancient; from the beginning of time there was a 
bazaar, all people they came here and bought, and left. So now they want to build there, reconstruct 
the city - on this place they want to build a recreation area! Yes, it goes without saying we need it, 
but we have to save our history.” (IV25, R) 
In Tolkun’s explanation the bazaar becomes a symbol of Osh’s glorious and ancient silk road 
heritage, one that has just about weathered the storm of 70 odd years of Soviet rule only to find 
itself under renewed threat from contemporary development. It is also presented as one possible 
answer to the economic problems that had been plaguing the city, and the country more widely, as a 
source of tourist revenue. Tolkun was the only interviewee to express this concern so clearly, but he 
was certainly not the only one grappling with these issues, with several respondents acknowledging 
the important role this historical site might play in the future of the city (IV14, IV49).
!178
Finally, the bazaar plays a very important social role in the city. It is a place that people come to 
gossip, to exchange information, and to advertise cars and apartments for sale via the continuous 
announcements piped over the external PA system. Since so many cry residents visit the bazaar each 
week, it becomes a place where you run into friends and colleagues who live outside your 
neighbourhood and trade news. In short, it is what Liu has termed a place of “intense sociality” (Liu 
2012; 30), though as we shall see in the following section the character of this sociality has changed 
for some in the wake of the June events. Perhaps most importantly of all, given the context of this 
investigation, the bazaar is a powerful place of memory. To return to Atkinson’s formulation, the 
bazaar is one of the “ordinary spaces where memory erupts” (Atkinson 2007: 521). As a touchstone 
it is full almost to bursting with memories of life in Osh - a place of peaceful exchange and 
coexistence and a site of terrible inter-communal violence; a place where Islamic heritage, silk road 
history and Soviet modernity collide. Above all, it is a space that is used by the majority of city 
residents on a regular basis. 
A close reading of my interviews in Osh has identified several narratives that emerged when people 
speak about the bazaar, and these will be investigated more thoroughly in the following sections. In 
these narratives the bazaar becomes emblematic of the way that different groups experience and use 
the city. One the one hand, minorities - and particularly minority men - use the bazaar to illustrate 
their increasing exclusion from the city, especially from its spaces of leisure. On the other hand 
young women are increasingly speaking about the bazaar (and the changes they would like to see 
there) as a way of trying to mediate the increasing tension between their globalised aspirations and 
the ‘traditional’ expectations they are subject to, as shall be seen in section 5 of this chapter. Finally, 
`section 6 will explore the ways in which young women are trying to capitalise on this period of 
change in the urban landscape of Osh, and in the bazaar in particular, in order to carve out safe 
spaces in the city for themselves. 
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7.4 When the bazaar is not the bazaar - narrating exclusion 
Although they overwhelmingly used it on a weekly basis, a number of the non-Kyrgyz residents I 
spoke with used the bazaar in our conversations as a way of explaining their increasing feelings of 
exclusion from the city, especially its public spaces. In these narratives respondents often contrasted 
the bazaar as they remember it in the past - described as aesthetically pleasing and easy to navigate - 
with the messy, disordered space they perceive today. Perhaps more significantly, they recounted 
how the market has been transformed from a space that was enjoyable to visit, as much about social 
interactions as about purchasing food and other items, to the purely functional space they 
experience today. As Maria, an elderly Tatar lady accompanied by her daughter, explained: 
“Maria: I usually shop at the main market…
Daughter: We have to watch what we spend, I’ve been to all the markets to see where it is cheapest 
to buy.
Maria: The market used to be very different - it was more colourful before. Everyone would have 
their products laid out on the floor, it looked like a beautiful, colourful carpet. People would shout 
out to you ‘come and buy my lovely apples’, ‘come and buy my fresh apricots’, but now it is silent. 
It was because the sellers were Uzbek - marketing, selling, it is in their blood.” (IV27, E) 
This evocative description of the bazaar formed part of a wider conversation we were having about 
the changes in the city since the events, from its ethnic make up to the daily soundscape Maria 
encountered when she left her house. The quote above evokes the sounds and sights of an idealised 
market, setting it as a beautiful place, one that Maria found real pleasure in visiting, that has since 
been lost to her. The perceived loss of access to such enjoyable public spaces has left residents such 
as Maria feeling stranded; still able to use the bazaar to shop (indeed, compelled to due to the high 
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prices elsewhere), but finding it qualitatively reduced, no longer the enjoyable place to visit it once 
was. As Maria herself put it (clearly relishing the opportunity to practice her impeccable English) 
“now we are here, betwixt and between, just waiting - we don’t know whether to stay here or go 
somewhere else, so we wait” (IV27, E). This position is familiar to many members of smaller 
minority groups in Kyrgyzstan, especially those deported to Central Asia during Stalinist purges as 
was the case for Maria’s family (Schmidt and Sagynbekova 2008). 
Such sentiments were shared by Zarif, an Uzbek accountant in his late thirties. Zarif recalled the 
bazaar of the past as “a good place”, well kept, with goods such as vegetables, meat and clothing all 
neatly assigned to their proper place (IV21, E). He described the “beautiful Chaikhanas” (tea 
houses) that ran along the bazaar, where one could eat, drink and meet with friends, contrasting this 
with the place he dismissed today as “a mess”. Again, this fitted into the wider story of exclusion 
that he told me, lamenting the fact that his once “beautiful” city had become a place where he was 
afraid to venture to many areas of the city, and where he now felt “like a refugee” (IV21, E). 
Whereas once the bazaar had been an attractive place, and an enjoyable environment in which to 
spend leisure time, it now fitted into a different image of the city as a dangerous, unpleasant and 
unwelcoming place. Perhaps the most striking use of the bazaar to talk about this sense of exclusion 
from the city, though, came during a discussion with Otajon and Shavkat, two young Uzbek men 
working as teachers in the same school. Responding to my question about the places they would 
usually visit in Osh, Shavkat became visibly frustrated as he tried to explain the distinction he made 
between the bazaar as he experienced it today - a place that was strictly for shopping, and served no 
other purpose - and as he used to experience it. 
“Shavkat: [laughs] Kuda ty poidesh?! Kuda? [trans. Where do you go? Where?!] 2010. Before we 
visited these places, but now we visit but we don’t feel happiness, OK? We don’t see any effect of our 
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spending time. Before 2010, before this time, we visited other places, we go hiking, and we go these 
places - to bazaar, but you know, that’s not bazaar, that’s… that’s not bazaar! that’s not! It’s… kak 
skazat? [trans. how to say?] That’s [unclear] yeah? Evil, it’s evil…
Interviewer: Yeah, so where, if you don’t like going to the bazaar, where do you go if you want to 
buy?
Otajon: No, we cannot say that we never go to bazaar, er, we go to bazaar, but…
Shavkat: We go to shop! But that’s not bazaar
Otajon: No, not to walk, only if we need, we go there” (IV22, E) 
For Shavkat and Otajon, their unease at visiting the bazaar reflects the unease they now felt in 
visiting public spaces in the rest of the city. They went on to talk about a park in the centre of Osh 
(Fontan) and the billiard clubs that they used to be able to visit, but now avoided in order not to 
provoke any “conflicts” (IV22). More than this, however, they seem to see the very meaning and 
character of the bazaar to have been transformed by the violence of June 2010. The bazaar is no 
longer the bazaar in its fullest, social sense, but has become something “evil”. The essential 
qualities of the space - as a pleasurable place to walk and socialise - have been stripped away, 
reducing it to its barest functions of buying and selling. For Shavkat and Otajon, and for Maria and 
Zarif also, the bazaar is no longer the place of “intense sociality” described by Liu, or the symbol of 
Osh’s mercantile and multicultural identity evoked by Megoran; it is simply a place to buy food 
before withdrawing from a public space which, like so many others in Osh, has become unfamiliar 
and threatening to them. This concern was echoed by international and non-governmental 
organisation workers I met with in Osh, who recounted the problems met by Uzbek stallholders in 
the bazaar since the events. In many cases, they explained, these stallholders were forced to pay 
protection money, or a ‘roof’, in order to continue their business there, actions which contributed to 
the increasingly mono-ethnicisation of important public spaces in the city (IV06, IV29).  
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This dislocation seems all the more extreme for Zarif, Shavkat and Otajon. Whilst Maria’s 
description of the past bazaar still presented it as serving a function (commerce) albeit in a more 
pleasant way, the men’s descriptions focus on the social-leisure function of the space, lamenting the 
loss of the bazaar as a place of recreation. Such a distinction raises the question of whether the 
bazaar should be considered as a gendered space. Certainly, during the time of this research the 
bazaar was a place that was used by men and women - the majority of shoppers were female, but 
men also did their shopping there. A large proportion of the stallholders were women, but certain 
roles in the market such as the cobblers and porters, were always performed by men. On the whole 
the main parts of the bazaar were dominated by a constantly moving throng of people buying and 
selling throughout the day, especially women buying food and domestic products. It does not appear 
to be a space that women are prevented from accessing due to the “cultural symbolic meanings” 
referred to by Fenster earlier in this investigation (Fenster 2005).  Berna Özcan has highlighted the 
important role of women in Kyrgyzstan’s bazaars, showing how this pushed the level of female 
entrepreneurship in Kyrgyzstan to around 30% (one of the highest in the region), even finding its 
way into popular idiom via the saying “‘Erkek kazanda, aial bazarda’ (emphasising that women 
look after men through their bazaar activities)” (Berna Özcan in Welter et al 2006).  
That women are so prominent in the bazaar suggests at first glance that this is a space to which they 
have free and unimpeded access. However, women’s apparent mobility in the bazaar should not be 
read as the threat to patriarchal order (Massey 1994). As Maria’s account demonstrates, even in the 
more pleasant past, her use of the bazaar was mainly linked to its function as an extension of the 
private sphere, a place where she bought the food and other goods needed to fulfil her duties within 
the home. To be sure, she derived pleasure from the sights and sounds of the bazaar, and no doubt 
from the social interaction and sharing of news that took place there, but its primary function was to 
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purchase household necessities at the best price. In contrast, Zarif, Shavkat and Otajon mourn the 
loss of the bazaar as part of the public space they have the right to freely access and enjoy. Now that 
is just a place to shop, it can no longer be defined as the bazaar as they understand it, as a leisure 
space - it has become something else, something “evil”. These interviews suggest that experiences 
of the bazaar are gendered, and closely linked to the gendered spatial binaries that define public 
space as inherently masculine, and private space as inherently feminine (McDowell 1999). As the 
next section will demonstrate, this gendered view of the bazaar also effects the younger generation 
of women, but with somewhat different results. 
7. 5 “It’s really like a dirty place” - young women rejecting the bazaar 
The second way that people in Osh use the bazaar to speak about the city looks in another direction. 
Whilst the previous section focused on the contrast some residents made between the pleasurable 
bazaar of the past and the perceived diminished place of today, in this narrative other residents - 
specifically young women - also find the bazaar to be a problematic space. However, instead of 
looking to an ideal type of the bazaar located in the past, these respondents contrasted it with a 
vision of modern, western style shopping centres they would like to construct in its place. 
Sitting with a group of female students from the Osh Humanitarian-Pedagogical Institute (OHPI), 
all in the early stages of their teacher training, a consensus soon became clear regarding one of the 
most urgent changes required in the city - to change the bazaar (or as one girl put it, to solve “our 
bazaar problems” IV02, E). In place of the current sprawling collection of stalls, tables, shipping 
containers and low level buildings, the girls agreed that something far more modern should be built. 
One of the students explained her thoughts in detail: 
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“I would join all the parts of our bazaar together, and put them in one high rise building, with 
different things on different floors; food on one floor, clothes on one floor, our national things on 
one floor. I hate shopping at the bazaar at the moment” (IV02, E) 
This sentiment was echoed repeatedly by other young women in the city in our conversations. 
Begimay, also a student, complained that the bazaar was “really like a dirty place” where conditions 
to sell food were “not healthful” due to stalls’ proximity to the road (IV17, E). She lauded Mayor 
Myrzakmatov’s efforts to move these stalls, and talked excitedly about the development of a new 
shopping centre in Osh, contrasting it to the bazaar and nearby Kelechek (or ‘Future’) clothes 
market with the ultimate accolade: “it’s really, like, modern” (IV17, E). A few days later another 
young student, Altynay, explained that she avoided shopping in the bazaar entirely, waiting until she 
could visit more modern malls in Bishkek instead (IV15). The dismay of these young women at the 
state of the bazaar was summed up by Katya, a Russian woman in her mid twenties, who described 
her shock at the state of the bazaar in the expressive fashion I had come to expect from her, telling 
me indignantly “on Saturday I, with my cousin, we went to bazaar and we just… it was just some 
kind of idea that it was just after a bomb, you know? We were just like this [mimes shock]!” (IV49, 
E).  
Katya would go on to explain her dream of leaving Osh for Bishkek, where she believed the higher 
standard of amenities, as well as the larger Russian community, would make for a more fulfilling 
life than she could achieve in Osh. Like Begimay and the OHPI students, Katya too believed the 
bazaar should be replaced with a more modern alternative. Even though she had worked in the 
tourist sector, and recalled many visitors to the city wanting to visit the bazaar as one of Osh’s most 
famous sites, she remained convinced that this messy, disordered space should make way for a more 
modern alternative. Aidai, an English teacher in her 20s, also recognised the potential importance of 
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the bazaar to tourists, suggesting “some piece” be left for their benefit, but insisting all the same 
that the bazaar make way for a “big supermarket” in its place (IV51, E). 
Figure 16. Ongoing construction work in the bazaar 2013 (Source: Author’s own) 
It is striking that this message should come overwhelmingly from young women, and this perhaps 
represents an attempt on their part to build their aspirations and expectations about their futures in 
Osh into the same framework. Aspirations, because they belong to the generation that has grown up 
since the end of the Soviet Union, spending their lives under capitalism instead. In addition to this, 
their generation has borne the full force of globalisation, something which is all the more powerful 
in the context of a comparatively large city such as Osh. As Kirmse, writing about young men’s 
responses to globalisation in Osh, puts it “Young people in Osh inhabit a ‘marketplace for styles and 
identities’. In contrast to youth in villages or in neighbouring states such as authoritarian 
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Uzbekistan, they engage with an array of social actors, from religious activists to internationals 
organisations, which reflect life in a rapidly ‘globalising’ city” (Kirmse in Darieva et al 2011).  The 
young women I met in Osh would listen to Adele songs before class, watch Turkish soap operas in 
the evening and feverishly ask me whether I thought Justin Bieber was good looking (and if not, 
why not?). They would come for extra language classes in the Amerikansky Tsentr [trans. American 
Centre] and ask for help applying for internships with one of the many international organisations 
and NGOs working in the city. A month after I arrived in Osh in 2013, I was whisked into a concert 
hall in town by two 18 year old friends to watch the smash hit movie at the time - Salaam New York 
- which tells the story of a young Kyrgyz man overcoming all the obstacles in New York to graduate 
top of his class at Columbia and become a hot shot lawyer. “That” Cholpon told me breathlessly 
afterwards “is my dream!”. Young people in Kyrgyzstan today have access to a vast array of 
information about the world beyond the country’s borders, and this accordingly affects their 
aspirations about the way they want to live (see Kuehnast 1998 for an extensive and insightful 
discussion about this).  
Simultaneously, though, young women in Osh (and Kyrgyzstan more widely) are all too aware of 
the expectations and restrictions placed on them by virtue of their gender. Whereas Soviet ideology 
promoted gender equality (in theory, at least - gender inequalities in areas such as salary remained 
stubbornly entrenched throughout this era (Thieme 2008)), recent years have seen a resurgence of 
practices and trends that threaten such equality. Bride kidnapping (ala kachuu) has become ever 
more problematic over the past 40 years, with one in-depth study of a Kyrgyz village in 2005 
suggesting that 40% of marriages in Kyrgyzstan may now result from this practice, and that the rate 
of non-consensual kidnappings is rising (Kleinbach et al 2005). Fear of kidnapping, along with 
economic hardship, may also explain why many families are so keen to ensure that their daughters 
are married early (by their early 20s at the very latest) (Thieme 2008). Many female students I 
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spoke with would explain that their families expected them to marry as soon as they finished 
University, in a tacit bargain that allowed them to complete their education. The past 20 years has 
also witnessed a renewed freedom to practice Islam in Kyrgyzstan, which had been repressed under 
Soviet rule. Crucially, this has seen the growth of a stricter variant of the religion than the 
traditional blend of Sufism and nomadic beliefs which had previously characterised religious 
observance in the country (Heyat 2010). As a result the resurgence of Islamic practice in 
Kyrgyzstan has often gone hand in hand with the growing popularity of a type of Islam where 
“custom and edicts are interpreted in an orthodox, Sunni tradition, and often in a fundamentalist 
form, that has a very restrictive view of women and gender relations” (Heyat 2010: 282). This in 
itself represents another facet of globalisation, as young people in Kyrgyzstan are increasingly 
exposed to different ways of practising Islam, with more and more choosing to adopt a more strict 
interpretation of the religion (McBrien 2009). The conjunction of these factors means that many 
young women in Kyrgyzstan - and especially the traditionally more conservative south - are aware 
that by their early 20s they are quite likely to be married, often living with their in-laws, with the 
responsibility for running a household. Certainly, this is what one group of female students in their 
final year at Osh State University told me as we chatted after class one day. The young women - no 
older than 20 - giggled nervously as they discussed the weddings that they told me would inevitably 
follow their graduation that summer. When I asked a friend teaching at the University about this 
later, she explained with exasperation how many times she had been visited by mothers that month 
asking to know who her best students were, so they could identify the best marriage prospects for 
their sons from that year’s graduates. 
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Figure 17. Stallholders in front of buildings that have been partially destroyed as part of street 
widening in the bazaar, 2013 (Source: Author’s own) 
Young women such as Begimay, Cholpon and the OHPI students are left to try to reconcile the 
aspirational lifestyle they have been imbibing through their participation in the globalised capitalist 
reality of Osh today, with the conservatism of the gender roles that will be the reality for many of 
them. This balancing act between their aspirations and expectations, then, may explain their 
attitudes to the bazaar, as once again the city reflects the gendered experiences of its inhabitants. If 
young women are to be tied to the ‘traditional’ position and responsibilities of a housewife - 
shopping, cleaning, cooking, childcare - then they can at least do these on the terms and in the 
image of the globalised lifestyle they aspire to.  
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Instead of shopping in a dusty, open air market, they want access to a clean, shiny multi-storey 
shopping mall. This compromise reflects what Kuehnast identified as the “strategic” and “shifting” 
ways in which young Kyrgyz women have employed and combined traditional and modern 
conceptions of Kyrgyz womanhood to navigate their ways as successfully as possible through the 
shifting economic, social and cultural realities of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan (Kuehnast 1998: 643). It 
also underlines the truth of Fenster’s observation that gendered arrangements of power in the 
private sphere affect the way in which women use and perceive public spaces (Fenster 2005). Some 
young women forge another path, of course, and soon after I left Osh I learnt that both Katya and 
Cholpon had left the city, Katya for Bishkek and Cholpon to move to New Jersey, where she would 
later to confide to me that she felt this was the only way to escape the marriage she felt was 
otherwise inevitable.  
7. 6 “For women it’s not convenient”  - (re)claiming space for women in the public realm  
There is another level to this process, however; another aspiration at play, that once again becomes 
clear through comparison with the narrative advanced by Zarif, Shavkat and Otajon at the beginning 
of this chapter. As mentioned before, these men were distraught at the loss of a treasured public 
space of leisure and sociality, as the bazaar no longer performs this function for them. Indeed, this 
closing of public space to national minority groups in Osh is a very serious issue. Unpacking young 
women’s responses to changes at the bazaar, and their hopes for its future, suggest that they too are 
struggling with the question of which public spaces are open, and comfortable, to them. Aidai, who 
as we saw earlier was strongly in favour of replacing the bazaar with a modern mall or supermarket, 
complained vociferously about the lack of places in Osh where she could spend time with her 
friends outside the house: 
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“We want to have… er… places, just, cinemas, theatres, it will be just… bowling centres! It would 
be good, because for me I couldn’t go… for example, I’m tired of cafes, and I only wander along the 
street, and there is no place just to play games. We have billiards, pool, here, but there’s a lot of men 
- for women it’s not convenient” (IV51, E) 
I asked Aidai where she could go when she wanted to meet up with her female friends, and she 
replied with a short list of the cafes where they felt comfortable meeting up to talk and, in her 
words, “to gossip sometimes”. These cafes - California, Tsarskiy Dvor, Hangar and Borsok - were 
among the most expensive in the city, underlining that for Aidai finding a place to spend time with 
her female friends was not only difficult, but costly. Seen in this light, young women’s hopes of 
building a mall in place of the bazaar could also be read as an attempt to carve out a space in the 
city centre where they could socialise on their own terms. Vanderbeck and Johnson have 
demonstrated how malls have come to occupy such a central role in young people’s conceptions of 
leisure spaces in the US (Vanderbeck and Johnson 2000), an idea which young women in Osh have 
been fully exposed to through the globalised media they consume. Women in Osh are by no means 
the first to look for a measure of freedom in this kind of space. In actual fact they are inscribing 
themselves in a tradition of women using semi-public spaces of consumption such as department 
stores and malls as a “place where women might escape from the confines of domesticity and male 
presence/control, even if only for short and temporary periods” that reaches back to the nineteenth 
century (McDowell 1999: 149). Replacing the bazaar with the mall, then, might allow young 
women to redress the power balance of public space in Osh, creating a space where they are more 
shielded from the gaze of the masculine city, and where they hold the knowledge about how to 
behave. Certainly, where new malls have been constructed in Kazakhstan, young people have 
flocked to them as social spaces (Koch 2013).  
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As well as changing the bazaar, 
young women I spoke with would 
list other recreational spaces they 
would like to see built in Osh - 
theatres, cinemas, parks, bowling 
alleys, libraries, and amusement 
parks.  
Figure 18. Young women in the 
central bazaar (Source: Zach 
Krahmer) 
Whilst at the time I thought little of 
this, seeing it as the natural response of young women looking to enjoy themselves, stepping back 
to see just how often this refrain emerged made the dearth of safe, comfortable public space in Osh 
for young women more obvious. Of all these respondents, Katya seemed to feel this the most 
acutely, perhaps because as an ethnic  with a penchant for  hair dye and mini skirts, she 
was instantly identifiable as straying from the increasingly conservative expectations placed on 
young women. When I asked her why she was so keen to move to Bishkek, she started by listing the 
places she could go there - the theatre, the cinema, bowling, discos - whereas in Osh “we have only 
two options where to go - it’s to eat shashlik or samsa , that’s it!” (IV49, E).  13
It soon became clear, though, that her concern wasn’t only about the lack of a proper cinema or 
variety in her dining options. Rather, she no longer felt able to express her identity as a young 
woman in public, without being subject to harassment and comment - as she explained “I don’t like 
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 Shashlik (a meat kebab) and Samsa (a pastry, most often filled with mutton) are popular foods in 13
Osh, and are widely sold in the city’s cafes and restaurants.
it when people [are] just gazing at me, and just like when passing by ‘beep beep beep beep’ [mimes 
pressing a car horn]. I don’t like it” (IV49, E). The cinemas and theatres of Bishkek, then, represent 
spaces where Katya felt she would be able to spend leisure time in a public space that was safe and 
comfortable, where she would be more able to fulfil her right to freely access the city. It is no 
surprise, then, that so many young women expressed a strong desire to build similar places in Osh, 
where safe space for women to socialise is currently limited to the home and a few expensive cafes.  
Perhaps this explains what might otherwise seem a paradoxical element of my findings: whilst life 
for most people in post-independence Kyrgyzstan has become more precarious, women have been 
particularly hard hit - as Thieme succinctly puts it “women face particular forms of vulnerability 
that intersect with one another” (Thieme 2008). And yet despite this increasing vulnerability, in my 
research women were, overall, far more likely to express happiness about changes in Osh than men. 
In fact, around 3/4 of the respondents who told me that Osh had become better in recent years were 
women. Women were distinctly more likely than men to remark upon the renovated parks, new 
monuments, resurfaced roads and new bus stops, as well as works underway to change the bazaar. 
Men, on the other hand, were far more likely than women to complain about the disappearance of 
jobs and factories in the city. These divergences should not be seen in terms of a crude gender 
divide - it would be inaccurate and simplistic to suggest that only men are concerned with the 
changing landscape of employment in the city, or that only women appreciate the aesthetic changes 
brought about by the new parks and monuments. However, the case of the bazaar suggests one 
possible reason for this divide in perceptions of urban change in Osh between men and women. 
Perhaps women see changes such as the creation of parks, construction in the bazaar area, and 
installation of new bus stops, as steps towards creating more safe and comfortable public spaces for 
them to enjoy. Certainly, on a walk through her neighbourhood in a former industrial area of the city 
Begimay was proud to show me their newly renovated park, describing how she was now able to 
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take pleasant walks there with her mother in the evening. Women in Osh are embracing the 
opportunity to ‘build back better’, and lending their support to initiatives to construct spaces they 
believe would be more attuned to their needs. Rather than returning to the status quo ante in the 
city, these interviews suggest young women have sought to take advantage of the post-crisis period, 
and the renewed attention on the built environment that this invariably brings (Ferguson 2010, 
Amaratunga and Haigh 2011), to improve their access to public space in Osh. Their ideas about how 
to improve the bazaar are emblematic of this. However, as the concluding section of this chapter 
will show, there is a paradox at the heart of this situation that means that these very spaces of 
perceived free access may actually be contributing to a wider pattern restricting women’s spatial 
mobility in Osh. 
7. 7 Conclusion - opening and closing public space in the bazaar 
It is clear that the bazaar occupies a central role in residents’ ways of seeing Osh. At first glance this 
centrality comes from the fact that so many city residents use the space each week. As such it could 
be read as one of the city’s few remaining shared spaces, a place where residents of all ethnicities, 
age groups and social classes mix on a regular basis. Such a vision chimes with Liu’s positioning of 
the bazaar as an “idiom of exchange” in all its forms. But as we have seen above, this research has 
uncovered other ways in which the bazaar is being used to explain other visions of contemporary 
Osh. For some, notably Uzbek men, the bazaar has become emblematic of the way that public space 
in the city feels increasingly unwelcoming to them. Where once the bazaar was a convivial place, 
one that afforded space to socialise with friends, it has now been reduced to it’s most basic 
functions of buying and selling.  
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For young women, however, the story is quite different. They celebrate recent construction work in 
the bazaar as a sign of things they hope are to come - the replacement of the traditional bazaar with 
a modern shopping mall or supermarket. This hope indexes two aspirations. One the one hand it 
reflects the way young women in Osh are seeking to use elements of the built environment in order 
to negotiate the complex, and at times tense, relationship between their aspirations of participating 
in the globalised lifestyles they have been exposed to in the post-Soviet era, and the increasingly 
conservative social norms they are expected to conform to. At the same time, this excitement about 
the development of a different kind of place in place of the bazaar reflects young women’s desire 
for more access to public space in the city. Whilst currently there are very few places in the city that 
they can comfortably and safely spend time with their friends, young women appear hopeful that 
changes in the bazaar, as well as other recent changes in the city such as the renovation of many 
parks, may represent the creation of more space for them in the city. 
This may seem like a positive development at first glance, and a step towards addressing the 
gendered spatial inequalities that persist in Osh as in so many cities. However, a number of caveats 
should be kept in mind.  
Firstly, in her critique of Lefebvre’s concept of right to the city, Fenster notes that women’s rights 
are often obstructed on two levels - the right to freely access spaces in the city, and the right to 
participate in decisions about them (Fenster 2005). Whilst the opinions expressed by the young 
women interviewed in the course of this investigation suggest they are challenging the first of these 
issues, there has been no consultation or outreach from city authorities that would suggest the 
second is being addressed. Although young women in Osh clearly have very strong hopes and 
opinions about the way they would like to see the city evolve, there is little evidence anyone is 
listening to them. Instead of participating in the planning process and having a voice in the creation 
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of a city that is open to them, young women are most often left to make the best of the situation 
presented to them. The case of the bazaar is perfectly representative of this - women such as Aidai, 
Begimay and the students of OHPI can see that change is afoot, and have a definite vision of the 
change they would like to see, but they do not have the power to influence this change. Instead, as is 
so often the case for young women in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, they must simply watch, wait and 
try to find the strategic compromise between aspirations and reality that works best for them.  
Secondly, the spaces that are apparently opening up, the opportunities being identified by young 
women, are intimately linked to a gendered spatiality that ties women to the private sphere, and men 
to the public. Whilst the idea of a mall or supermarket may hold the promise of freedom and 
increased access to the city, this is somewhat illusory. The path of “consumption as (partial) 
liberation” has already been trodden by other women, and whilst it may offer a temporary respite 
from male dominated spaces, it also reinforces a view of women as consumers rather than 
producers, as firmly situated in spaces that are linked to their role in the private sphere rather than 
the public arena (McDowell 1999: 159). Young women may be trying to gain access to more places 
in Osh, but these places represent a continuation of some very traditional gender roles. 
Finally, the kind of progress being imagined by these young women is coming at a cost to other city 
residents. The mall or shopping centre these young women wish to see built can hardly be 
considered public space. Instead, it would certainly be a more privatised space than the current 
bazaar, and (as we have seen in similar cases in Kazakhstan) highly exclusionary to all those 
without the requisite economic and cultural capital to access the space (such as the poor, the rural 
and the elderly) (Koch 2010). Moreover, it is impossible to ignore that even as public space is 
potentially opening up to one group, it is closing to others. It is clear from the testimony of Zarif, 
Shavkat and Otajon above that Uzbek men find it more and more difficult to freely participate in 
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life in the bazaar. For them, changes in the space have not met the goal of facilitating free 
communication and peaceful coexistence between all city stakeholders as imagined in the Arendtian 
view of ‘spaces of appearance’ explored in Chapter 2. Certainly the argument can certainly be made 
that opening up more public space for women is an important step in (re)building a more peaceful 
city in Osh. However, this process is unlikely to meet with success whilst it reinforces problematic 
gendered spatial divisions between the public and private, continues to exclude women from 
decision making processes about the future of the built environment, and comes at the expense of 
other groups in the city.
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Chapter 8: Case Study - From monuments to mahallas: contrasting 
memories in the urban landscape of Osh 
8. 1 Introduction 
Walking in a sun-dappled park in the centre of Osh, it is difficult to imagine the violence that 
engulfed the city just three years before. And yet, tucked away in this quiet leafy park are two 
memorials to the violence, euphemistically known as the ‘events’. On the day after the 3rd 
anniversary of the events these seemed to stand as the perfect visual metaphor for the complex 
relationship between memory and place in the city since the events. Sitting at the base of the Peace 
Bell monument sat a large wreath of red and white flowers, laid there by the city Mayor and the 
Prime Minister in a small official ceremony the previous day (Figure 17). The bell itself, though, 
was missing (as it had been for at least four months by that point) leaving the poignant sight of the 
floral tribute to victims of the events languishing under an empty structure.  
Figure 19. The Osh Peace Bell 
following the commemorative 
ceremony, June 2013 (Source: 
Author’s own) 
This tension between the urge to 
create commemorative spaces in 
the urban landscape and the extent 
to which these spaces a re 
maintained, used and perceived as 
authentic by the communities they 
are meant to serve is present 
throughout the cityscape, and is 
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the focus of this case study. It can reveal much about how communities and the city authorities are 
experiencing changes in Osh since the violence of 2010, and how they are using the built 
environment to attempt to mediate, and in some cases control, these changes. 
Although in recent years a body of literature has begun to emerge around monuments, changes in 
urban form and the construction of national identity in Kyrgyzstan (notably in Cummings (2013), 
Liu (2012) and Megoran (2013), but also in Marat (2008), Morozova (2008) and Diener (2013)), 
this has largely focused on events in the capital city, Bishkek, and on elite interventions in the 
cityscape, with the exception of Megoran and Liu. Cummings has advanced interesting discussions 
around the relationship between monuments and official ideology in Kyrgyzstan, but her focus has 
remained centred on the way that elite driven narratives are concretised in space, arguing that ‘as 
observed elsewhere in the Soviet Union, liberalization has not considerably widened the pool of 
monument entrepreneurs’ (Cummings 2013: 608). Whilst this may be true, that is not to say that 
elite narratives are the only ones being written into the built environment in present day Kyrgyzstan. 
On the contrary, in Osh non-elite narratives of memory and identity are being expressed through the 
informal and quotidian fabric of the city, and that contrasting these spaces with the formal 
monumental spaces described by Cummings enables the researcher to build a far richer picture of 
forces at play in Kyrgyzstani cities today.  
This case study juxtaposes the 'top-down' commemorative perspectives of the municipal 
government, and the 'bottom-up' perspectives of the diverse communities who live in the city, 
seeking to unpack how these views interact and where they diverge, and what effects this produces. 
It will show how official commemorative interventions in the city since 2010 have sought to 
inscribe a distinctly Kyrgyz (rather than Kyrgystani) identity in Osh’s urban space, at the same time 
as encouraging a focus on reconciliation through the monuments that respond to the June 2010 
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violence. On the other hand, it also identifies a number of non-elite narratives of memory which 
speak to issues such as Osh’s industrial heritage, cultural identity and experiences of the June 
violence, and explores the insights that can be gained from placing these narratives alongside those 
supported by elites in the city. As explored in Chapter 3, such an approach argues for a move away 
from investigations that focus purely on either ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ views of commemorative 
spaces, then, supporting those theorists who have suggested that the richest observations can  come 
from examining interactions between these two views (Irwin-Zarecka 2007;  Olick  2003; Forest, 
Johnson and Till 2004).  
In the case of post-conflict Osh such a juxtaposition sheds new light on how interventions in the 
cityscape are producing different effects on the urban populace, and questions how future urban 
development may affect the potential for building a sustainably peaceful city. Using this dual lens of 
collective memory, it explores how a greater understanding of this relationship could improve our 
understanding of the possible impacts of interventions in the physical fabric of the city, from the 
monumental to the small scale, especially in the wake of crisis. It interrogates spatial changes in the 
city that have occurred since the events, as well as those planned for the future, alongside persistent 
visions of Osh as expressed by non-elite city residents.  
The question of memory is one that can reveal much about life in the city. For example, it can 
illuminate areas of tension, and concordance, between the hopes and expectations of the city 
authorities and the man on the street. Similarly, it can sketch out some of the varied narratives that 
animate people’s conceptions of Osh as a place in which they live and work, or suggest ways in 
which recent and proposed future changes to the cityscape might impact on the socio-geographical 
experiences of its inhabitants. 
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So, how do the relationships between memory and place, between top down and bottom up 
narratives, and between the monumental and the quotidian expressions of collective memory 
express themselves in contemporary Osh? And how can this help us to illuminate the city’s recent 
tumultuous past? The following section will begin by interrogating city authorities’ attempts to 
build their favoured view of Osh into the city from the top down, via the construction of a number 
of public monuments since the events of June 2010. It will then go on to consider a number of 
different commemorative narratives that emerged from non-elite actors during my research, which 
interact with these officially sanctioned interventions in different ways.  
8. 2 ’Patriots of the City’  – New monuments in Osh since 2010 14
Since the ‘Events’ in 2010, five significant new monuments have been constructed under the aegis 
of the city authorities; statues of three heroic figures from Kyrgyz history and culture Manas 
(unveiled on the second anniversary of the events), Barsbek and Alimbek Datka (both built in 
2011), as well as the ‘Mothers’ tears’ statue (erected on the first anniversary of the June violence) 
and the Osh peace bell (also unveiled in 2011). These statues represent the elite narrative of 
memory being inscribed in the city. In the case of Osh it is important to recognise the ‘elite’ 
represents the municipal authorities, and in particular the then Mayor, Melis Myrzakmatov. When 
we talk about the elite narrative in Osh, then, this does not necessarily represent the view of a 
national elite, but rather that of a powerful local elite, with the capacity to dictate urban change in 
the city, centred around Myrzakmatov. 
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This research suggests that the impact of these monuments in the minds of city residents has not 
been equal. Indeed, it is possible to sharply delineate between the three larger monuments – Manas, 
Barsbek and Alimbek Datka – which were repeatedly mentioned by respondents, and the two peace 
monuments, whose presence appears largely overlooked by city residents. Accordingly, this chapter 
will adopt this distinction whilst examining the nature, position and impact of the new city 
monuments. 
The statues of Manas, Barsbek and Alimbek Datka can first and foremost be distinguished by their 
size. They tower over the roads where they stand; ancient, sword-wielding warriors on a grand 
scale, contrasting sharply with their often crumbling surroundings of post-Soviet decay. Driving 
past them (or underneath, in the case of the Datka arch) is impressive; to walk by them is arresting – 
the new monuments tower over passersby in a way that is only matched in the city by the remaining 
Lenin statue in the centre of the city. All three statues stand at major access points to the city, 
meaning that the vast majority of visitors to Osh will pass under the gaze of at least one of the stern 
warriors – a fact which is not lost on the local population; one taxi driver noted that the three stood 
at the ‘doors’ to the city, greeting visitors from the airport, Bishkek and Aravan (IV04, U).  
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Legendary warrior and subject of Kyrgyzstan’s most famous epic poem, as well as a concerted post-
Soviet attempt to build national identity (Marat 
2008), Manas sits astride his rearing horse at 
the centre of a roundabout near the airport 
(Figure 18). Here the dramatic red stone plinth 
rising from the ground (guarded by a growling 
mountain lion) led one respondent to proudly 
tell me that Osh could now claim to be home to 
‘the largest Manas in the world’ (IV41, E).  
Figure 20. Manas monument, June May 2013 
(Source: Author’s own) 
Barsbek (Figure 19) also stands atop an 
impressive plinth in the middle of a 
roundabout, this time at the far end of Sulaiman-Too mountain, on the road to Aravan. Sword raised 
in one hand (some have suggested towards the nearby border with Uzbekistan), he is flanked by 
four equally fierce looking guards, each of whom is accompanied by panels explaining Barsbek’s 
role in the formation of the Kyrgyz state in Kyrgyz and in English (although making it across the 
lines of traffic circling the roundabout to read these panels can be a somewhat hair-raising 
experience).  
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Figure 21. The Barsbek statue, May 2013 (Source: Author’s own) 
The last of the trio is arguably the most impressive (Figure 21). Whilst the monument to Alimbek 
Datka (a former leader in the south, to whom this is the second monument in the city, as well as 
another to his even more famous wife, Kurmanjan Datka, herself a problematic emblem of Kyrgyz 
statehood (Morozova 2008)) also includes a statue of the famous figure, pride of place is given to an 
immense arch, topped with a tunduk – the top part of a yurt, which also figures on the country’s 
flag. This arch stands astride four lanes of traffic entering and exiting the city on the road that 
eventually leads to Bishkek. Leading up to the monument on either side the street is edged with 
colourful mosaics seemingly depicting scenes from traditional Kyrgyz life – yurts, horseback 
warriors, manaschi (traditional Kyrgyz storytellers, responsible for reciting the epic poem of 
Manas) and women in traditional headwear.  
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Figure 22. Map of Osh showing location of  major monuments  (Source: OpenStreetMap 
contributors, with author’s edits) 
So, what does the placement and form of these monuments reveal to us? Firstly, these are 
indisputably Kyrgyz monuments – they depict a trio of heroes who are inextricably linked to 
Kyrgyz history and culture, but likely have less resonance for other ethnic groups in the city 
(although this may be less true in the case of Manas, who has been promoted as a symbol of inter-
ethnic co-operation during the Akaev era, on account of his diverse family and entourage (Megoran 
2013). This is all the more striking when, as in the case of Barsbek, the monument is directly 
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juxtaposed with numerous buildings on Navoi Street still clearly bearing the marks of the June 2010 
violence.  
These three monuments were all completed under the aegis of the then Mayor of Osh, Melis 
Myrzakmatov. As discussed in Chapter 6 Myrzakmatov is probably the most significant figure in 
the city’s political landscape in recent years, a divisive figure who has been closely identified with 
much of the changes that have been brought about in Osh’s urban fabric since the ‘Events’. Whether 
you view him as a dangerous nationalist or a much needed strong leader, Myrzakmatov used his 
time in office to “energetically” pursue the twin policy aims of promotion of tolerance and the 
development of Kyrgyz symbolism in the city - such as the new monuments - during his time in 
power (Megoran 2012, 22). Noting that these policies may appear contradictory,  Megoran 
demonstrates how they are in fact indicative of Myrzakmatov’s belief that inter-ethnic peace in the 
city can best be achieved by the development of a strong Kyrgyz state as guarantor, a state that will 
be underpinned by the kind of symbolic underpinning he has begun to introduce to Osh (Megoran 
2012). How, then, are the most visible examples of this Kyrgyz symbolism perceived by the people 
of Osh? For some city residents, this focus on Kyrgyz heroes is a welcome way of increasing 
people’s knowledge of the country’s history whilst also improving the aesthetic qualities of the 
town; one Kyrgyz teacher applauded the Mayor’s decision to recognise what she termed ‘heroes of 
history’ through the monuments, saying ‘it is good, you see? He shows the history and it is a 
sightseeing place at the same time’ (IV19, E).  For others, however, these monuments seem 
emblematic of the introduction of a ‘new culture’ (IV22, E) into the town, with its own heroes, 
stories and rules of behaviour that they must learn anew. One Uzbek respondent lamented the fact 
that, in his opinion, Uzbek heroes were no longer celebrated in Osh. Pointing towards the statue of 
Barsbek he complained that no-one had even heard of him before the statue went up, adding 
mischeviously that at least he could be sure of the history of his pet dog, also called Barsbek.  
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Figure 23. The Alimbek Datka arch and statue, May 2013 (Source: Author’s own) 
Secondly, there is their sheer size. These are monuments built to impress passersby – they are 
formidable, dominating the space in which they stand. There are no accommodations made to help 
people to interact with them at a human level (unlike, for example, the monuments to the Second 
World War, Afghan War or Chernobyl victims elsewhere in the city, which invite the viewer to step 
into and use their monumental space).  Standing at the entrances to the city they send a message to 
everybody passing by that they are now entering a space that has been specifically and symbolically 
identified as Kyrgyz, through the use of both Kyrgyz subject matter and an ethnicised visual 
language that uses tunduks, yurts and patterns taken from traditional Kyrgyz arts and crafts to 
underline its heritage. The use of the arch in the Alimbek Datka monument (Figure 21) is especially 
telling here – as Jarman has shown with regards to Protestant ‘orange arches’ in Northern Ireland, 
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the act of passing through such a structure (especially one topped with a symbol such as the tunduk) 
is a powerful marker of stepping from one territory to another (Jarman 2001).  
Thus these three monuments appear to fulfill a dual function; one the one hand they use their size, 
placement and subject matter to identify and mark the space in which they stand as distinctly 
Kyrgyz, and by dint of their position at the main gates to the city, they extend this identification to 
the whole of the city – a vitally important message in a city with such a contested identity as Osh. 
At the same time, they appear to fulfil a secondary role of promoting knowledge amongst the 
populace of certain figures from Kyrgyz history. Both roles are consistent with the experience of 
other cities such as Dublin (Johnson 1995), Moscow (Forest and Johnson 2002) and Pretoria 
(Crampton 2001). Strikingly, this dual function of public statuary - to impress and to instruct - is 
reminiscent of the use of monuments in the Soviet Union. Across the Soviet Union monuments 
were erected in public space as part of the process of constructing and disseminating a Soviet 
national identity – ‘Soviet patriotism’ even – in the furthest reaches of the Soviet Union 
(Bruggemann and Kasekamp 2008: 430, Forest and Johnson 2002). Adams has demonstrated how 
Soviet forms of inculcating identity into public space - whether through the construction of 
monuments and buildings, or through the staging of grand spectacles - continue to have important 
implications on the way that Central Asian elites use the urban environment to narrate national 
identity today (Adams 2010). Certainly, Koch has demonstrated that one need look no further to the 
capital of neighbouring Kazakhstan, Astana, to see another example of how the built environment is 
being instrumentalist to both legitimise the governing elite, and underpin the national image they 
seek to promote in the post-Soviet era (Koch 2010). 
If there is any doubt as to how effective such a strategy can be, we need look no further than Osh 
itself to see the results of a previous top-down intervention whose traces can still be found in the 
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city today - President Akayev’s ‘Osh 3000’ celebration, initiated in 2000. This initiative comprised 
of a year long celebration of Osh’s position as one of the most ancient cities of the world. Named 
‘Osh 3000’ after the apparent age of the city, Akayev intended this plan to bring Osh more firmly 
into the Kyrgyzstani political landscape, identifying it as an ‘exemplar of longstanding co-existence’ 
in Kyrgyzstan, rather than a ‘problematically’ Uzbek city  (Liu 2012: 67). Today the city still bears 
the marks of this celebration - buildings and gates are inscribed with the slogan ‘Osh 3000’ across 
the city centre, whilst in other places decorative lights spelling the same flutter listlessly across a 
central street. More strikingly, many respondents took up this theme in our conversations, 
repeatedly telling me of the Soviet scientist (Y A Zadneprovsky) who proved that Osh was 3000 
years old, and proudly proclaiming their city ‘one of the ancient towns in the world... older than 
Rome’ (IV18, E). That so many city residents were keen to independently tell me of the ancient 
nature of the city, using the exact formulas and narrative promoted by the Osh 3000 campaign is 
testament to the power of an officially promoted narrative to endure when it has been built into the 
ever day fabric of the city, from the monumental to the mundane.  
Interestingly, there has been a move towards inscribing many of the same symbols and patterns used 
in these great nationalist monuments into the more mundane aspects of city space in recent years. 
Throughout Osh new parks are being edged with fences incorporating the tunduk motif 
(representing the top part of a yurt, and traditionally considered sacred (Cummings 2013)), a 
symbol which can also be found on the sides of benches, gates and at the top of buildings. At night, 
coloured lights decorate numerous streets in the city centre, picking out traditional Kyrgyz patterns 
in blue, red and green lights along the side of streets and across roads. This echoing of monumental 
motifs in miniature results in space, for example the parks in Oshsky Rayon or at the foot of 
Sulaiman-Too mountain, that is symbolically bounded as Kyrgyz space, tied in to the same register 
and version of history as the three new monuments.  
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Figure 24. The Peace Bell, August 2012 (Source: Author’s own) 
 
The contrast between the three monuments described above, and the other two to have been erected 
since the events could not be greater. Both of these structures are tucked away in a small, leafy park 
next to the Municipal buildings on Lenin Street. One, known as the ‘Mothers’ tears’, shows two 
women crying together, carved from a light stone and identified as Uzbek and Kyrgyz by their 
headdresses and by the use of traditional patterns drawn from Kyrgyz and Uzbek crafts around the 
base of the statue. The other, standing no more than 10 metres away, is a metal structure designed to 
hold a metal ‘peace bell’, inscribed with the phrase ‘peace in all the world’ in English, Russian and 
Kyrgyz, but not in Uzbek. Neither stands more than a few metres high, in stark comparison with the 
other new monuments, and with the towering Lenin statue that stands in a nearby square. Whilst the 
‘Mothers’ tears’ statue appears to be in good condition, the peace bell was a somewhat neglected 
sight during the period of this research; the bell itself had disappeared entirely, leaving an empty 
space at the centre of the monument, and the structure itself had been graffitied with slogans saying 
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‘Chechnya’ and ‘Caucasus power over all tombs’. By the occasion of the third anniversary of the 
June events this graffiti had been cleaned off, yet the bell was still absent - a trip to the monument 
on the day after the anniversary commemorations yielded the striking picture of a large floral 
wreath to the victims, placed there by Mayor Myrzakmatov and Prime Minister Jantoro Satybaldiev, 
laying under an empty space where the peace bell should have hung.  
Figure 25. The Mothers’ tears 
monument, May 2013 (Source: 
Author’s own). 
Strikingly, during my research 
respondents were almost 
entirely silent about these 
monuments - they were 
mentioned only once, during a 
language class themed around 
potential tourism sites in the 
city. This silence speaks 
volumes - whereas the new 
monuments took a central 
p l a c e i n r e s p o n d e n t s ’ 
descriptions of the city (for 
better or worse), the two peace 
monuments simply don’t seem 
to have struck a chord with 
city residents. Given the less than prominent form and position the authorities have given to these 
structures within the cityscape, perhaps this apparent indifference is less surprising. However, this 
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leads to the question, if residents’ memories of the 2010 conflict are not crystallising in these 
officially sanctioned spaces, where and how are they being expressed? In order to try and answer 
this question it will be useful to examine the question of memory in the city from another 
perspective - from non-elite city residents, or  the ‘bottom-up’. 
8. 3 Ghost cities – Seeing Osh from the bottom up 
If it has been relatively easy to pinpoint official, top down, interventions in the city, it is far more 
difficult to identify unofficial narratives of memory; instead of crystallising around clearly 
identified and codified commemorative  spaces, such memories are more likely to ‘erupt’ in spaces 
of everyday life (Atkinson 2007; 521). Nonetheless, it has been possible to identify a number of 
compelling conceptions of collective memory from the bottom up. 
Like most cities, Osh is overlaid by maps of memories held by its inhabitants; maps which often 
reveal a different narrative to that prized by local elites. In Osh, these memories manifest 
themselves in a number of ways. For example, the continued use of old names for streets and 
institutions long after they have been officially renamed is common. The central streets of 
Kurmanjan Datka and Masalieva are still commonly referred to by their Soviet era names of 
Aravanskaya and Kyrgyzstanskaya, whilst one student of the now Kyrgyz Social University told me 
it was simply ‘easier’ to stick to the ‘old habits’ of calling the University by its pre-events name, the 
Kyrgyz Uzbek University (IV20, E).  Similarly, some respondents expressed surprise that another 
central street, Zainabedinova, had been recently renamed after a previous Mayor - its seems likely 
that its original name will prove just as resistant to change by city authorities as others in the city 
centre.  
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This question of the persistence of street names gives a clue, then, to the existence of other 
persistent conceptions of the city overlaying the officially sanctioned version in the process of being 
constructed in recent years. Three of these in particular have come to the fore through this research. 
Firstly there appears to be, most particularly amongst people of from the generations old enough to 
have experienced the Soviet era as adults, a persistent and compelling vision of the city’s past 
economic prosperity and stability. Respondents repeatedly mapped out the locations, purpose and 
workforce of the city’s former factories in their interviews, until it became a kind of mantra: The 
silk factory in Yugo-Vostok, that employed thousands of people and now stood as an indoor market 
(Osh Tataan). The cotton paper factory in KhBK district, which at its height employed 11,000 
people in 3 shifts (Liu 2012: 82), and now stands as an empty, hulking reminder of the city’s 
industrial past. The pump factory that once led the world in technology, but is now home to another 
indoor clothes market and mall (Kelechek). These buildings are the concrete reminders of how, as 
one middle aged respondent put it, “from an industrial agricultural country, we turned into an 
agricultural poor country” (IV50, R). 
These three factories have become the poles of a memory map which, for many older Osh residents, 
overlays the city and contrasts unfavourably with the post-Soviet landscape of economic decline. A 
map which is all the more real for being laid out  in bricks and mortar - solid and highly visible 
traces of an aspect of the city which seems indelibly changed. Indeed, it is telling that respondents 
were repeatedly drawn to these three factories out of the 24 that had been present at the height of 
Osh’s industrial age (Liu 2012), perhaps because these buildings continue to play an active role in 
everyday urban life in Osh (either through their new use or, in the case of the cotton factory, 
because they have given their name to an entire centrally located neighbourhood). In the words of 
one despairing resident, now working as a taxi driver ‘Before we had factories, we produced textiles 
and silk, but today there is no work, no money, no future’ (IV37, R).  
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The second street level memory map describes more recent memories - those of the 2010 violence. 
This map does not look the same to everyone - indeed, every respondent had their own set of places 
in Osh where memory is linked to the bricks and mortar of the city - what is striking is the way so 
many respondents used landmarks in the city to tell their story of the events. For example, an office 
building is reframed as the location of snipers during the violence by one young Russian woman; 
the Lenin statue is where a member of the Tatar community recalled gathering for evacuation to 
Bishkek; A young Kyrgyz girl points out a kiosk near her home on Kurmanjan Datka Street and 
recalls its owner sheltering underneath the floorboards during the violence. Elsewhere an elderly 
Uzbek woman points out the house of her Kyrgyz neighbour who hid her during the events, whilst 
an elderly Kyrgyz man points to the corner on which a man was shot during the violence, and to the 
place he and his neighbours built a barricade to keep violent groups away from their homes. In 
another part of the city a group of teachers lament the loss of a school in the Yugo-Vostok 
neighbourhood – ‘a good school, and old school’ - burnt during the events and never rebuilt (IV01, 
R). Another Uzbek woman weeps as she tells the story of her Aunt, forced to bury her son in the 
courtyard of their home, only to see the home burnt to the ground the very next day.  
Across Osh, people are using the built environment as a way of telling their story of the events, and 
as a vessel for their memories of this traumatic time. It is as if a ghost city sits on top of the 
everyday sights of Osh, one in which familiar landmarks and previously unremarkable buildings are 
simultaneously read as places of danger or sanctuary. By walking through this landscape every day, 
residents are participating in the reformation and recollection of these memories, keeping them alive 
and constantly interweaving the ‘now’ of a place with the ‘then’ (Hebbert 2005; Blokland 2001). 
Given how present the past is in everyday Osh, any interventions in the cityscape are bound to 
collide with these memories, and the people keeping them alive through their daily routines. 
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To these two memory maps I would add a third compelling narrative of the city which emerged 
through my conversations with respondents. This third narrative recalls Osh’s past as a multicultural 
city, setting it against what is perceived as the mono-ethnic nature of the town today. Numerous 
respondents saw this as evidenced by the presence of distinctive Uzbek mahalla neighbourhoods in 
the city’s historic centre. One, himself an urban planning professional, explained that Uzbeks were 
concerned their homes were being targeted for demolition along ethnic lines, and passionately 
spoke about the need to preserve this heritage, saying ‘The city of Osh is an ancient city (...) its own 
traditional features have to remain, and a small street – mahalla, such small streets, these small 
houses – such kind of stuff should be preserved’ (IV14, R). Again, this is a narrative which was 
almost exclusively recounted by members of the older generation (at least over the age of 40), from 
professional backgrounds, and across a wide variety of ethnic groups. These respondents 
remembered studying and working alongside not only Kyrgyz or Uzbek, but Russian, Tatar, 
German, Greek, Ukranian and other groups in their youth, and lamented the loss of this diversity in 
Osh today. One ethnic Tajik teacher fondly recalled how neighbours had all chipped in to help her 
to learn Russian when she arrived in Osh as a child, remarking sadly that ‘then nationality wasn’t 
important – no one asked what your nationality was. It’s a pity today – everyone wants to know 
your nationality, but not your personality’ (IV01, E). Another elderly Tatar respondent vividly 
described how the audio geography of the city had changed in recent years, with Uzbek music 
becoming rarer and market sellers falling silent, leaving the city with an increasingly mono-ethnic 
soundtrack she described vividly as “a kind of language violence” (IV27, E). 
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8. 4 Mapping the complex interactions of memory 
On the one hand, then, this research suggests a compelling picture of the official narrative of 
memory that city authorities are trying to build into Osh. Through the construction of a number of 
monuments, and the apparent privileging of the three which depict heroic figures from Kyrgyz 
history in particular, the city authorities are endeavouring to mark out the city of Osh as a 
specifically Kyrgyz territory. This is no mean feat in an area where identity is as keenly contested as 
Osh. Through the act of monumentalising these figures, and strategically positioning them at 
entrances to the urban space, the authorities are also attempting to inscribe a particular version of 
history - one which favours heroes tied to the titular nationality, the Kyrgyz - into  space, and 
therefore into the consciousness of city residents. Although these monuments may be alienating to 
some groups in the city, they do appeal to others - most notably (though not exclusively) in my 
research, to ethnic Kyrgyz residents of the city, who expressed pride in these monuments. This is an 
important point: just as the elite narrative of memory in Kyrgyzstan is not unitary, with 
interventions in Osh representing a localised elite, non-elite narratives should also not be viewed as 
monolithic. 
At the same time, three strands of bottom-up or non-elite memory have emerged through the course 
of this fieldwork; firstly, the ghost of Osh’s past as a successful industrial city, in which familiar 
landmarks in the cityscape carry a double identity as former places of work for many of the city’s 
older residents. Secondly, the mapping of memories of the 2010 conflict onto the city by practically 
every respondent, show how residents are using the cityscape to order and store their memories of 
that traumatic time. The third strand of memory repeatedly identified by older residents was that of 
Osh as a previously multiethnic city, as symbolised by the mahalla neighbourhoods in the city 
centre, that had increasingly lost this diversity. All three strands seem to support Liu’s assertion that 
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‘Viewed from the streets, Osh presents a complex social, political, economic and religious reality. It 
shows that issues of wide import, such as the trajectories of post-socialist economies, the effects of 
state power, the nuances of inter-ethnic relations or the new public presence of Islam need to be 
examined through the details of everyday lives within actual public places.’ (Liu 2012: 25). 
Whilst this in itself is revealing about life in Oh since the events, the most fruitful approach to 
understanding collective memory, and specifically its relationship with the built environment, is to 
bring the top-down and bottom-up approaches into the same investigatory framework (see 
Schudson 1997; Olick 2003; Rolston 2010, Irwin-Zarecka 2007). As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
this approach does not deny that elites attempt to construct and privilege certain narratives of 
collective memory, but either does it ignore the narratives being created and popularised at by non-
elite actors. Instead it looks at the dynamic interactions between these narratives to try and shed 
light on the processes through which one narrative becomes widely accepted as the truth, and how 
this changes over time (Rolston 2010; Misztal 2003). It is important to note that this approach does 
not assume that all expressions of memory will fit neatly into either a ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ 
categorisation - life most often far too messy for such binaries - rather that applying such an 
analytical framework provides a way of seeing memory in the built environment that has the 
potential to reveal previously unremarked linkages, oppositions and silences in the narratives of 
memory being expressed there. This focus seems particularly appropriate for investigations of the 
relationship between collective memory and the built environment, since this often provides the 
space in which top-down and bottom-up expressions of collective memory interact 
Such a dynamic approach to understanding collective memory does not negate the experiences of 
ordinary people, and the way they use and experience the built environment from day to day. 
Neither does it deny the power of elite groups to manipulate and shape the built environment to 
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reflect the narratives of collective memory they favour, or underplay their motivations to do so. It 
does, however, encourage researchers to think in wider terms than simply one paradigm and to pay 
attention to the processes and negotiations that occur when differing narratives of collective 
memory, formed in different contexts, from different materials and by different groups, collide in 
the same space. As Forest, Johnson and Till eloquently put it simply opposing so-called ‘public’ and 
‘elite’ versions of memory is reductive; in reality ‘different social groups, functioning as distinct 
‘publics’ and counter-publics may interact with officials or choose other actions that influence the 
remaking of these [commemorative] places (...) public memory is an activity or process rather than 
an object or outcome’ (Forest, Johnson and Till 2004: 358). 
The situation in Osh demonstrates this point amply; the different strands of memory weave in and 
out of one another in a complex pattern, sometimes coming together in harmony, sometimes 
opposing each other in their visions of Osh, and sometimes not reflecting the same concerns at all. 
Examining the whole of this commemorative picture in the same framework brings to light a 
number of points that may otherwise be missed if we only consider the top-down or bottom-up 
spaces of memory. 
For example, whereas many residents seem to be engaged in a process of mapping out the city’s 
industrial past as they walk through its mercantile present, this narrative does not seem to feature in 
the slightest in the city authorities attempts to narrate Osh’s past and future. Perhaps the city 
authorities do not wish to draw attention to this divergence, brought about by the city’s economic 
decline since the end of the Soviet era. Or perhaps this narrative is simply not their most pressing 
concern in a city where challenges are legion, and resources scarce. Crucially, this narrative recalls 
the existence of challenges and contrasts in Osh beyond those brought to light by the 2010 events. If 
the 2010 violence focussed attention on Osh, there is a concomitant risk that researchers, authorities 
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and local and  international organisations focus on the effects and causes of this violence to the 
exclusion of other long term challenges which continue to define Osh residents’ lives, such as the 
economic decline of the post-Soviet era. This economic decay is likely not something Osh’s 
governing elite wish its citizens to focus on. The Soviet era pride in industrial achievement - still 
visible in the urban fabric through the huge murals that have survived on residential buildings - has 
been replaced in the symbolic language of the city by the figures of Barsbek, Manas and Alimbek 
Datka. The current official silence regarding Osh’s industrial identity is made explicit, then, when it 
is contrasted with the non-elite narratives being expressed by people as they make everyday use of 
the city’s post-industrial landscape. 
In other cases bringing together the elite and non-elite narratives reveals clear opposition. For 
example, the vision of Osh being promoted by the city authorities through their monumental 
interventions in the city is that of a distinctly Kyrgyz city taking its place in the greater arc of 
Kyrgyz history and mythology. This runs counter to the memories expressed by some respondents, 
who see Osh not as a historically Kyrgyz city, but rather one that has traditionally been 
characterised as a diverse and multicultural place. This narrative resists city authorities’ efforts to 
inscribe an exclusive sense of Kyrgyzness in space. It demonstrates just how these efforts are 
causing non-Kyrgyz residents (and to some extent, older Kyrgyz residents) of the city to feel out of 
place and under pressure in the very place they call home. Certainly, this seems a long way from 
former Mayor Myrzakmatov’s stated aim of building tolerance in the city. And yet it is important to 
note that this was overwhelmingly expressed by older residents of the city, and rarely by the young. 
This suggests that this resistance might decline further in future years (at least amongst members of 
the titular nationality), as the new officially favoured narrative of public memory in Osh takes root, 
and comes to resonate with the lived experience of a generation that has grown up since the Soviet 
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era. Already, many city residents I spoke to actively expressed their support for these monuments 
and the history they celebrate. 
When it comes to the 2010 events and memories of violence there is a clear attempt from all 
quarters to commemorate and situate these memories in the physical fabric of the city, giving them 
a sense of permanence. However, the places this is being done do not match up with one another: 
although peace monuments have been purposefully constructed by city authorities, they do not 
appear to have been incorporated into the commemorative vernacular at street level. Indeed, most 
people seem more comfortable locating their memories of the events in places that form part of their 
daily routine, and do not interact with the official spaces of commemoration (even though they are 
mere steps from other frequently visited sites). This can partly be attributed to the kinds of 
narratives these spaces represent; whilst the official monuments support messages about 
reconciliation and peace, the unofficial spaces are often used to express memories of violence, fear 
and trauma (though this too is not exclusive - one Uzbek teacher described her neighbourhood as a 
place of mutual aid during the violence, insisting attackers came from outside the area (IV28)). 
Thus attempts to commemorate the same event don’t always represent the same story. This is more 
than a simple mismatch or misunderstanding between citizens and the city authorities: such a 
situation privileges and protects the official sites, whilst leaving the unofficial sites actively being 
used by people at risk from future development, a risk that will be explored in the final section of 
this case study. 
Reading across these narratives also allows us to see how understandings of public memory can be 
nuanced by factors such as time, place and subject matter. For example, an individual may resist 
elite narratives through their insistence on recalling the city’s industrial past in their everyday 
practice, whilst wholeheartedly supporting the city authorities’ attempts to bolster ethnic Kyrgyz 
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identity in Osh’s urban fabric through the construction of heroic monuments. In other cases the 
meaning of symbols inscribed in the cityscape has changed over time. Just as older Osh residents 
may remember that Manas used to represent a commitment to multiculturalism in the immediate 
post-Soviet era, they now read the new Manas statue as symbolic of rising Kyrgyz nationalism in 
the city. Perhaps most interesting, though, is what happens when these commemorative spaces 
intersect. The peace monuments, with all their imagery of inter-communal reconciliation, 
immediately abut the place where one minority community member recalled standing and waiting 
in fear to be evacuated from the city during the June events, along with other members of her 
community. Similarly, the positioning of the new heroic monuments to Alimbek Datka and Barsbek 
in the middle of mahalla neighbourhoods which were seriously damaged during the June violence, 
leads to a layering the physical expressions of commemorative narratives of Kyrgyz nationalism, 
multiculturalism and violence onto the same physical space. These spaces, through which people 
move on a daily basis, are therefore saturated with narratives of memory; narratives that city 
residents respond to in different ways as they interact with the spaces. It is this commemorative 
saturation that leads Liu to suggest we “think with” the city of Osh as an analytical framework, 
rather than simply about it, in order to understand the effects of these densely layered spaces on the 
people who use them (Liu 2012: 13). 
8.5 Looking to the future - writing memory out of the city 
Planned changes to Osh could also have far-reaching consequences for the way people currently 
remember in the city. Chapter 6 of this thesis set out in detail developments which have been 
planned for Osh in the near future, as well as those changes which have already taken place, 
including the widening of key central streets, construction of high rise buildings, and development 
of the city to reflect a “contemporary” urban way of life (The Renaissance of Osh). Such a logic of 
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development could have a number of effects on memory in the city. Firstly, as the city Masterplan is 
to be implemented, many parts of the city centre look set to be remodelled. Indeed, numerous 
houses and businesses have already been demolished as part of the street widening in Monueva 
Street and in the central bazaar. By officially proclaiming the two peace monuments as the official 
commemorative spaces for the events, even though these do not appear to resonate with the wider 
population, the authorities are failing to acknowledge and safeguard the multitude of meaningful 
commemorative spaces in the everyday fabric of the city. Such spaces may find themselves at a 
very real risk of demolition or transformation in the near future, and the bottom-up memories of the 
June events written out of the city 
Secondly, if carried out these steps will have one clear consequence for the urban landscape of Osh 
– the removal, or at the very least reduction in size, of historical mahalla neighbourhoods in the city 
centre, largely inhabited by ethnically Uzbek families. To remove this highly visible symbol of 
Osh’s identity as a multicultural city brings the city authorities into direct conflict with the narrative 
of memory of diverse Osh set out above, and expressed by numerous city residents.  
Removing mahalla neighbourhoods in the city centre could fatally undermine the Uzbek 
community’s memories of belonging in Osh, built into the very fabric of their homes which, as 
Bevan has noted elsewhere, could leave them not only physically displaced, but disconnected from 
their networks of memory and by extension, identity (Bevan 2007). Given this possibility, it 
becomes more easy to understand why one Uzbek respondent likened his situation to that of a 
refugee in his own city (IV21). This feeling can only be exacerbated when it is contrasted with the 
city authorities’ grand scale interventions in the urban landscape so far, in the shape of the three 
distinctly mono-ethnic that now mark the gateways to the city.  
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So, whilst the reality of Osh’s future urban development is still unclear – whether the city 
authorities will have the money, political stability and support from Bishkek to carry out their plans 
is a decidedly moot point – it is clear that these decisions could have important consequences for 
the construction of a sustainably peaceful city. Without taking account of the way different groups 
in the city (not simply along ethnic lines, but also defined by age group) use everyday elements of 
the built environment to express their memories of the city, the city authorities risk destroying these 
street level commemorative spaces, and in doing so alienating and marginalising many city 
residents, further reducing Osh’s prospects of sustainable peace.  
Only by examining the way in which collective memory is being built into urban space from both 
the top-down and the bottom-up can these relationships be fully brought into the light. Applying 
this technique to the question of public memory in post-events Osh has proved especially fruitful: It 
has demonstrated that whilst memories of Osh’s industrial past are being relived by many city 
residents on a daily basis through their ordinary routines, there has been little or no attempt to 
mirror this commemorative narrative by building it into the city’s urban fabric from the top down. It 
has revealed agreement between elite and grassroots actors over the need to express memories of 
the 2010 violence through the built environment, yet laid bare the divergence of opinions on how, 
and where this could best be done. Finally, it has shown that some citizens use the cityscape to 
dispute the narrative of mono-ethnicity being expressed in top down monumental interventions in 
the city (which are supported by numerous city residents), presenting an alternative vision of Osh as 
a historically multiethnic place. In the case of Osh, understanding the ways in which elite and 
grassroots narratives if memory are expressed and interact in the built environment enables the 
researcher to build fuller and more compelling picture of life in the city than would emerge from 
studying either phenomenon in isolation.  
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Chapter 9: Case Study - Housing in Osh: Identity politics and 
aspirational living 
9.1 Introduction 
Having taken an in-depth look at the shifting meanings of commemorative spaces and the bazaar in 
Osh in the previous two chapters, it is now time to explore another important element of the post-
conflict cityscape - housing. As we shall see in this chapter, housing in  Osh is both a deeply 
emotive issue, and the subject of many reconstruction and development efforts in recent years, 
making it a particularly useful area of inquiry in the context of this research project. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that residents in Osh espouse a wide variety of differing views about what kind 
of housing should be built in the city. This chapter will set out some of these opinions in greater 
detail, demonstrating the tensions that exist between contrasting views of future housing. It will 
show how at the elite level the approach favoured by the Myrzakmatov municipality (the 
construction of high rise apartment blocks) has often been opposed by international donors funding 
reconstruction in the city, a trend that was first picked up on in Chapter 6.  At the non-elite level, 
this chapter will reveal a nuanced picture, where pragmatic acceptance of the need to increase the 
housing stock in the city often goes hand in hand with deeply emotional responses to housing types 
(seen by many as the repositories of group memory and identity in Osh in the way that Connerton, 
Till and others have described (Connerton 1989, Till 2008)) from within both Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
communities. Seen as a whole, the question of housing throws into relief the wider struggle over the 
future of Osh’s identity, something which has already come to the fore on several occasions in the 
preceding chapters, and will again be a key theme in Chapter 10. 
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As evidenced in Chapter 6, the logic of urban development in Osh since 2010 suggests a number of 
interventions in the sphere of housing. These interventions have been driven by three main factors. 
Firstly, they are a response to the urgent need created by the destruction of upwards of 2000 houses 
in Osh and Jalalabad cities, and surrounding villages, during the 2010 Events. In Osh city alone the 
UN counted 1462 residential properties as destroyed. Concerns regarding the harsh winter 
conditions in Kyrgyzstan (where winter temperatures usually drop below zero by the end of 
November) made the prompt reconstruction of destroyed housing all the more pressing.  
Taking a longer term perspective, the provision of housing has also been identified by municipal 
authorities as a priority in order to accommodate the continued growth of Osh’s urban population. 
The population of Osh city exploded during the Soviet period (rising from 47,149 in 1904 
(Zakharova 1997) to a little over 229,000 by 1989 (National Statistical Office of the Kyrgyz 
Republic 2009). This vast expansion can be attributed to the twin Soviet policies of forced 
sedentarisation of previously nomadic Kyrgyz communities throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, as well as the development of Osh as an industrial centre with an attendant 
workforce (Saliev 2000; Liu 2012). The city  has continued to grow in the post-Soviet era with the 
current population officially stated to be around 250,000 (National Statistical Office of the Kyrgyz 
Republic 2009), although many estimates of the city’s population rise as high as 500,000 if new 
neighbourhoods and surrounding settlements are included (World Bank 2008). The geographical 
location of the city - with the border with Uzbekistan a little way to the north, development 
restrictions linked to the UNESCO world heritage site around the Sulaiman mountain, and hilly, 
rocky ground rising to the south-east of the city - has led many to believe that the only way to 
accommodate Osh’s growing population will be to build upwards, through the construction of 
multi-storey apartment buildings.  
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Figure 26: Map showing the physical surroundings of Osh city 
(Source: GoogleMaps with author’s edits) 
As one representative of the city architecture office put it: 
“Osh is a small city, that’s why it is necessary to build multistories buildings… we have to construct 
skyward, so, as in the prosperous cities, like in the best cities… it is better to construct in Osh 
multistories buildings” (IV13, R) 
This solution would mirror the Soviet response to the same issue. Starting in the 1950s, the Soviets 
began to build residential blocks in Osh, hitting a peak in the 1970s and 80s with the construction of 
7-8 storey apartment buildings (Aliev 2000). This was not only to accommodate the city’s growing 
population, which was rising at a rate of 6.4% per annum in the 1970s, but also to erase Osh’s 
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‘Eastern’ or Islamic character seen as incompatible with Soviet socialist values. As Aliev has noted 
“The very first plan for the building and reconstruction of the city coincided with the so-called 
‘struggle with architectural excesses and vestiges of the past in the consciousness of the people’, 
especially relating to religiousness” (Aliev 2000: 119). Of course, the continued existence of 
mahalla neighbourhoods in the city centre show that this policy was not entirely successful.  
A third factor driving interventions in the sphere of housing - specifically the proposed construction 
of high rise apartment buildings - is the belief that the city today still has the appearance and 
structure (and by extension the mentality) of a village, rather than that of a modern city. This belief 
was repeatedly expressed during my research, both by individuals within or aligned with the 
municipal authorities, and by many ordinary residents. Many respondents suggested that Osh’s 
status as the ‘Southern capital’ of Kyrgyzstan was at odds with its appearance, which is more akin 
to that of a “big village” (IV03) or as one middle aged Kyrgyz man put it, a kishlak (an Uzbek word 
for a village or rural homestead): 
“If you look from the Sulaiman mountain you see kishlaks, kishlaks, kishlaks, and the multistories 
buildings, and kishlaks…so…but there is no total look of typical city blocks” (IV26, R) 
The solution to this situation is widely seen as the construction of ‘modern’ high rise buildings, akin 
to those found in Dubai, Astana or Hong Kong (IV12, IV13, IV37, IV39). So, as we shall see in the 
following section, it is possible to identify three narratives driving interventions in housing 
provision in Osh city. On the one hand, tensions between local and national government officials, 
and international donors, has informed immediate post-crisis housing provision, and resulted in the 
construction of single storey interim structures where homes were destroyed. On the other hand, 
discussions about longer term housing needs have often focused on the erection of high rise 
!227
constructions, but for two quite different reasons. For some people this represents a cautious 
acceptance of multi-storey buildings as a pragmatic response to accommodation needs in a growing 
city. For others, though, it represents an opportunity to replace traditional forms of housing they 
find troubling, even frightening. Of course the actual construction of such buildings is contingent on 
the availability of already scarce funding, but whether or not they are likely to be built in the near 
future, resident attitudes to housing types are very revealing of attitudes and aspirations within the 
city. 
9. 2 Reading the meanings of housing in Osh 
Before exploring these narratives further, though, it is of vital importance to understand that any 
such interventions in Osh take place in a context where types of housing have come to be widely 
identified with certain ethnic groups. This is primarily expressed through the concept of mahalla, 
the traditional high density, low rise residential neighbourhoods that have long given Osh its 
distinctive character when compared to other Kyrgyzstani cities, such as Bishkek. Liu has written 
extensively on the distinctive architecture and arrangement of mahalla homes, which often house 
several generations of the same family, and are built with few windows on the outside, instead 
opening onto a central courtyard (Liu 2012). These courtyards often house fruit trees, a small 
garden, and maybe some chickens. Indeed, one of my most enjoyable evenings with an Uzbek 
family in the neighbouring town of Aravan, was spent eating kovatok (stuffed vine leaves) made 
from the vines trailing above our heads, whilst the family’s teenage son repeatedly attempted to 
convince their rogue chicken to return to its pen in the corner of the courtyard. Walking through a 
mahalla neighbourhood is also  a quite different experience to that of walking through an area 
dominated by apartment blocks. The streets are more narrow, sometimes twisting, and the houses 
alongside them often decorated with beautiful, intricately carved wooden panels.  Although 
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ethnically diverse to a certain extent, the mahalla is largely inhabited by ethnic Uzbeks - indeed, 
may ethnic Kyrgyz people consider the mahalla to be a dangerous and threatening space (Liu 2012; 
IV17, IV18). Moreover, as Liu has demonstrated, mahalla neighbourhoods do more than simply 
house Uzbek communities: 
“Mahalla has a much wider meaning. It’s connected with what it means to be Uzbek. Because 
Uzbeks are a minority within the entirety of Kyrgyztsan, the mahalla becomes all the more 
important because its a place where they can be themselves, they can be Uzbek” (Liu interview by 
Solash 2012) 
This form of housing is seen as being intricately linked to the kind of social life - specifically Uzbek 
social life - that takes place and is continuously reproduced in them, then. The buildings themselves, 
and the environment they create, become repositories of memory - and therefore Uzbek identity - 
and in turn become constitutive of this very identity. To return to Nora’s famous formulation, they 
become lieux de mémoire for Osh’s Uzbek community (1996). Of course, mahalla living isn’t to 
everyone’s taste - one part Uzbek friend who was raised in a flat confided in me that she could 
never settle into mahalla life, where “everyone knows your business, what you’re wearing, where 
you’ve been!” (Field notes 04/05/13). 
On the other hand, multi-storey apartment buildings are largely - though not exclusively - identified 
as a Kyrgyz or Russian form of living. Such buildings were mainly erected during the Soviet era, 
when the rapid industrialisation of Osh meant that the city’s workforce rapidly swelled, and needed 
to be accommodated. This has created another way of reading the city’s history. One middle-aged 
resident explained to me “you can learn the city just looking at its constructions”, going on to 
explain how to tell the difference between different eras of Soviet construction, since “the 
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Khruschevka [apartment block built in the Khruschev era] is a bit narrow, and built from brick”, 
whereas a Brezhnev era building, or “Brezhnevka” is “a bit wider, and built from reinforced 
concrete” (IV26, R). Oftentimes the construction of a factory would then necessitate the 
construction of a residential neighbourhood around it, where its workers would reside - one resident 
of the Yugo Vostok neighbourhood recalled how the forest of mulberry trees that previously covered 
that area were cut down in the 1970s to make way for workers at the nearby silk factory (IV27). 
This area is now almost completely Kyrgyz, with the exception of some Russian and Tatar families, 
and prized in the summer for the cool breezes that rise from the river running alongside it. 
Figure 27. A new apartment block in Osh,decorated with a ‘tunduk’ symbol (Source: Author’s own) 
This legacy of residential development in Osh also produces effects on the spatial distribution of 
housing types in Osh. Many of the largest mahalla neighbourhoods sit in the ancient heart of the 
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city, around the base of the Sulaiman mountain and around the bazaar. Zakharova describes this 
“old city” as being “laid out like an amphitheatre” around the mountain,  gradually spreading out 
towards the river Ak Bura’s flood plain (Zakharova 1997; 64). Following Russian annexation of this 
part of modern day Kyrgyztsan in 1876, the ‘new’ or ‘Russian’ town was constructed along the 
river Ak-Bura, especially towards the South-East,  and the three main streets running parallel to the 
river were set out (Ibid). These three parallel streets, today named Kurmanjan Datka, Lenin and 
Masalieva, continue to form the back bone of central Osh’s transport infrastructure.  
Figure 28. Soviet era buildings in the city centre (Source: Author’s own) 
Soviet era construction thus mainly sprung up around the edges of this Uzbek/Russian core, for 
example in neighbourhoods such as Zapadny, KhBK and Yugo Vostok. That is not to say, however, 
that the Soviet city planners were completely averse to demolishing traditional homes in the city 
centre to make room for new buildings when they saw fit. One of Osh’s largest mahallas is a result 
of just such an intervention. Situated on a hill top above the Yugo Vostok neighbourhood, in the 
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South East of the city, On Adir (also known as the Amir Temur micro district) was originally 
created to rehouse ethnic Uzbek families whose city centre neighbourhood was bulldozed in Soviet 
times (Liu 2012). 
Since the end of the Soviet era a third type of housing has increasingly made its presence felt in 
Osh’s urban landscape. Novostroiki, or new-build, houses have sprung up in numerous 
neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the city, such as Ak Tilek in the west. Commonly built by 
Kyrgyz families, these homes are often not linked up to the city’s water and electricity networks, 
and lack good road links. The World Bank, which has implemented a programme focussing on 
improving living standards in novostroiki in Osh and Bishkek, estimates that around 40,000 people 
currently live in one of Osh’s seven novostroiki  neighbourhoods constructed since 1991 (World 
Bank 2008). Interestingly, although the World Bank identifies the novostroiki as areas of deprivation 
in need of access to basic services, Osh residents often referred to them as aspirational, with one 
interviewee excitedly informing me that her family was building a home there (IV19), whilst 
another disparagingly noted “the rich guys live there” (IV16, E). 
It is clear, then, that the ethnic identification and spatial distribution of housing types in Osh mean 
that interventions in the sphere of housing reconstruction, especially in the wake of a traumatic 
experience such as the 2010 Events, are likely to be characterised by complexity and contestation.  
  
This research has uncovered a number of instances where such intricacy has emerged: firstly in 
contestation between the municipal authorities and international actors (and later Bishkek backed 
actors) regarding what kind of housing should be reconstructed after the Events, and where. 
Secondly, non-elite conversations about housing reveal a complicated mix of pragmatism and deep 
emotional attachment that cannot be reduced to the simple message that Uzbeks only want to build 
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and live in mahalla housing and Kyrgyz all want to build and live in high rise apartment blocks. 
Finally, the municipality’s apparent commitment to supporting multi-storey housing raises the 
question of what impact this could have on Osh’s distinctive cultural and social identity, which is in 
no small measure remembered through the presence of mahalla neighbourhoods at the heart of the 
city. 
9.3 Elite level tensions 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the immediate post-crisis response of the authorities in Kyrgyzstan to the 
destruction of homes and other buildings in Osh was to create a body, the State Directorate for 
Reconstruction and Development (SDRD), responsible for overseeing and implementing 
reconstruction in the city. The SDRD stated from the outset that it would take into account certain 
“key principles” advanced in the city master planning process for Osh and Jalalabad - that is the 
respect of the “red zone” within which development should not be allowed to occur, and a general 
preference for the construction of multi-storey housing (Satybaldiev 2010). This became clear as 
early as 6 weeks after the Events, when the head of the SDRD (Zhantoro Satybaldiev, who went on 
to become the country’s Prime Minister from September 2012 to March 2014) set out his 
organisation’s priorities for the reconstruction of Osh and Jalabad, identifying the “urgent 
rehabilitation and construction of housing for the affected people”, and going on to underline that 
“we are already starting to construct blocks of flat, which will be offered to the affected, depending 
on their choice” (Ibid). Interestingly, Satybaldiev also appears to acknowledge the issue of 
ethnicisation of housing types Osh, when he affirms that “the interests of all population groups for 
construction of individual houses will be taken into account independently of the 
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nationality” (Ibid).  An interview with another former SDRD employee (the body has now been 15
dissolved) confirmed that at the beginning of its work in Osh, it was expected that they would pull 
down the damaged houses in the city centre to make way for multi-storey buildings, as envisaged in 
the city Masterplan: 
“There were a lot of people who [we were] told not to rebuild their houses, but to give them lands in 
a new district, in order to build on these places multi-storey buildings. Why did this question arise? 
Because all the burned down houses were situated in the centre of the city, the centre of the city is 
traditionally the ancient part of the city and generally old houses were burned (…)  they were built 
in an ethnic-traditional style, so, so called ‘Mahalla’, but it is situated right in the centre of the city, 
and according to the new general plan these houses would be moved or rebuilt” (IV14, R). 
Media reports from the time suggest that the construction of multi-storey housing blocks was also 
part of a somewhat clumsy attempt on the part of the municipal authorities in Osh to enforce the 
creation of multiethnic neighbourhoods, by rehousing Uzbek and Kyrgyz families affected by the 
violence in the same housing blocks (Orange 2010, Feifer 2010). On one level this can be read as an 
attempt to ‘build back better’, to take advantage of the moment of opportunity that emerges in the 
post-crisis city (as described by Amartunga and Haigh (2011) and Charlesworth (2006))  to rebuild 
it in a way that addresses the ethnic divisions that lay at the heart of the Events. However, whilst 
this aim may seem laudable at first glance, it is far from the “resolver” strategy of reconstruction 
advanced by Bollens (1998). In relying solely on an architectural vernacular and housing type so 
strongly identified with one group of residents this approach fails to “facilitate mutual 
empowerment and tolerable urban co-existence” through these new constructions (Bollens 1998: 
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 Note that Satybaldiev’s use of the term ‘nationality’ here is in line with its Soviet era use (as 15
discussed briefly in Chapter 4) denoting ethnic identity rather than national citizenship.
731-2). Instead, the resulting policy appears closer to a “partisan” strategy, favouring those residents 
who have already embraced apartment living and leaving no room for mahallas. 
And yet, the same ex-SDRD worker went on to explain that his organisation had in fact favoured a 
different reconstruction strategy. Taking into account factors such as the importance of private 
property, human rights and what he called the “ethnic element” of the situation, as well as a 
pragmatic concern to provide viable housing before the onset of winter, the SDRD chose to focus its 
immediate efforts on rebuilding individual temporary homes on the exact sites where houses had 
been burned down (IV14). 
A representative of an international organisation involved in the reconstruction effort further 
elaborated on this approach, explaining that alongside the urgent need to construct shelters capable 
of withstanding a harsh Kyrgyz winter, there lay a second concern underpinning their approach to 
reconstruction: the wish to “ground” the Uzbek community, to prevent them from being driven out 
from the centre of Osh by quickly providing them with a solid presence on the site of their former 
homes (IV56, E). This introduced what the representative saw as a “protection” element to the 
reconstruction work, which was underlined by the decision to build shelters from bricks rather then 
other, more temporary, materials that would usually be employed in such a situation (IV56). Such 
an approach betrays a consciousness of not only the functional, but also the symbolic role of these 
buildings. As explored in Chapter 2, the “totemic” aspect of certain buildings - the way in which 
they signify the presence of a certain community in a certain place and space - helps to explain why 
they are attacked in times of conflict (Bevan 2007; 8). Building brick shelters on the exact spot 
where homes were destroyed, then, kept a space open to rebuild these physical markers of 
‘Uzbekness’ in central parts of the city. 
This approach quite clearly diverges from the municipality’s vision of high rise buildings rising 
from the ashes of damaged neighbourhoods, however, and as such led to a certain level of tension 
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between the municipality and international organisations and the SDRD. A representative of another 
international organisation involved in this process noted the many “roadblocks” thrown up by the 
Mayor’s office during the construction of these shelters (IV11, E), whilst the SDRD employee 
remarked wryly that “the city municipality doesn’t like me, because I criticise a lot” (IV14, R). 
Certainly one year on from the Events, Osh’s chief architect complained to the press that “90%” of 
the reconstructed homes violated the city plan, going on to express their concern about their ability 
to withstand seismic stress (Kloop 2011) – an accusation denied by representatives of international 
organisations in my interviews. At the end of the day, however, the approach supported by 
international organisations and donors, as well as the SDRD, won out over the municipal 
authorities, most likely because these groups held the purse strings for most reconstruction and 
development activities in the city. 
The differing approaches to reconstruction of the municipal authorities, SDRD and international 
donors reveal the tensions and complexity that lie at the heart of Charlesworth’s vision of the 
“architect as potential peace builder” (Charlesworth 2006:1). In the case of post-Events Osh all 
actors have explained their position in these terms, whether by trying to enforce ethnic mixity via 
multi-storey buildings, attempting to protect the right to remain in the city of communities 
perceived to be at risk or, as was shown in the previous chapter, through Myrzakmatov’s aim of 
building a strong ethnic Kyrgyz identity into the fabric of the city. All can be argued to be 
responding to the challenge of building back better, of using the (re)built environment to promote 
peace, and yet in practice these approaches clash, even undermine, each other and have led to no 
little mistrust between some of the main actors involved in reconstruction in Osh. 
So, if there exists a certain level of tension among the ‘elite’ level actors involved in shaping the 
future of housing in Osh, what is the view from the street level? Here, my research has unearthed a 
complex mix of idealism and pragmatism regarding the city’s future, coloured by individual choices 
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(too often overlooked in discourses about housing in Osh that sometimes betray universalising 
tendencies) and highly emotional responses to certain forms of housing. 
9.4 The view from the street 
One of the most striking messages to emerge from my non-elite interviews was that the most 
common hope for the future development of Osh, expressed by residents I interviewed, was the 
construction of high rise buildings. Respondents were not directly asked about building types (or at 
least, not until they themselves had first opened up this line of discussion), but instead largely 
expressed this opinion in response to the questions ‘if you could change Osh in the future, what 
would you change?’ and its variant ‘If you were the Mayor of Osh, what would you change in the 
city?’.  Given that I ensured my respondents were broadly representative of the ethnic make up of 16
Osh, such striking support for the construction of multi-storey buildings in the city meant that a 
significant number of ethnic Uzbek respondents had expressed their support for this proposal. 
Indeed, of the 14 non-elite respondents who spoke specifically of the need to construct high rise 
buildings in the city, 5 were ethnic Uzbeks, one was ethnic Russian, and the rest ethnic Kyrgyz.  
Respondents gave a wide range of reasons for supporting the development of multi-storey housing 
blocks in the city. Some, for example, pointed to practical concerns such as the growing population 
of Osh, or to the perceived comfort and convenience of apartment living compared to the time 
consuming upkeep of a private house and garden (IV34), as evidence of the need to grow the city’s 
housing stock upwards. As one young Kyrgyz man put it; 
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 As discussed in Chapter 6, the Mayor is widely perceived in the city to be the driving force of 16
construction in Osh, and responsible for decisions about the city’s future development. Having 
heard this narrative multiple times during my fieldwork I began to incorporate it into this question, 
especially if the initial way of formulating the question  - ‘if you could change Osh in the future, 
what would you change?’ - did not elicit a response. There were no noticeable differences in the 
types of answers prompted by the two questions that would lead me to believe they were 
understood differently from one another.
 “you know, our population is growing, and we need more places to live, more buildings, and 
if we built high scrapers (sic) we can like, er, put in them more people” (IV20, E) 
Others saw in high rise buildings the chance to improve the aesthetic quality of the city (“our city 
will be very beautiful, with very high buildings, with beautiful houses” IV18), notably by making it 
appear more modern. In this perspective, the current aesthetic quality of Osh is unfavourably 
compared with a vision of modern, high rise buildings akin to those found in Dubai, Astana or Hong 
Kong (IV12, IV13, IV37, IV39). Such a view led some residents, such as a young Russian woman 
living in an apartment building in the centre of Osh, to state; 
 “As I consider myself a modern person, I think that it’s ok to build just multi-storey building 
because we have no, just er, historical architectures (…) we have no, just, historical structures, no 
historical monuments. I think that it’s ok to create something new” (IV49, E) 
As we shall see, such a view of Osh as a city without historical architecture is one that contrasts 
strongly with the views of other city residents (notably from the Uzbek community, but also from 
older, well educated Kyrgyz respondents), who expressed deep attachment to mahalla housing as 
the physical proof of Osh’s status as an ancient city. 
Interestingly, one respondent - the head of a research institute in the city - suggested that building 
high rise apartment blocks would play a peace building role in Osh by forcing ethnic groups to live 
together, echoing the policy proposed by the municipal authorities in the immediate aftermath of the 
June Events (IV24). In sum, then, the broad support for multi-storey constructions expressed by a 
number of Osh residents is explained by them in a number of ways: They are more modern, more 
convenient, necessary to house the city’s growing population, and are even seen by some as a tool 
to build a more harmonious society.  
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9. 4.1 Uzbek pragmatism 
Dig a little deeper, though, and this support is revealed to be more nuanced. Nearly all of the Uzbek 
respondents who proposed the construction of multi-storey apartment buildings qualified this in 
some way. One respondent suggested these buildings should be built in Zapadny, an area in the 
West of the city which used to be quite multi-ethnic, but has become more markedly Kyrgyz since 
the June Events, and is already home to numerous Soviet era apartment blocks.  Another suggested 
it would be “better to build the city, how I understand, multi-storey buildings around the city, and in 
the middle kind of these, you know (gestures to low level houses outside the window)” (IV22, E). 
This idea was supported by my Uzbek translator, Daniyar, in a later conversation. As a self 
proclaimed supporter of all things focussed on progress and business development, and impatient to 
see Osh develop into a  modern city, Daniyar was at pains to ensure I understood that such progress 
couldn’t occur at the expense of the traditional mahalla neighbourhoods around the base of 
Sulaiman-Too. Here, he explained, the Soviets had already determined that the earth was 
seismically unsuitable for multi-storey construction. Better that such buildings be reserved for a 
district like KhBK. (Field notes 15/05/13) In short, where Uzbek respondents supported the 
construction of high rise housing blocks, this was almost immediately qualified as something that 
should occur away from the mahalla - either on the outskirts of town, or in a neighbourhood already 
characterised by this type of construction. Most importantly, high rise buildings were very much 
seen as a pragmatic solution to complement existing low rise and mahalla housing, not to replace it.  
Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine many of the residents I spoke to standing aside to let their 
traditional homes be demolished, given the deep emotional attachment many of them expressed. 
“This is the house of my father, and his father before him” explained one man “I don’t want to leave 
here” (IV37, U). Others cast doubt as to whether they would be able to live in a flat, saying they 
were too accustomed to living in a house (IV39), or that living in a house is integral to an Uzbek 
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way of life, because “our nation, our people, need more rooms and yards in their house. They are 
used to live in houses like this, and I think it would be difficult to live in the multi-storey 
houses” (IV22, E). As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the mahalla is more than just a 
collection of houses, it a repository of memory and practice which is constitutive of Uzbek identity 
in Osh, and gives this identity a sense of stability and permanence (Liu 2012, Connerton 1989). 
It was interesting to note, however, that not every Uzbek respondent expressed this point of view. 
One female respondent told me that she wouldn’t mind living in a flat in order to take advantage of 
the “modern conveniences” it contained, and suggested this might be especially good for young 
people (IV34, U). A young female Uzbek friend of mine echoed this sentiment a few days later, 
saying that her busy work schedule made living in a flat a more attractive option to her. Again, she 
went on to say that she would like to see more high rise construction in the city, as long as it didn’t 
impinge too much on historical city centre neighbourhoods (Field notes 24/04/13). Women, 
especially younger daughters and daughters-in-law (Kelin) who have moved in with their husband’s 
family, are expected to shoulder the burden of ensuring exacting standards of cleanliness and 
tidiness are maintained in traditional houses (especially in close knit mahalla neighbourhoods, 
where any lapse in standards could immediately be remarked upon by neighbours). Is it any 
surprise, then, that it is these women who are most inclined to view apartment living as an 
opportunity to embrace ‘modern convenience’, and reduce the amount of housework they are 
expected to undertake every day, often on top of jobs and childcare responsibilities? Conversely, 
young men that I spoke to, such as Daniyar or Sajrafuddin, a student in the faculty of languages at 
Osh State University, seemed the most adamant that they would not want to live in high rise 
housing (Field notes 15/05/13, 23/04/13). Of course, given the traditional division of labour in the 
home, it is unlikely the burden of cooking and cleaning the house fell on them, so the appeal of the 
modern conveniences of apartment living was probably lessened. 
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9. 4.2. Replacing the ‘dangerous’ mahalla  
Looking more carefully at Kyrgyz and Russian responses that support high rise construction is also 
quite revealing. Whilst respondents offered a number of pragmatic reasons to explain their hopes of 
building multi-storey buildings in Osh (as mentioned above, these reasons include the perceived 
modernity and convenience of apartments, as well as being a practical response to the pressing 
needs of the city’s growing population), another theme emerged through these conversations. If 
some members of the Uzbek community I spoke to lent their qualified support to this type of 
construction as a practical measure which could complement, but not replace, existing housing in 
Osh, the inverse was true of many of the Kyrgyz and Russian residents I spoke to. For a significant 
number of these residents the construction of multi-storey buildings in Osh went hand in hand with 
the destruction of traditional low rise neighbourhoods in the city centre – the mahalla. This 
narrative is informed by a perception of the mahalla as a dangerous or frightening space amongst 
many non-Uzbek residents (Liu, 2012), and therefore one which they would be happy to remove 
from the cityscape. Whilst one elderly Kyrgyz man (the same person that had suggested that making 
communities live together in apartment buildings would build ethnic unity) warned me of the 
criminal activities that took place in the mahallas (“these mahallas, for example On Adir district, 
drugs were found there also” (IV24, R)),  another young Kyrgyz woman, Begimay, confided her 17
fear of the mahalla, saying; 
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 Although reliable crime statistics are difficult to come by in Osh, especially given the mono-ethnic 17
nature of the police force in the city and the prevalence of corruption in law enforcement agencies, 
contacts within the OECD policing mission in Osh confirmed that illegality is no more commonplace 
within mahalla neighbourhoods than in the rest of the city.
 “I’m afraid, there are a lot of mahallas, like Lyuli [a term for gypsy communities] mahalla, 
other gypsy people live there, Lyuli, who are like asking, begging the money. Yeah, I’m afraid to go 
there, I don’t need to go there” (IV17, E) 
The conflation of the mahalla space with the presence of the Lyuli community here is revealing. 
The Lyuli, or Mugat, people are a Central Asian gypsy community subject to a vast amount of 
discrimination and marginalisation in Osh, who largely live in closed communities such as the 
Yangi mahalla on the outskirts of the city (Erkinov, 2009). Indeed, local friends would often warn 
me sternly to beware of Lyuli ‘beggars’ or ‘thieves’ in the market, and most weeks I would see 
stallholders aggressively chase Lyuli children away from their stalls. For Begimay, the mahalla 
space was so threatening, so foreign, that she appeared to see all mahallas as inhabited by this most 
hated and marginalised of groups, and not by someone who could easily be sitting next to her in one 
of her classes at the local University. Begimay was certainly not alone in expressing this fear of the 
mahalla – respondents as diverse as a 14 year old school girl and a University lecturer in her 40s 
admitted they never visited “Uzbek streets” or well known mahallas such as the sprawling hilltop 
community of On Adir, because they were afraid of these places. Another young Kyrgyz student, 
Ruslan, had a simple, more final, solution to what he perceived as one of the city’s problems; “I 
would say destroy mahallas (…) because I like skyscrapers, and I am standing for a modern 
city” (IV20, E). Ruslan was also troubled by the presence of the mahalla for its anti-modern 
connotations, which ran counter to the bright modern city he felt Osh should become. 
One of the most striking ways that debates about the mahallas would often be expressed was 
through a seemingly wider discussion about the urban versus rural. Across Osh people use their 
discourse to privilege the urban experience, depicted as superior by dint of its perceived inherent 
modernity, over the the rural experience, commonly described as backwards, old fashioned, and anti 
modern. This dialectic was demonstrated to me early in my stay in Osh, as Cholpon (a young 
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student in Osh State University’s language faculty) ruefully explained how students born in Osh 
would tease her for being ‘aildik’ - from the village - since she had come to live and study in the 
city from a small village a couple of hours away. To be aildik, Cholpon explained, was to be 
backwards, unsophisticated,  and less able to speak Russian (a mark of having received a good 
education) then their urban counterparts. Indeed, Cholpon would rarely speak Russian with anyone 
other than eager foreign visitors such as myself, for fear that she would make mistakes that would 
show her up as a villager. The city, another group of students in Osh would tell me, is more civilised 
and more educated than the village, a modern place, with better services and greater access to job 
opportunities (see IV03 focus group). 
But whilst this dialectic of the modern city versus the anti-modern village may be widely accepted 
in the city, this narrative diverges when it comes to the character and status of Osh itself. Whilst 
some city residents identify Osh as a centre of modernity that stands as a bulwark against its 
problematic anti-modern rural hinterland, others are dismayed that the city itself is indistinguishable 
from the villages that surround it, and is desperate need of intervention if it is to become truly 
modern. 
“You know who are more prone to violence?” asked Azamat, “It’s the people who live in villages”. 
City dwellers, he went on to reassure, were “more tolerant, more open minded” (IV16). Like many 
in the city, Azamat blamed the worst excesses of the 2010 violence on an influx of people from the 
villages. To him it was simply inconceivable that the residents of cosmopolitan Osh, the second 
largest city in Kyrgyzstan, would turn on each other in such devastating fashion. This was a refrain 
expressed on numerous occasions, from residents keen to explain that the attackers in June 2010 
were ne mestnye - not local - but had travelled into the city from surrounding rural regions such as 
Alai with the express intention of carrying out violent acts (IV28, IV29). Seen in this perspective, 
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the June events are as much an attack by the rural against the urban, as they are an episode of inter-
communal urban violence. This in itself mirrors some explanations of urbicide, in which violence 
against the city is seen as the revenge of the ‘backwards’ countryside against the progressive, 
modern countryside. Of course, as explored further in Chapter 3, whilst this narrative may be 
compelling in its simplicity, it risks obscuring the political aims of urbicide, such as the destruction 
of spaces which create the potential for heterogeneity and urban mixity (Coward 2009). 
One local human rights advocate elaborated on this problem further, suggesting that  inter-
communal peace building efforts in Osh should take into account the residents of rural areas, who 
were increasingly coming into the city in search of work. These people, she explained, were 
uneducated, and unused to the multiculturalism they encountered in the city, which made them more 
easily incited to violence (IV29). In these accounts, then, Osh was presented, whether accurately or 
not, as a ‘modern' place, home to a reasonable and educated population used to living in peace with 
one another. The countryside surrounding the city was presented, conversely, as an uncultured and 
backwards place. This thinking, it should be noted, was very much in line with the view of the city 
promoted in the Soviet era as the home of modernity, and the space in which modern Soviet citizens 
would be produced through education and participation in the workforce. The city, then, was 
presented by some residents of Osh as being under threat from the uneducated, unreasonable and 
potentially violent inhabitants of the villages around it, who needed to be educated in the norms of 
the modern city if they were to successfully participate in its life. During the course of my stay in 
Osh many respondents made reference - sometimes affectionately, sometimes with malice - to the 
rural ethnic Kyrgyz as having “come from the mountains” (IV41) or “come in from the 
villages” (IV30), making them less civilised - and potentially more aggressive - than their urban 
counterparts. Given that rural to urban migration is ongoing at a considerable rate in Osh (as it is in 
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the rest of Kyrgyzstan) it is easy to see why some residents of the city felt uneasy about the 
potential impact of influx of rural populations on Osh’s modernity. 
However, in the opposing narrative the border between Osh as a modern city and the backwards 
rural space that surrounds it is much less clear. According to this view Osh is problematic precisely 
because it is “just a big village” (IV03). To return to Sagyndyk’s earlier complaint about the view 
that greets those who climb to the top of the city’s iconic mountain, it’s all “kishlaks, kishlaks, 
kishlaks” and “no total look of typical city blocks” (IV26). Sagyndyk’s consternation arose from the 
fact that the aesthetic quality he and many other Osh residents associated with the vision of a 
modern city (that of regular ranks of high rise buildings) was apparently being stymied by the 
continued presence in the centre of Osh of the mahalla. Through the mahallas the rural had invaded 
the urban, holding back the development of modern Osh. No surprise, then, that the municipal 
authorities favoured changes that would “permit a gradual change from the ‘village structure’ into 
an urban way of life and into business of a contemporary nature” (Renaissance of Osh 2013). This 
narrative was neatly summed up by a senior academic in the Osh Technological University, who 
had himself been involved in city planning efforts for a number of years: 
 “We want Osh to be a modern city, and to build high buildings (…) I guess she [note- 
myself] has seen in what condition is our city, the central part of our city? So most of the buildings 
are one storey buildings, which were built 50-60 years ago, right? These buildings look like rural 
buildings, right? We also want that the central part of Osh city, being an ancient city in Central 
Asia, so, will be built up, the same as in the Arab Emirates, in Astana, and European cities” (IV12, 
author’s emphasis) 
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Taken together, these highly emotional responses suggest that for some people the construction of 
high rise housing in Osh would serve a second purpose – not only providing housing space that 
meets the diverse hopes of residents described earlier in this chapter, but as a way of destroying 
spaces that some residents perceive as threatening, dangerous and foreign. The continued presence 
of these buildings at the heart of Osh makes possible the presence of a troubling ‘other’ (portrayed 
here as criminal, threatening, foreign or old fashioned) that only the removal of these buildings can 
rectify. 
Again, this is not to say that this is a unanimous message – one middle aged Kyrgyz man asked me 
worriedly “how shall we prove that the city is ancient? How is it possible without history?” when 
we began to discuss plans to knock down the mahallas (IV25, R). To him the mahallas 
demonstrated Osh’s unique and ancient historical identity, without which the city would be like any 
other in Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps more interesting, though, are the houses that have sprung up around 
Osh in recent years, which point to another aspiration regarding housing in the city, and one that is 
not acknowledged in the simple binary of high rise housing versus mahalla housing. Passing 
through the outskirts of the city on the road from Bishkek for the first time, I was immediately 
struck by the large numbers of new houses standing part finished by the roadside. As explored 
earlier in this chapter, these ‘novostroiki’ homes, instantly recognisable by their shiny roofs and 
unblemished brickwork, have sprung up all around Osh and other large cities in Kyrgyzstan. Their 
presence reflects the fact that although many see the construction of multi-storey buildings in the 
city as a necessary step, living in a private house remains an important aspiration for many Kyrgyz 
people. As two young university teachers I interviewed explained: 
 “R1: House is better! 
 R2: Than flat, of course! 
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 R1: You have your own yard, and you have your own small garden.. 
 R2: And orchard also, garden, I prefer garden, er how to say? Garden kitchen? 
 I: Oh yes, a kitchen garden? 
R2: Kitchen garden! Because you can grow everything, and when you choose something, 
when you cook something from your own kitchen garden, it is just... sweet, yes, tastier.” 
                   (IV19, E) 
Another respondent, a teacher in the same University, told me with pride that she and her husband 
had recently moved from a flat in KhBK district to a house they had built in the western suburb of 
Ak Tilek (IV18). These women expressed a sense of pride about living in  a house instead of a flat, 
and the numbers of novostroiki homes springing up in neighbourhoods such as Ak Tilek suggest they 
are not alone in this aspiration. Interestingly, another neighbourhood marked by the presence of 
large private homes is the wealthy Residencia, so called because the President’s summer residence is 
situated there, along with the offices of most of the international organisations operating in Osh. 
This part of the city, with its large, leafy homes set behind high outer walls, is situated in the central 
south-west of Osh, and was saw no homes destroyed during the June Events. Home to the city’s 
wealthiest residents, this is the lifestyle to which many ordinary Kyrgyz aspire, and which many 
novostroiki are replicating to some extent (what one international worker in Osh described as 2-3 
storied “mansion boxes” surrounded by a wall (IV05, E)). It serves as a salient reminder that 
ethnicity is far from only factor affecting people’s housing choices and aspirations – to overlook 
questions such as wealth and socio-economic status risks trapping the debate in a dangerously 
deterministic view of life in Osh. Similarly, failing to acknowledge the presence and significance of 
novostroiki neighbourhoods, presents a falsely reductive view of housing options in the city.   
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 Even though at first glance, then, my data would appear to show quite a broad level of support for 
proposals to construct high rise buildings in Osh, taking in a variety of ages, genders and ethnic 
groups, a closer look at the data reveals a more nuanced story. As discussed above, many (although 
not all) in the Uzbek community seem keen to continue living in traditional low rise housing, 
synonymous with mahalla neighbourhoods. However, in giving qualified support to the 
development of multi-storey housing as long as it doesn’t entail the destruction of their homes, 
Uzbek community members also demonstrated their hopes regarding the future development of 
Osh, and an acknowledgement that some construction will be necessary in order to achieve this 
future. This pragmatism is tempered with a deep emotional attachment to mahalla living, and the 
conviction that Osh’s future should not come at an unbearable cost to their way of life, expressed 
through mahalla living. On the other hand, similar pragmatic reasons for supporting the 
construction of apartment blocks expressed by Kyrgyz residents are accented by another deeply 
emotional narrative about housing types. This narrative expresses fear and discomfort over the 
presence of mahallas – perceived as foreign, threatening, dangerous – in the city centre, which the 
proposed high rise buildings would erase from the cityscape, rendering it safe. That said, it is 
imperative to remember that these narratives are in no way unitary, and that there are other vectors 
at play in the discussion about housing types and the future of Osh than just the so-called ethnic 
question. As touched on above, it seems likely that wealth and social class also play a significant 
role in this conversation, and one that would merit further research. 
9.5 Analysis - a slow urbicide? 
Talking about housing in Osh pulls together actors operating at different levels, then, including 
local, national and international government representatives, humanitarian actors and local 
residents, who also draw on a variety of allegiances and identities depending on their ethnicity, 
socio-economic status, age, gender and much more.  Trying to unpack the different narratives being 
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deployed by these diverse actors in conversations about housing amply demonstrates the complex 
political, emotional and aesthetic context in which interventions in the urban fabric of Osh occur. 
One common thread that runs through many of these interventions, though, is how certain types of 
housing have come to represent the identity of a certain group – and by extension the identity of 
Osh as a city – and what it might mean to change this. The notion of the mutually sustaining links 
between collective memory, group identity and the buildings and places that perpetuate and lend 
permanence to these memories and identities is a theme that has run through this investigation, and 
one that comes to the fore again with regards to housing. 
As Liu has eloquently demonstrated, traditional mahalla neighbourhoods have come to serve as a 
lieux de mémoire for the largely Uzbek communities that live in them, and this has consequences 
for the way many ethnic Uzbek residents see the future development of the city. Although 
respondents I spoke with often supported the construction of high rise buildings to accommodate 
Osh’s rising population, they also stipulated that this should not take place at the expense of 
mahalla houses. To destroy this way of living, it would seem, would destroy a central element of 
Uzbek memory and identity in Osh. To those living outside the mahallas, these areas are also often 
highly emotionally charged spaces, perceived by many residents as frightening, foreign places. To 
these respondents, mainly ethnic Kyrgyz or Russians, the construction of high rise buildings would 
not only be a practical solution, but a way of removing this threatening spaces from the city once 
and for all. Crucially, it would also remove the physical vestiges of Osh’s non-Kyrgyz heritage from 
the urban landscape, and prevent them from being rebuilt in the future, by occupying these spaces 
with a different kind of architecture. Both the memory of the city’s multicultural past, and the 
possibility of its multicultural future could thus be written out of the city. In the previous chapter of 
this thesis it became clear that Mayor Myrzakmatov had been attempting to build an ethnic Kyrgyz 
identity into the landscape of Osh through the construction of a number of new monuments. In 
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contrast, this chapter suggests that some city residents supported an approach to housing in the city 
(one that had the support of the Myrzakmatov municipality) which would build a more Kyrgyz 
identity into the city via the destruction of problematic mahalla spaces. Both can perhaps be seen as 
part of a process of ‘Kyrgyzification’ of space in Osh, and a rejection of the Uzbek identity and 
history that the mahalla testifies to. As Megoran has noted, Kyrgyz nationalism is “profoundly 
insecure about the country’s survival”, therefore it should not be so surprising that the presence of 
this non-Kyrgyz space at the heart of the country’s second city is perceived as threatening by so 
many residents (Megoran 2012: 5). Remove this space, then, and the threat to Kyrgyz identity is 
removed also. As Bevan reminds us, this process is all the more powerful since it applies not only to 
the present, but to the material evidence of the past, to memories of belonging (Bevan 2006). 
Housing interventions in Osh’s urban fabric are universally couched in terms of improving the city, 
and yet this research shows that the preferred approach of the Myrzakmatov municipality, which 
has a broad level of support amongst ordinary people, has the potential to undermine what Coward 
has called “the existential quality that defines urbanity” - heterogeneity, or the sharing of space by 
different groups (Coward 2008; 54). That is to say, the heterogenous nature of Osh, to which the 
diverse housing types in the city bear witness, is an essential element of its successful identity as a 
city, and one that is at risk from such interventions. As seen above, such a concern seems to 
motivate some city residents (as well as international donors) who are keen to preserve these 
traditional housing types, in order to preserve Osh’s unique history and identity. The unease 
(sometimes explicitly stated, sometimes implicitly) underpinning many objections to the 
replacement of mahalla neighbourhoods with multi-storey housing is that the municipality’s post-
conflict reconstruction and urban development efforts might achieve through town planning what 
the violent mobs of the 2010 Events began - the erasure of Osh’s physical proof of a heterogeneity 
largely symbolised by its Uzbek population, a kind of slow urbicide. Weizman has poignantly 
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described way urban planning policy has been used in just this way to isolate and minimise 
Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, describing them as “transformed into an archipelago of 
small islands of conjured ‘authenticity’, within an ocean of Jewish construction” (Weizman 2007: 
51). Were the Myrzakmatov municipality able to follow through their plans of erecting high rise 
blocks across the heart of Osh, the remaining mahallas of Osh could be reduced to just such a fate. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion - Building Back Better? 
10.1 Introduction 
This investigation began by advancing one understanding of the June 2010 violence in Osh as an 
attack against the plurality at the heart of the city, both literally and symbolically. Taking its cue 
from Pullan and Baillie (2013), Coward (2010) and Bevan (2006) it categorised the urban violence 
that took place in Osh as violence committed against the city - against the diversity that it both 
symbolises and makes possible - rather than simply in the city. Taking this approach meant 
understanding the reconstruction that followed the violence in the same way; as a process with 
symbolic as well as practical significance (Charlesworth 2006). It went on to pose a number of 
questions central to this research project. It asked how post-conflict reconstruction took place in 
Osh between 2010 and 2013? This question sought to pin down exactly what type of projects were 
undertaken, how they were implemented, and which actors were responsible for rebuilding the city. 
It then questioned how should this reconstruction should be characterised - was it a continuation of 
the violence against the city carried out during the Events, only this time via what Graham (2004) 
termed the “dark side” of urban planning (p. 34)? Or have these interventions been intended as a 
curative riposte to this violence in the vein of Charlesworth’s peacebuilding architect (2006), aiming 
to safeguard the plurality that that was threatened by the violence? Moreover, is it possible that in 
the highly fluid post-conflict context a new arrangement of plurality was being inscribed in Osh’s 
urban fabric, as traumatic experiences were woven into a new commemorative narrative of the city 
(Bell 2003). Were the construction and reconstruction projects explored over the previous four 
chapters then part of this ongoing process? Finally, it asked what can the notion of collective 
memory reveal about the way the city has changed, and how this has affected city residents? 
Building on an understanding of collective memory, place and identity as being inextricably linked, 
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this investigation explored this relationship against the backdrop of Osh’s changing cityscape in 
order to shed new light on the way urban (re)construction was being experienced by the people who 
live and work in the city.  
Nine chapters later, a number of key findings can be drawn from the data collected for this thesis, 
and will be discussed in more detail in this final chapter. Firstly, the built environment in Osh is 
saturated with memory, and changes in urban space there (both those that had already taken place, 
and those that seemed likely to) are affecting and being affected by this. Secondly, in line with the 
theories advanced by Foucault (1980) and Hirst (2005), the urban environment in Osh is being 
marshalled as a resource for power by a number of groups, and this process is all the more visible - 
and urgent - for taking place in the post-conflict moment. Finally, all three characterisations of the 
reconstruction that has taken place in Osh were observed. Different actors are intervening in 
different ways, and with different underlying motivations, leading to a layered and complicated 
vision of reconstruction in Osh. This complex picture of reconstruction has a number of 
consequences for investigations into the practice of post-conflict reconstruction more widely, as 
well as for residents of Osh, and raises the question of what does it actually mean to ‘build back 
better’.  
10.2 Summing up the empirics 
This investigation has uncovered a number of important points, which range from the big picture of 
developments in Osh’s urban fabric in recent years, to the fine grained detail of the way these 
developments have been experienced by the city’s residents. Taken together they represent a 
compelling picture of the content, motivation and impact of the physical reconstruction projects 
pursued between 2010 and 2013. The previous chapters have answered the question of how 
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reconstruction has happened. They showed the variety of projects undertaken under the umbrella of 
reconstruction activities, especially focussing on the provision of damaged and destroyed housing, 
and determined that these were largely driven by two groups of actors; international organisations, 
donors and NGOs on the one hand, and the municipal authorities on the other. Chapter 6 underlined 
how difficult it is to separate out post-conflict reconstruction activities from ongoing construction 
activities in the post-conflict context, for example, or the competing reconstruction initiatives 
advanced by international organisations and NGOs, and the city municipality, often in the same 
spaces. Instead it suggested that post-conflict reconstruction be viewed as a continuum that moves 
from immediate needs to longer term projects, with different actors taking the lead at different 
points. These actors were demonstrated to employ different approaches to reconstruction, with 
international organisations and NGOs putting into practice some of the principles discussed in 
Chapter 2, such as participatory planning and stakeholder engagement, whilst the municipal 
authorities preferred a more top-down approach, with little to no resident consultation. The 
investigation also showed how these projects had elicited mixed reactions from city residents, often 
divided along ethnic and gender lines, and how one figure - former Mayor Melis Myrzakmatov - 
had captured the narrative of construction in the city to bolster his popularity amongst certain 
constituencies in the city.  
Chapters 7 - 9 explored the complex layered reality of urban change in post-conflict Osh. They 
showed how all three narratives identified in Chapter 4 are relevant in the city. The post-Soviet 
legacy can be seen in the renewed centrality of the Masterplan in urban planning (a direct holdover 
from the Soviet era (Stanilov 2007)), the city’s layout and dilapidated khrushevki apartment blocks, 
and the strong memories being kept alive by non elite actors in elements of the cityscape such as the 
former factory buildings that litter the city centre. The ethnic divide emerged time and again in 
discussions about housing type, access to public space, and the construction of monuments, to name 
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but a few. And the city’s identity as a ‘Southern Capital’ was repeatedly raised by respondents keen 
to underline its unique identity, long history and important role in modern and ancient Kyrgyzstan. 
These chapter also suggested other useful ways of thinking about Osh, for example as a gendered 
city, or a place where the role of religion is increasingly being negotiated through its public spaces. 
Above all, these chapters revealed Osh to be a place which was deeply affected by the Events, but 
not defined by this alone. The city’s streets, parks, markets and monuments are both site and subject 
of processes of negotiation and contestation regarding the ethnic, gender, generational, regional and 
religious identities of contemporary Osh. 
10.3 An over-determined commemorative landscape 
At the very beginning of this investigation the question was posed what can an understanding of 
collective memory reveal about post-conflict urban change in Osh and the way that this is impacting 
residents? The answer, as has been repeatedly demonstrated over the previous chapters, is a great 
deal. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, social groups use buildings and other elements of 
the built environment as frameworks of remembering (Halbwachs 1952), because the perceived 
solidity of the built environment lends a sense of solidity and timelessness to the memories being 
expressed there (Connerton 1989). This investigation of post-conflict Osh supports this assertion; 
the urban landscape is saturated with commemorative narratives of the Events and much else 
besides. This is occurring from both the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives. The 2010 - 2013 
period witnessed clear attempts by elite actors to inscribe their own commemorative narrative in the 
cityscape (what Schudson (1997:3) termed the “self-consciously framed acts of commemoration”), 
for example through the construction of monuments and introduction of the pointedly Kyrgyz 
tunduk motif in renovated public spaces.  These three years also saw much memory work from the 
bottom-up, as non-elites used the so-called “ordinary places where memory erupts” (Atkinson 2007: 
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521) to make concrete their own narratives of memory. Take the Uzbek men who used their 
memories of the bazaar in the past to highlight how they increasingly felt excluded from public 
space in the city since June 2010, or the myriad places in the city where residents recalled the June 
Events - pointedly not using the official monuments to the violence.  
Just as Irwin-Zarecka  (2007) predicted, though, the most interesting insights have come when 
bottom-up and top-down narratives have sought to use the same “touchstones” to solidify and 
transmit, or to erase, memories. When this occurs, these sites become over-determined by their 
commemorative meanings, flashpoints in an already tense context. In Osh one such space is the 
mahalla. As Liu (2012) has shown, and this investigation has borne out, mahalla neighbourhoods 
play a specific role in enabling Uzbek ways of life within a Kyrgyzstani city. These neighbourhoods 
bear witness to the continued historical presence of an Uzbek community at the heart of Osh. Uzbek 
respondents in this research repeatedly underlined what the mahallas represented to them - as “the 
house of my father, and his father before him” (IV37, U), a way of living well suited to “our nation, 
our people” (IV22, E), and a defining characteristic of Osh as a city (Field notes 24/04/13, 
04/05/13). In short, the mahalla was the framework through which the memory of what it was to be 
an Osh Uzbek could be transmitted and concretised. In contrast, it was the mahallas’ very role as a 
marker of Uzbek memory and identity that made it so problematic to other respondents. Commonly 
depicted as sites of criminality (IV24, IV17) and danger (IV15, IV18), and classified as unsanitary 
and old-fashioned in municipal documents such as The Renaissance of Osh, the mahallas recalled 
above all historical presence of Uzbeks at the heart of the city. At a time when the Myrzakmatov led 
elites were trying to construct an exclusively Kyrgyz ethno-national identity for the city this space - 
and the memories it embodied - disrupted the process, and became one of the things that would 
need to be forgotten in the process of forming a new identity. As Renan famously noted, the process 
of forgetting is just as important as the process of remembering when it comes to the interplay of 
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memory and identity (Bhabha 1990). In Osh this forgetting could be facilitated through the 
replacement of mahalla neighbourhoods with housing more readily identified as Kyrgyz, but the 
importance of the mahallas in Uzbek frameworks of memory and identity means that this process 
would likely be highly contested, and deeply distressing for the communities living there. Similarly, 
the city’s urban fabric is being used to facilitate the forgetting of Osh’s Soviet heritage, as these 
buildings are repurposed, removed or neglected, cutting adrift a generation of Soviet educated 
citizens from these important elements of their frameworks of identity and memory. 
10.4 Undertaking an “archeology of power” in Osh 
Interrogating collective memory in the post-conflict city sheds light on places where 
commemorative saturation of the urban landscape can explain the tensions that arose around 
proposed and real changes there. It also helps to lay bare the built environment’s relationship with 
power.  Just as Hirst (2005) predicted in Chapter 2, elements of the built environment across Osh 
have been deployed as part of multiple discourses of power, that occurred at different scales, and 
often in the same place. For example, Chapter 7 showed how the system of patriarchal power used 
buildings and spaces in the city to restrict young women to certain types of public space they read 
as safely accessible (the bazaar - even though many young women would like to change its form, 
and certain cafes, streets and parks), as opposed to the many spaces that they feel are “not 
convenient” (IV51, E) or prone to unpleasant street harassment (IV49). Within the mahalla, the 
built environment also helped to regulate the lives of women. This occurred, for example, through 
the mutual surveillance of these close knit communities (where “everyone knows your business, 
what you’re wearing, where you’ve been” (Field notes 04/05/13)), and through the huge amount of 
house work expected of housewives there, which made some female respondents ruefully admit 
they might enjoy the “modern conveniences” of an apartment home (IV34, U; Field notes 
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14/04/13). Similarly, the use of heroic Kyrgyz monuments and traditional Kyrgyz decorative 
patterns in the urban fabric, along with proposals to destroy ethnically identified mahalla housing 
discussed above, formed part of a discourse of power that privileged ethnic Kyrgyz identity over 
others in the city. This discourse used the built environment to shore up the “insecure nationalism” 
of the young Kyrgyz state (Megoran 2011), both by promoting Kyrgyz identity and by writing out 
the memory that other ethnicities also found their home there (What Bevan (2006) has previously 
termed “cultural cleansing” of the built environment (25)).  
What is perhaps most intriguing is that the same spaces and buildings are being simultaneously used 
in several discourses of power. For example, the post-2010 monuments not only serve to reinforce 
the construction of ethnic Kyrgyz identity in space, they also form part of the discourse of 
patriarchal power. Their content is both gendered, focussing on strong male warriors with women 
only appearing in the role of weeping mothers, and ethnicised, writing out Uzbek, Soviet and other 
experiences from the cityscape. Similarly, the young women discussed in Chapter 8 were been keen 
to remake the bazaar in a more ‘modern’ and welcoming form - using this space to push back 
against the patriarchal order that restricted their ability to fully enjoy many other public spaces. 
However, in seeking to challenge patriarchal power through the bazaar (what McDowell (1999; 
160) termed “consumption as partial liberation”) these young women are simultaneously 
reinforcing the patriarchal order which casts women as consumers rather than producers, assigning 
them once again to the private sphere. It is for this precise reason, then, that Mitchell has 
characterised explorations of collective memory in the urban environment as an “archeology of 
power” (Mitchell 2003; 446). 
Although these processes are at constantly at play in Osh and other cities, the post-conflict moment 
makes them perhaps easier to observe and unpack. As shall be discussed below, the urban 
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environment is in flux at this point - decidedly not a blank slate (Clarke et al 2010), but presenting a 
fleeting opportunity to intervene in the cityscape with more haste and more resources than would 
usually be possible (Amartunga and Haigh 2011).  As such different actors converge in the city, 
each with their own motivations and power structures that they wish to use the rebuilt environment 
to advance there. This was certainly the case in Osh, where the cast of stakeholders looking to 
participate in the city’s reconstruction after 2010 was wide - bringing together local, national and 
international actors, donor governments and municipal authorities, and city residents from a huge 
variety of backgrounds - all of whom had specific ideas about how the urban fabric of Osh should 
be rebuilt and, as we shall see below, with what ultimate goal. 
Looking beyond what collective memory has revealed about changes in Osh, sections 10.3 and 10.4 
above also underline the value of taking this into account when planning and undertaking post-
conflict (or post-crisis) reconstruction projects more generally. Chapter 2 brought to the fore the 
views of a number of theorists - notably Esther Charlesworth and Scott Bollens, for example - who 
insisted on a nuanced vision of reconstruction, one that acknowledged the political potential of 
these activities and identified the wide variety of motivations competing to drive such a process. 
This investigation throws further weight behind this viewpoint - one cannot understand former 
Mayor Myrzakmatov’s personalisation of reconstruction actives in the city, or UN led attempts to 
‘ground’ the Uzbek community by rebuilding homes in the city centre, as anything but political. 
Considering collective memory takes this insight one step further. As discussed above, considering 
collective memory sheds light on previously obscured power relations embodied in reconstruction 
projects. In Osh this has meant showing how the construction of monuments, shelters and parks has 
formed part of a struggle to define the commemorative narrative and landscape of the city. Applied 
elsewhere such an approach has the potential to reveal the hidden power relations embedded in 
proposed reconstruction projects, moving away from a reductive view of reconstruction as a 
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technocratic undertaking and towards a more holistic, and effective, understanding. This 
investigation has also demonstrated how interrogating the links between collective memory and the 
built environment enables researchers to give voice to the experiences of non-elite stakeholders. 
Most literature explored in Chapter 2 focussed on post-conflict reconstruction as an element of the 
liberal peace building architecture, typically led by the UN or NGOs. Considering collective 
memory encourages a wider interpretation of this process, one that places the memories and 
experiences of non-elite actors at the heart of considerations.  
This investigation has amply demonstrated the diverse ways that Osh’s urban landscape is 
inextricably bound up with questions of power, identity and memory, the range of spaces this occurs 
in, and how this can lead to tension, or to the double exclusion of some groups, when a space in the 
built environment becomes over-determined with meaning and memory or when it is deployed as 
part of a discourse of power. It argues for the extension of a collective memory approach to other 
cases of post-conflict reconstruction, which would benefit from the insight this generates. Clearly, 
in this context interventions in the city’s fabric can never be simply technocratic or neutral, then. 
So, to return to the second research question that began this investigation, how should we 
characterise reconstruction in Osh since 2010? 
10.5 Characterising reconstruction in the city 
Of course, as is so often the case, the answer to this question is a complicated one. In reality the 
data presented in this thesis provides evidence to support all three motivations described in the 
introduction to this chapter.  
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Looking at the interventions funded or carried out by international organisations and NGOs, there is 
a clear normative slant to the projects they advanced in post-conflict Osh. As well as providing 
much needed shelter to affected populations, these projects specifically sought to counter the 
damage done to the city’s conditions for diversity by the 2010 violence. Respondents from NGOs 
and international organisations underlined what they called the “protection” element of these 
projects and the vital role they would play in “grounding” the embattled Uzbek community in  the 
city (IV56). Other respondents raised concerns about the increasing popularity of ethnic Kyrgyz 
imagery in new monuments, parks and street furniture (IV09), and expressed worry that certain 
previously diverse public spaces were becoming mono-ethnic as a result (IV07). Donors opposed 
Mayor Myrzakmatov’s plans to rebuild apartment blocks in place of destroyed houses after the 
Events (IV56, IV14), supporting the construction of low rise private homes instead, echoing the 
ethnicised view of housing discussed in Chapter 9. NGOs were concerned about the timing of 
reconstruction projects, and keen to ensure both Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities received the same 
attention in the reconstruction period (IV61). The shelter cluster, tasked with providing immediate 
and longer term accommodation for residents of seriously damaged homes, involved these 
stakeholders in discussions around the design and implementation of the reconstruction project to 
ensure it met their needs (IV11).  
Taken together these actions reveal a marked preference for those actions that reconstructed or 
protected conditions for diversity in the city (the presence of mahalla style housing, public spaces 
that are comfortably accessible to all ethnic groups, ensuring minority voices were heard in the 
reconstruction process), and a sensitivity to the idea that this plurality was under threat. ‘Building 
back better’ in this case meant rebuilding a city where Uzbeks, and other national minorities, would 
still have a secure place despite the violence of the June Events. This is no real surprise given that 
these stakeholders are acting within the pervasive wider framework of liberal peace building 
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discussed in Chapter 2, which as Richmond reminds us is closely associated “with humanitarian 
intervention, with security sector reform (and DDR ), with institution building, good governance, 18
democratisation, rule of law programming, human rights, reconstruction, development, and free 
market reform” (Richmond 2012; 5). 
In contrast, the approach favoured by the Myrzakmatov-led administration seems designed to do 
just the opposite and continue to reduce the qualities of and conditions for diversity in the urban 
environment, a process that this thesis argues began in the Events. The previous section recalled 
how Myrzakmatov oversaw a process of Kyrgyzification of space in the city. By acknowledging 
ethnic Kyrgyz identity in spatial interventions (but not Uzbek or Russian, for example) an 
exclusionary, mono-ethnic identity was increasingly built in the city. This took place through the 
erection of imposing monuments at key entrances to Osh, the use of symbolic imagery such as the 
tunduk on buildings, fences and park benches, and traditional Kyrgyz patterns on lights and painted 
on walls. The Peace Bell monument was inscribed with a message in English, Kyrgyz and Russian, 
but not Uzbek (the only recent intervention in the urban landscape to acknowledge Uzbek identity 
was the ‘Mothers’ Tears’ statue - a very passive and non-threatening vision of Uzbek identity. At the 
same time, the the municipal authorities repeatedly expressed strong support in their post-conflict 
reconstruction and city master planning activities for the replacement of symbolic mahalla 
neighbourhoods (so central to the identity and lifestyle of the Uzbek community as discussed 
above) with new high rise apartment blocks or parks. 
This all points to a conscious remaking of the city as an exclusively Kyrgyz space - a process which 
is also underway in Bishkek, where there has long been a large Russian population, for example 
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 DDR stands for “Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration”, a key concept in peace 18
building practice and literature.
through the replacement of Russian street names with Kyrgyz ones. If the June violence was the 
first step in diminishing plurality in Osh in favour of the titular nationality (and the targeting of 
Uzbek homes, businesses, educational establishments and cultural centres suggests that this was one 
aim of the violence), then the actions of Myrzakmatov’s municipality appear intended  to continue 
this process through other means. But what was the motivation behind this? Was it simply a case of 
crass nationalism designed to reward Myrzakmatov’s core constituency, in line with the neo-
patrimonialism and patronage that so often characterises Kyrgyz politics (Morozova 2010, Collins 
2002)? Certainly this has been intimated by some international observers (for example, see the 
International Crisis Group’s 2012 report “Kyrgyzstan: Widening ethnic divisions in the South”), and 
the same fear was expressed by a great many respondents during this research, especially those 
from national minority groups.  
However, it is possible to see this in another way. Recounting an interview with the then Mayor in 
2011, Megoran reveals that Myrzakmatov saw the Kyrgyzification of Osh as a necessary step in 
building peace in the city, explaining “‘By building statues of Barsbek, of Manas, we are 
strengthening the Kyrgyz state and thereby are guarding the peace between the peoples.’” (Megoran 
2012; 25). According to this logic, the Events were caused by disunity (or at its most extreme, 
Uzbek separatism) and the best guarantor of a peaceful city was a strong Kyrgyz identity that all 
groups in the city would subscribe to (Megoran 2012). Interventions to suppress expressions of 
Uzbek identity in the built environment and bolster symbolically Kyrgyz ones were therefore 
intended to impose one unifying identity that would combat the dangerous disunity that reached its 
apogee in the violence of the Events. To Myrzakmatov this was ‘building back better’. The 
approach favoured by the international community was by extension viewed as dangerously 
destabilising, since it supported the existence of plural identities in the city (Chatham House 2013). 
Understanding the reconstruction tactics on international actors and NGOs, and the Myrzakmatov 
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led administration, as belonging to two quite different traditions of post-conflict peace building 
interventions, however, certainly helps to make clear why the two have clashed in the cityscape of 
Osh. 
Not all of the changes in the post-conflict environment in Osh can be attributed to these two groups 
of actors, however. Osh residents have also played an important role in setting the tone for city 
development since 2010. As seen in Chapter 7, and discussed above, young women expressed their 
hopes for change in the bazaar in a way that was quite different to the narratives proposed by either 
the internationally backed reconstruction efforts or the municipal authorities. Similarly, Chapter 9 
showed that residents did not necessarily see their housing options as split between the two 
ethnicised options of mahalla or apartment block. In fact, several spoke excitedly about the 
opportunity to live in one of the new neighbourhoods of detached houses being built in areas such 
as Ak Tilek in the west of Osh. Moreover, the different commemorative narratives being grounded in 
the cityscape from the bottom-up interacted in complex ways with the intentions of the top-down 
reconstruction efforts - sometimes supporting them (many ethnic Kyrgyz residents were highly 
supportive of Myrzakmatov’s work in the city, for example), and sometimes resisting them (as is the 
case with the older generation’s refusal to accept official silence about the city’s Soviet industrial 
past, or the places that non-elite memories of the Events are remembered, as discussed in Chapter 
8).  
When seen from the bottom-up, it is impossible to characterise urban change in Osh as either 
reducing or safeguarding plurality. It is, however, quite possible to see this as a process of re-
arranging plurality, the outcome of which is not yet clear. Different groups of residents tried to 
capture (or constrain) the momentum of (re)construction in the post-Events period in a way that 
would best serve them, that would bring the re-made city into the service of their own discourses of 
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power. This process also reflects the re-ordering of social memory that so often takes place after a 
traumatic event such as the Events, as social groups seek to inscribe the experience into their 
communal narrative in a constructive manner (Bell 2003).  
Widening the focus from Osh to post-conflict reconstruction more generally, an important lesson 
has emerged from this consideration of the motivations of different stakeholders active in the 
reconstruction process. The range of actors and motivations that competed in the remaking of Osh’s 
urban space described above paints a picture of reconstruction that is far messier than the literature 
often allows for. As mentioned in section 10.4, writing on physical post-conflict reconstruction most 
often (though not exclusively) focusses on the actions of the UN, NGOs and donors. In contrast, 
one key observation of this study has been the complex, even messy, nature of urban reconstruction 
in practice. Osh’s rebuilding has involved a range of actors, contrasting - sometimes conflicting - 
motivations, differing time frames, blurred lines between what constituted reconstruction and 
‘normal’ city development activities, and contrasting views on how best to involve communities in 
planning. Taking all of these into account makes the challenge of building back better even more 
complicated, to be sure, but it would also allow for a better understanding of potential controversies 
and unintended consequences in the reconstruction process. Rather than being shocked by the 
‘roadblocks’ thrown up by a figure such as Myrzakmatov, practitioners and policy makers would be 
better prepared to understand why some stakeholders might oppose their initiatives and how this 
could be addressed earlier. 
10.6 Conclusion: ‘Building back better’ for whom? 
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This thesis has succeeded in illustrating how reconstruction was carried out in Osh following the 
2010 violence, how this process was perceived by local residents and the way in which former 
Mayor Myrzakmatov captured the narrative of reconstruction to shore up his popularity with many 
city residents. It has demonstrated how this reconstruction can simultaneously be characterised as 
safeguarding diversity, intended to reduce diversity, and  attempting to reinscribe a new vision if 
diversity in the city, depending on which projects and actors one considers. Finally, it has shown 
how a consideration of the relationship between collective memory and urban space can provide 
vital insights into the power relations being built into Osh’s landscape, and explain how some 
spaces - over-determined with memory - have come to be flashpoints in the changing city. These 
findings have resonance outside Osh. This investigation supports those theorists of post-conflict 
reconstruction who underline the political nature of such an undertaking. It emphasises the potential 
of collective memory to uncover hitherto hidden power relations in the (re)built environment and 
ensure non-elite experiences feed into the reconstruction process. The case of Osh has shown the 
deep complexity of the post-conflict reconstruction process - the actors involved, the timeline and 
the approach to urban planning, for example. This thesis argues that taking into account this 
complexity at the beginning of other reconstruction projects has the potential to  make these more 
effective and responsive to the needs of the places and communities being rebuilt. 
One important question remains, however; what do all these changes mean for the people of Osh? 
This investigation has repeatedly shown how central the bricks and mortar of the city are to the 
identity and sense of security of its residents. From the mahalla neighbourhoods, to the bazaar to 
the monuments and informal commemorative spaces through the city, there is an important and 
highly emotional connection between people and place in the city. Residents described Osh as their 
“motherland” (IV15, E), declared their love for it (IV21, IV41) and told of the generations of their 
family who had made it their home (IV40, IV37) and dropped “the blood from our belly button” 
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there (IV23, R). However, the counterpoint to this emotive and often passionate attachment to the 
city revealed a more distressing reality. Many residents - notably those from minority communities 
and an older, disempowered generation brought up under Soviet rule - expressed deep anguish at 
what they perceived as their increasingly precarious place in the city. Responding to recent changes 
in Osh, these residents described themselves as “refugees in our own city” (IV21, E), people with 
“no future” in Osh (IV46, R), which had become somewhere “we all dream of leaving” (IV01, E). 
The place that had been so important to forming and sustaining these residents’ identities and 
memories, then, had become threatening and closed to them. The municipality’s approach to urban 
development can be strongly linked to this. The mode of reconstruction discussed above, which 
seeks to rebuild a specifically Kyrgyz identity in the city, is increasingly excluding these groups 
from Osh.  
Even though, as discussed above, some reconstruction efforts in Osh have also focussed on 
preserving the city’s historic diversity, or remaking this in a new image, it is the municipality’s 
efforts that appear to be bringing about the greatest effects on people there. This is perhaps 
unsurprising - the international community’s activities were winding down and moving on to the 
next emergency even as this research was taking place, and such a crisis response was never 
designed with a long term presence in mind. Similarly, whilst the young women interviewed in this 
investigation were passionate about their hopes of carving out space for themselves in the city, they 
scarcely possess the economic and social capital to make this happen. In contrast, even with the fall 
of former Mayor Myrzakmatov, the municipal authorities retain the interest, presence and authority 
(although perhaps not the money) to pursue their plans for the city’s development. This paints a 
bleak picture for Osh’s most precarious communities. Even without a recurrence of the overt 
violence of 2010, the places that hold their memories and identities, that prove their history and 
continued presence in the city, look likely to continue to be eroded as city development proceeds 
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further. This leaves a large portion of Osh residents stranded; increasingly cut off from the 
frameworks of memory and identity that had sustained them for so many years, unable to 
comfortably access large parts of the city in the ways they once did, but unable - or unwilling - to 
go elsewhere. As one resident of a home slated for destruction in the next round of street widening 
put it when I asked if she would leave the city “We would stay here, of course we would stay here, 
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Age Gender Profession Ethnicity Date & 
Location
IV01 Group interview (6 
people)





IV02 Group interview (6 
people)
Female Students Kyrgyz 08/05/13 
Osh
IV03 Group interview (10 
people)






IV04 Aziz Male Taxi driver Uzbek 13/05/13 
Osh
IV15 Aigerim Female Student Kyrgyz 29/05/13 
Osh
IV16 Azamat Male Unemployed Kyrgyz 17/04/13 
Osh
IV17 Begimay Female Student Kyrgyz 20/05/13 
Osh








IV20 Adilet Male Student Kyrgyz 25/04/13 
Osh
IV21 Zarif Male Accountant Uzbek 08/05/13 
Osh
IV22 Shavkat and Otajon Male Teachers Uzbek 18/05/13 
Osh
IV23 Chingiz Male Retired Kyrgyz 27/05/13 
Osh
IV24 Omurbek Male Scientist Kyrgyz 06/06/13 
Osh
IV25 Tolkun Male Businessman Kyrgyz 29/05/13 
Osh








IV28 Feruza Female Teacher Uzbek 16/03/13 
Osh
IV29 Dinara Female NGO worker Uzbek 15/03/13 
Osh
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IV30 Street interview 
(Monueva Street)
Male Unemployed Uzbek 15/05/13 
Osh
IV31 Street interview 
(Monueva Street)




IV32 Street interview 
(Monueva Street)
Female Uzbek 15/05/13 
Osh
IV33 Street interview 
(Monueva Street)
Female Housewife Uzbek 15/05/13 
Osh
IV34 Street interview 
(Monueva Street)
Female Housewife Uzbek 15/05/13 
Osh
IV35 Street interview 
(Mahalla)
Female Housewife Uzbek 21/05/13 
Osh
IV36 Street interview 
(Mahalla)
Female Housewife Uzbek 21/05/13 
Osh
IV37 Street interview 
(Mahalla)
Male Uzbek 21/05/13 
Osh
IV38 Street interview 
(Mahalla)
Female Housewife Uzbek 21/05/13 
Osh
IV39 Street interview 
(Mahalla)
Female Uzbek 21/05/13 
Osh
IV40 Alisher Male Taxi driver Uzbek 18/05/13 
Osh
IV41 Kanykey Female Teacher Kyrgyz 05/06/13 
Osh
IV42 Street interview 
(KhBK)
Female Kyrgyz 27/05/13 
Osh
IV43 Street interview 
(KhBK)
Female Street vendor Kyrgyz 27/05/13 
Osh
IV44 Street interview 
(KhBK)
Female Kyrgyz 27/05/13 
Osh
IV45 Street interview 
(KhBK)
Male Student Kyrgyz 27/05/13 
Osh
IV46 Male Taxi driver Uzbek 26/04/13 
Osh
IV47 Male Taxi driver Russian 20/04/13 
Osh
IV48 Male Taxi driver Kyrgyz 12/05/13 
Osh
IV49 Katya Female Unemployed 22/04/13 
Osh
IV50 Almazbek Male Security Guard Kyrgyz 18/04/13 
Osh




Name (pseudonym) Organisation type Date & Location
IV05 International organisation 14/03/13 Osh
IV06 International organisation 29/03/13 Osh
IV07 International organisation 09/04/13 Osh
IV08 Non-governmental organisation 
(international)
25/04/13 Osh
IV09 Non-governmental organisation 
(international)
08/04/13 Osh
IV10 Non-governmental organisation (local) 17/04/13 Osh
IV11 International organisation 31/03/13 Osh
IV12 Academic 22/04/13 Osh
IV13 Local government 20/04/13 Osh
IV14 Meder State Directorate for Reconstruction and 
Development 
12/04/13 Osh
IV52 Jamila Non-governmental organisation (local) 10/06/13 Osh
IV53 Non-governmental organisation 
(international)
04/07/12 Bishkek
IV54 Donor Government 10/07/12 Bishkek
IV55 International organisation 17/07/12 Bishkek
IV56 International organisation 18/07/12 Bishkek
IV57 Academic 19/07/12 Bishkek
IV58 Non-governmental organisation 
(international)
20/07/12 Bishkek
IV59 Academic 07/08/12 Bishkek
IV60 Non-governmental organisation 
(international)
22/08/12 Bishkek
IV61 Non-governmental organisation 
(international)
24/08/12 Osh
IV62 International organisation 24/08/12 Osh
IV63 International organisation 24/08/12 Osh
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